Howard claim in Indiana

2025See, e.g., Amalfitano, 956 N.E.2d at 212 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find the defendant’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor); Wells, 836 N.E.2d at 479-80 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the defendant had charges dismissed and the evidence against the defendant was such that his decision to plead guilty was a pragmatic decision).

2025See, e.g., Amalfitano, 956 N.E.2d at 212 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find the defendant’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor); Wells, 836 N.E.2d at 479-80 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the defendant had charges dismissed and the evidence against the defendant was such that his decision to plead guilty was a pragmatic decision).

2020See Whitfield v. State, 699 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (stating an argument raised for the first time on appeal will not be 3 Howard argues that his motion to dismiss the Habitual Offender Enhancement should have been granted because the lack of a proper initial hearing precluded him from pleading guilty at the pre-trial conference and prejudiced him.

2019See Gaby v. State , 949 N.E.2d 870 , 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to amend the charging information one week before trial to correct an error in the date of an alleged molestation offense because such "did not deprive [the] defendant of" his defense of challenging the victim's recollection of the alleged offense).

2018See Hise v. State, 452 N.E.2d 913 (Ind. 1983) (holding that prospective juror’s comment that she could not presume the defendant to be innocent because she knew the defendant too well did not place the defendant in grave peril and thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial); Stroud v. State, 450 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1983) (holding that prospective juror’s comment that she could not hear the case fairly and impartially because her daughters knew the defendant and she feared for their safety did not relate to any substantive facts or evidentiary matters

2013Moreover, “[a]fter a filing deadline has elapsed, a party is not permitted to amend a petition to cure its procedural defects.” *132 Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind.2006).

2009Id. at 469 (footnote omitted). 5 .

2007Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind.1999).

2006See Abner v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (Ind.1985) (rejecting claim that defendant was *470 denied right of confrontation by admission of discovery deposition into evidence where forty pages of a 124-page deposition were devoted to defense counsel’s examination of witness).

2004See id. at 183 . *965 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) no fundamental error occurred when C.C., a minor victim of child molestation, was allowed to testify prior to the trial court determining her competency to testify; (2) the State did not violate Howard's right of confrontation by presenting C.C.'s deposition testimony to the jury after the trial court declared her to be unavailable; (8) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Howard's request to introduce evidence which wo