statutory construction principle in Pennsylvania

2014See Independent Oil and Gas Association of Pennsylvania v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Fayette County, 572 Pa. 240, 247-248 , 814 A.2d 184 (2002) (under the statutory construction doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of specific items in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters not so included); McClellan, 546 Pa. at 472-473 , 686 A.2d at 805-806 (“It is widely accepted that general expressions such as ‘including, but not limited to’ that precede a specific list of included items should not be construed in their widest context, but apply only to persons or

2014See Independent Oil and Gas Association of Pennsylvania v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Fayette County, 572 Pa. 240, 247-248 , 814 A.2d 184 (2002) (under the statutory construction doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of specific items in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters not so included); McClellan, 546 Pa. at 472-473 , 686 A.2d at 805-806 (“It is widely accepted that general expressions such as ‘including, but not limited to’ that precede a specific list of included items should not be construed in their widest context, but apply only to persons or

2016Moreover, pursuant to the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind of class”), where general words follow specific enumerated terms, “the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Shire v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (General Motors), 828 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Independent Oil and Gas Association of Pennsylvania v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Fayette County, 814 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. 2002)).

2016Moreover, pursuant to the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdem gener-is (“of the same kind of class”), where general words follow specific enumerated terms, “the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Shire v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (General Motors), 828 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Independent Oil and Gas Association of Pennsylvania v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Fayette County, 572 Pa. 240 , 814 A.2d 180, 183 (2002)).

2019In the event there is no such express legislative mandate, the second step requires the court ‘to determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail . . . turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule that legislative intent may be determined by a consideration, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular interpretation.’ Hazleton, 778 A.2d at 1210 (quoting Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455 ) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 13 formal complaint with the [Commission], [Complainant] had the burden of establishing that [West Penn] failed to provide . . . reasonable services.” Aronson

2017In the event there is no such express legislative mandate, the second step requires the court ―to determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail . . . . turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule that legislative intent may be determined by a consideration, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular interpretation.‖ Hazleton, supra at 1210 (quoting Ogontz, supra at 455 (citing in turn 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6))) (emphasis omitted).

2018A.S. v. David Eschbach, Jr., Inc., 874 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (Pa. 2005) (applying the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which provides that “the express mention of one meaning 15 in a statute implies the exclusion of other meanings”).

2009A.S. v. Eschbach, 583 Pa. 47, 56 , 874 A.2d 1150, 1156 (2005), our Supreme Court explained that this canon of statutory construction requires courts to “refrain from judicially expanding” a statutory list of persons whose ability to sue a tortfeasor in an automobile accident was limited.

2026In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford T[wp.] v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2017In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford Township v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2026In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford T[wp.] v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2017In entertaining a void-for-vagueness claim, this Court initially focuses on the language of the Ordinance, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), keeping in mind the statutory construction principle that “[u]ncertainties in the interpretation of an ordinance are to be resolved in favor of a construction which renders the ordinance constitutional.” Upper Salford Township v. Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 336 (Pa. 1995).

2019Co. v. Vukman , 621 Pa. 192 , 77 A.3d 547 , 555 (2013) ("[I]n a statutory construction analysis, ... '[t]he word 'or' is defined as a conjunction 'used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives.' ...

2019Co. v. Vukman , 621 Pa. 192 , 77 A.3d 547 , 555 (2013) ("[I]n a statutory construction analysis, ... '[t]he word 'or' is defined as a conjunction 'used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives.' ...

2019In the event there is no such express legislative mandate, the second step requires the court ‘to determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail . . . turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule that legislative intent may be determined by a consideration, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular interpretation.’ Hazleton, 778 A.2d at 1210 (quoting Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455 ) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 13 formal complaint with the [Commission], [Complainant] had the burden of establishing that [West Penn] failed to provide . . . reasonable services.” Aronson

2014In the event there is no such express legislative mandate, the second step requires the court “to determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail ... turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule that legislative intent may be determined 11 In its brief to this Court, SEPTA again does not rely upon, or refer to in any manner, the section of its enabling legislation pertaining to sovereign and official immunity, 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(c)(3). 12 To be clear, we need not, and do not, determine whether SEPTA is properly treated as a Commonwealth agency for all purposes. [J-65-2013] - 11 by

2025It was premised solely on the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 25 upon which the court determined that “because the General Assembly conditioned payment of specific loss benefits on a death 25 “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is the principle that “the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters.” Thompson v. Thompson, 223 A.3d 1272 , 1277 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. 2002)). [J-88-2024] - 36 by cause other than the work injury that it intended to e

2016Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218 (Pa. 2002). 11 See Heltzel, 90 A.3d at 832 (explaining that “a statute should be clear when it establishes the public nature of records.”).7 Accordingly, for the above reasons, we reverse the OOR’s final determination to the extent it concluded that the proposals of the unsuccessful bidders are subject to public disclosure.8 ___________________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge 7 Requestor contends that it is entitled to an award of recoupment of attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation under Section 1304(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S

2021Snyder Brothers, 198 A.3d at 1073 .

2021Snyder Brothers, 198 A.3d at 1073 .

2025Dep’t, 735 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. 1999) (noting the statutory construction principle that “the specific controls the general”). 132 See generally Herold v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 329 A.3d 1159 , 1189 n.22 (Pa. 2025) (discussing the doctrine of liberal construction of remedial legislation); Borough of Youngwood v. Pa. Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 947 A.2d 724, 731 (Pa. 2008) (identifying law at issue as “remedial statute; therefore, any exceptions to its remedial provisions are to be narrowly construed”); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c) (providing that, except for

2023Rather, the Court cited to Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 590 (Pa. 1999), and Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa. Super. 2000).

2023Tax Operations, 892 A.2d 781, 801 (Pa. 2006) (“[W]e reject that part of the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court that established some universal requirement to find a ‘proprietary’ interest based on ownership of assets or sharing in risk in order to meet the independence criterion of the statute.”).

2023Rather, the Court cited to Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 590 (Pa. 1999), and Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa. Super. 2000).

2021In support of its conclusion, the Superior Court cited Commonwealth v. Cianci, 130 A.3d 780, 782 (Pa. Super. 2015), in which the Superior Court concluded — again without conducting a statutory construction analysis — that convictions of REAP and aggravated assault (attempts to cause serious bodily injury) did not merge.

2020Alternatively, assuming, arguendo, that ‘any’ is an ambiguous term, this Court concludes that an analysis of the statutory construction factors do not resolve the ambiguity and that the ambiguity must be construed in favor of SBI. 157 A.3d at 1030-31 (emphasis added).

2020Accordingly, to the extent the rule of lenity is applicable in a statutory construction analysis, it would apply to an interpretation of the Act’s penalty provisions, rather than subsection (a) which is at issue here.14 As Justice Todd recognizes, “‘there is no impropriety in putting a literal construction on a penal clause, and a liberal construction on a remedial clause in the same statute.’” Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 5, quoting Verona v. Schenley Farms Co., 167 A. 317, 320 (Pa. 1933) (internal quotations omitted).