15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Pingree v. Triple T Foods, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Estate of Pingree v. Triple T Foods, Inc., 430 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1237 (D.Kan.2006); Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 261, cmt. c. 2011See Estate of Pingree v. Triple T Foods, Inc. , 430 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1237 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc.green2 sentences1972In Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191 , 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951), we recognized the historical limitation of the assumption of risk doctrine to cases arising out of a master-servant or some other contractual relationship. 1972In Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191 , 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951), we recognized the historical limitation of the assumption of risk doctrine to cases arising out of a master-servant or some other contractual relationship. | 1 | 2 |
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smithgreen1 sentence2025Fordham, 171 P.3d at 28 We have not previously considered whether to adopt a public-safety officer’s rule. 87 In 1996, the issue was presented to us in Juhl v. Airington, but we did not reach it. 88 Justice Gonzalez, joined by Justice Abbott, wrote separately to advocate for adopting the rule consistent with the “trend in other jurisdictions to extend the Rule beyond premises liability based on public policy.” 89 We do so now, 417 (Wilkins, C.J., concurring in part) (“[A]s states have abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine as part of the evolution of comparative negligence, so too have cour | 1 | 1 |
Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickensgreen1 sentence2025Fordham, 171 P.3d at 28 We have not previously considered whether to adopt a public-safety officer’s rule. 87 In 1996, the issue was presented to us in Juhl v. Airington, but we did not reach it. 88 Justice Gonzalez, joined by Justice Abbott, wrote separately to advocate for adopting the rule consistent with the “trend in other jurisdictions to extend the Rule beyond premises liability based on public policy.” 89 We do so now, 417 (Wilkins, C.J., concurring in part) (“[A]s states have abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine as part of the evolution of comparative negligence, so too have cour | 1 | 1 |
Randy Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P.green1 sentence2025Fordham, 171 P.3d at 28 We have not previously considered whether to adopt a public-safety officer’s rule. 87 In 1996, the issue was presented to us in Juhl v. Airington, but we did not reach it. 88 Justice Gonzalez, joined by Justice Abbott, wrote separately to advocate for adopting the rule consistent with the “trend in other jurisdictions to extend the Rule beyond premises liability based on public policy.” 89 We do so now, 417 (Wilkins, C.J., concurring in part) (“[A]s states have abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine as part of the evolution of comparative negligence, so too have cour | 1 | 1 |
Pantalone v. Talcottgreen1 sentence2014See Pantalone, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (holding that a fact issue existed, requiring a jury to determine the application of the doctrine of assumption of risk, when a defendant snowmobile driver violated section 25.03 by speeding). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Fashauer, Jr. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Incgreen1 sentence2012See Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1279 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that when the employee is given a specific order—that is, where he or she is told to perform a specific task in a particular way "he is not contributorily negligent; rather his conduct falls under the abolished doctrine of assumption of risk."). | 1 | 1 |
Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'ngreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1 |
Moreno v. Marrsgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1 |
Steelman v. Lindgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. Sloangreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1 |
Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc.green2 sentences1997See, e.g., Watters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen’s Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant’s conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass’n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Ford Motor Companygreen2 sentences1976However, that person's "knowledge" of the risk was undisputed and the holding was based upon a finding that the voluntary encounter of the known and appreciated risk was "reasonable." This insertion of an "unreasonability" element into the assumption of risk doctrine was expressly disapproved in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974). 1976However, that person’s “knowledge” of . the risk was undisputed and the holding was based upon a finding that the voluntary encounter of the known and appreciated risk was “reasonable.” This insertion of an “unreasonability” element into the assumption of risk doctrine was expressly disapproved in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974). | 1 | 1 |
Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.red2 sentences1976Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 379 (Tex.1963). 1976Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., supra. Sometimes, however, that person may know such facts as to be charged with knowledge of the danger. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farley v. MM Cattle Company
green
2 sentences2011With the adoption of [cjomparative negligence, the defense of contributory negligence and the defense of “Assumption of Risk” were both merged with comparative negligence and those defenses were abolished in Texas as confirmed in Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.1975), [sic] See also Chapter 33 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code as Amended, 1995. 1993Farley v. M M Cattle Co. , 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975). | 3 | 1993–2011 |
Fordham v. Oldroyd
green
1 sentence2025Fordham, 171 P.3d at 28 We have not previously considered whether to adopt a public-safety officer’s rule. 87 In 1996, the issue was presented to us in Juhl v. Airington, but we did not reach it. 88 Justice Gonzalez, joined by Justice Abbott, wrote separately to advocate for adopting the rule consistent with the “trend in other jurisdictions to extend the Rule beyond premises liability based on public policy.” 89 We do so now, 417 (Wilkins, C.J., concurring in part) (“[A]s states have abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine as part of the evolution of comparative negligence, so too have cour | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell
green
2 sentences2016Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 168 , 127 S.Ct. 799 , 166 L.Ed.2d 638 (2007) (“In Gottshall we ‘cataloged’ the ways in which FELA expressly departed from the common law: It abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, prohibited employers from contracting around the Act, and abolished the assumption of risk defense.”). 2016Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 168 , 127 S.Ct. 799 , 166 L.Ed.2d 638 (2007) (“In Gottshall we ‘cataloged’ the ways in which FELA expressly departed from the common law: It abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, prohibited employers from contracting around the Act, and abolished the assumption of risk defense.”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Connell v. Payne
green
1 sentence2014We further noted that the rationale for abolishing the assumption of risk defense did not apply in express consent cases. 1 Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chrismon v. Brown
green
1 sentence2013Chrismon v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 102 , 111 n. 9 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ("[T]here is a meaningful distinction between implied assumption of the risk — an affirmative defense that applies even if the defendant is negligent — and the inherent-risk doctrine, which is not an affirmative defense but a legal standard for determining whether a sports participant owes a duty at all.”). 39 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Crouch
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Crouch v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Graham v. Colon
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., Watters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen’s Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant’s conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass’n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( 1997See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609, 612 (1977) (holding that police officer summoned to party who suffered injuries while attempting to arrest drunken minor could not recover because he assumed risk); Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 490-92 (La.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that Firemen's Rule bars only ordinary negligence actions based on assumption of risk and allowing police officer investigating chemical leak to recover when defendant's conduct was wanton); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805 , 49 N.W.2d 707, 709-10 (1951) ( | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rhoads v. Service MacHine Company
green
2 sentences1976Rhoads v. Service Machine Co., 329 F.Supp. 367 (E.D.Ark.1971). 1976Rhoads v. Service Machine Go., 329 F.Supp. 367 (E.D.Ark.1971). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Hillman-Kelley v. Pittman
green
2 sentences1976See: Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 91; Hillman-Kelley v. Pittman, supra, 489 S.W.2d at 693 , and J. & W. 1976See: Henderson at 91 ; Hillman-Kelley v. Pittman, supra, 489 S.W.2d at 693 , and J. & W. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
A. L. Messick and Wife, Elma Messick v. General Motors Corporation
green
2 sentences1976The injured person was warned of the risk, but was held not to have assumed that risk, in Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972). 1976The injured person was warned of the risk, but was held not to have assumed that risk, in Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ellis v. Moore
green
2 sentences1976Ellis v. Moore, supra. Again, the test is subjective. 1976Ellis v. Moore, supra. Again, the test is subjective. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Marshall v. Ranne
green
2 sentences1974Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.1974); Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 201 , 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951); Biscayne Texas Properties v. Miner, 502 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Noel: Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 126 (1972). 1974Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.1974); Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 201 , 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951); Biscayne Texas Properties v. Miner, 502 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Noel: Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 126 (1972). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Biscayne Texas Properties v. Miner
neutral
2 sentences1974Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.1974); Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 201 , 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951); Biscayne Texas Properties v. Miner, 502 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Noel: Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 126 (1972). 1974Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.1974); Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 201 , 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951); Biscayne Texas Properties v. Miner, 502 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Noel: Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 126 (1972). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.