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9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valley Properties, Inc. v. King's Department Stores of Tewksbury, Inc.green2 sentences2005Accord Valley Prop., Inc. v. King's Dep't Stores of Tewksbury, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 92, 95 (D.Mass.1981) (restrictive covenants are "necessary inducements to shopping center tenants which facilitate the orderly and harmonious development for commercial use of real property"). 2005Accord Valley Prop., Inc. v. King's Dep't Stores of Tewksbury, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 92, 95 (D.Mass.1981) (restrictive covenants are "necessary inducements to shopping center tenants which facilitate the orderly and harmonious development for commercial use of real property"). | 1 | 1 |
City of Indianapolis v. State Ex Rel. Kennedygreen2 sentences1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). 1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
Small v. BD. OF SAFETY OF MONROEVILLEgreen1 sentence1997The Marshals direct us to Small v. Board of Safety of Monroeville, 513 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), in which we stated generally that, “before a police officer can be terminated or demoted for economic reasons the officer must still be given an opportunity for a hearing.” The Marshals’ reliance on Small is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pfifer v. Town of Edinburgh
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2011More recently, we examined the economic exception and explained that the crucial distinction is that of person-directed and position-directed personnel actions. *845 Pfifer, 684 N.E.2d at 582 . | 2 | 2002–2011 |
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
green
2 sentences1990If the regulation does not bear a substantial relation to the legitimate ends sought to be achieved, either through a failure of the statute as a whole to serve those ends or as applied to a particular piece of property, then the exercise of the police power is deemed to be unreasonable. * * * * * * The economic inquiry of the second prong of the test has its roots in Justice Holmes’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal [v. Mahon], 260 U.S. 393 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 [1922], which is generally regarded as the seed from which all modern regulatory taking cases have grown. 1990If the regulation does not bear a substantial relation to the legitimate ends sought to be achieved, either through a failure of the statute as a whole to serve those ends or as applied to a particular piece of property, then the exercise of the police power is deemed to be unreasonable. * * * * * * The economic inquiry of the second prong of the test has its roots in Justice Holmes’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal [v. Mahon], 260 U.S. 393 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 [1922], which is generally regarded as the seed from which all modern regulatory taking cases have grown. | 2 | 1989–1990 |
In Re Gateway Ethanol, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2011Following the Gateway court, it “decline[d] to apply a laundry list of factors identified by other courts [and instead focused] on the economic factors of the Lease.” 9 Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Atkins v. Klute
green
2 sentences1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). 1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
MILLS CASTOR v. City of Winchester
green
2 sentences1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). 1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State Ex Rel. Miecznikowski v. City of Hammond
green
1 sentence1997See generally, City of Indianapolis v. Kennedy, 224 Ind. 600 , 70 N.E.2d 635 (1947); State v. City of Hammond, 448 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1983); Atkins v. Klute, 169 Ind.App. 206 , 346 N.E.2d 759 (1976); Mills v. City of Winchester, 130 Ind.App. 397 , 162 N.E.2d 97 (1959). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Reves v. Ernst & Young
green
2 sentences1996However, the focus of this factor is whether an objective investing public would reasonably expect the instrument to be protected by the securities law, “even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are not ‘securities’ as used in that transaction.” Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 , 110 S.Ct. at 952 . 1996However, the focus of this factor is whether an objective investing public would reasonably expect the instrument to be protected by the securities law, “even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are not ‘securities’ as used in that transaction.” Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 , 110 S.Ct. at 952 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Shira v. State ex rel. Ham
green
2 sentences1987The economic exception was first articulated in Indiana, in Shira v. State, et al. (1918), 187 Ind. 441, 444-445 , 119 N.E. 833 , 834 where the Court held: “This rule [of no dismissal without statutory cause and proper notice] is subject to the exception, however, that the membership of the police department may be reduced for economic reasons, and a dismissal on that ground does not violate the rights of the officer. 1987The economic exception was first articulated in Indiana, in Shira v. State, et al. (1918), 187 Ind. 441, 444-445 , 119 N.E. 833 , 834 where the Court held: “This rule [of no dismissal without statutory cause and proper notice] is subject to the exception, however, that the membership of the police department may be reduced for economic reasons, and a dismissal on that ground does not violate the rights of the officer. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.