statutory construction analysis in Texas

2019See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 901 (Tex. 2000) (recognizing “the traditional statutory construction principle that the more specific statute controls over the more general”); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.026(b) (“If the conflict between the general provision and the special or local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.”). 6 court abuses its discretion by dispensing with a jury tri

2018See id. (quoting "the traditional statutory construction principle that the more specific statute controls over the more general" from Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld , 34 S.W.3d 887 , 901 (Tex. 2000) ).

2013The goal of a statutory construction analysis is to “effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legisla tors who enacted the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2013The goal of a statutory construction analysis is to "effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation." Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim.

2004Coop. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co. , 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 2003).

2004Coop. v. Midlothian Butane Gas Co., 111 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex.2003).

2003See Meritor Auto., Inc., 44 S.W.3d at 90 .

2003See Meritor Auto., Inc., 44 S.W.3d at 90 .

2024See Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. Texas Ass’n 10 of Health Plans, 598 S.W.3d 417 , 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.) (explaining sovereign immunity does not bar UDJA claim when it raises “a constitutional challenge to the statute, not a statutory construction claim”); see also Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 77 (Tex. 2015). 5 Westmoreland’s UDJA claims, insofar as they are asserted as part of his counterclaims, are barred by sovereign immunity and the trial court should have granted the plea and dismissed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2020See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 , 75–76 (Tex. 2015) (reaffirming rule that “sovereign immunity is inapplicable when a suit challenges the constitutionality of a statute and seeks only equitable relief”).

2016See generally Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring) (rule of lenity requires courts to adopt less harsh interpretation of penal statutes).

2016See generally Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. Crim.

2015Finally, the Johnsons argue that Randy has a justiciable interest sufficient to confer standing, based on In re C.T.H., 112 S.W.3d 262, 265-66 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2003, no pet.).

2007Finally, the Johnsons argue that Randy has a justiciable interest sufficient to confer standing, based on In re C.T.H., 112 S.W.3d 262, 265-66 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet.).

2024See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620 . 6 CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s partial denial of the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction as to Westmoreland’s counterclaims and render judgment granting the plea as to Westmoreland’s remaining counterclaims. __________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice 5 Westmoreland contends that because his counterclaims constitute “affirmative relief” beyond those raised by the Commission, his UDJA claims should remain viable under BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990).

2016Sefzik, in contrast, did not expressly consider whether a claim to construe a statute waived sovereign immunity, and instead reaffirmed that a claim challenging agency action cannot overcome sovereign immunity. 355 S.W.3d at 620 , 621 n.2.5 Further, if Sefzik had held that sovereign immunity barred all claims seeking construction of a statute under the UDJA, Sefzik would overrule Leeper, as Leeper solely addressed a statutory construction claim (and thus formed the singular basis to exercise jurisdiction).

2025See Springer v. Johnson, 280 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (“[W]hen the law makes a general provision, apparently for all classes, and a special provision for a particular class, the general must yield to the special insofar as the particular class is concerned.”); Ramos v. State, 928 S.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Tex. App.—Houston 1996, pet. ref’d). 22 D.

2025See Springer v. Johnson, 280 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (“[W]hen the law makes a general provision, apparently for all classes, and a special provision for a particular class, the general must yield to the special insofar as the particular class is concerned.”); Ramos v. State, 928 S.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Tex. App.—Houston 1996, pet. ref’d). 22 D.

2024See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 620 . 6 CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s partial denial of the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction as to Westmoreland’s counterclaims and render judgment granting the plea as to Westmoreland’s remaining counterclaims. __________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice 5 Westmoreland contends that because his counterclaims constitute “affirmative relief” beyond those raised by the Commission, his UDJA claims should remain viable under BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990).

2018Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997 S.W.2d 265, 273-74 (Tex. 1999) (discussing the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).

2016See BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 1719182 at *3 .

2016See BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 1719182 at *2 ; PlainsCapital, 459 S.W.3d at 556 ; Bates, 406 S.W.3d at 544 .

2015Specifically, the plurality stressed that history’s role in the statutory- construction analysis because “‘[t]he endeavor should be made, by tracing the history of legislation on the subject, to ascertain the uniform and consistent 37 purpose of the legislature, or to discover how the policy of the legislature with reference to the subject matter has been changed or modified from time to time.’” Id. at 872 (quoting Rathbun v. State, 280 N.W. 35, 43 (Mich. 1938)).

2015SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENT The Second Court of Appeals correctly adopted the statutory construction analysis performed by the Houston Court of Appeals in Lumpkin v. State, 129 S.W. 3d 659, 663 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2004, pet. ref’d).

2002See Banr, 562 S.W.2d at 849 ; Finían, 27 S.W.3d at 228 .