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31 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Knolls Condominium Ass'n v. Harmsgreen2 sentences2014See Knolls, 202 Ill. 2d at 459 . 2014See Knolls, 202 Ill. 2d at 459 . | 3 | 3 |
In Re Application of County Collectorgreen2 sentences2006In re Application of the County Collector, 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72 (1989). 2006In re Application of the County Collector, 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72 (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc.green2 sentences2005See Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc., 295 Ill. 2005See Holzer v. Motorola Lighting, Inc. , 295 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000Ed. 2d at 319-24, 331 , 119 S. Ct. at 1219-22, 1228 (in determining whether the federal caij acting statute, which increased the maximum punishment of 15 years where either “serious bodily injury” or “death” resulted from the offense, constituted a single offense or three distinct crimes, the Court turned to statutory interpretation to ascertain Congress’s intent and specifically relied on the statutory construction principle of constitutional doubt to construe the statute as establishing three separate offenses; the Court further considered whether the facts of “serious bodily injury” and “de 2000Ed. at 319-24, 331, 119 S. Ct. at 1219-22, 1228 (in determining whether the federal carjacking statute, which increased the maximum punishment of 15 years where either "serious bodily injury" or "death" resulted from the offense, constituted a single offense or three distinct crimes, the Court turned to statutory interpretation to ascertain Congress' intent and specifically relied on the statutory construction principle of constitutional doubt to construe the statute as establishing three separate offenses; the Court further considered whether the facts of "serious bodily injury" and "death" h | 2 | 2 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United Statesred2 sentences2000Ed. at 319-24, 331, 119 S. Ct. at 1219-22, 1228 (in determining whether the federal carjacking statute, which increased the maximum punishment of 15 years where either "serious bodily injury" or "death" resulted from the offense, constituted a single offense or three distinct crimes, the Court turned to statutory interpretation to ascertain Congress' intent and specifically relied on the statutory construction principle of constitutional doubt to construe the statute as establishing three separate offenses; the Court further considered whether the facts of "serious bodily injury" and "death" h 2000Ed. at 319-24, 331, 119 S. Ct. at 1219-22, 1228 (in determining whether the federal carjacking statute, which increased the maximum punishment of 15 years where either "serious bodily injury" or "death" resulted from the offense, constituted a single offense or three distinct crimes, the Court turned to statutory interpretation to ascertain Congress' intent and specifically relied on the statutory construction principle of constitutional doubt to construe the statute as establishing three separate offenses; the Court further considered whether the facts of "serious bodily injury" and "death" h | 2 | 2 |
In Interest of CRgreen2 sentences1999See In re C.R., 221 Ill. 1999See In re C.R., 221 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridgegreen2 sentences2011Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill.2d 141, 153 , 227 Ill.Dec. 753 , 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997). 2011Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Lawrence M.green1 sentence2026Courts should not, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Sean A., 349 Ill. App. 3d 964, 970 (2004). 8 Thus, “[i]t is clear that our supreme court has held that a trial court has broad authority at a temporary custody hearing to control the custody of a minor and the services given to him or his parents, even if the DCFS has been granted temporary custody of the minor.” Id. at 971 (citing In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408 , 419-20 (2001)); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 530 (1996). ¶ 2 | 1 | 1 |
In re Sean A.green2 sentences2026Courts should not, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Sean A., 349 Ill. App. 3d 964, 970 (2004). 8 Thus, “[i]t is clear that our supreme court has held that a trial court has broad authority at a temporary custody hearing to control the custody of a minor and the services given to him or his parents, even if the DCFS has been granted temporary custody of the minor.” Id. at 971 (citing In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408 , 419-20 (2001)); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 530 (1996). ¶ 2 2026Courts should not, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Sean A., 349 Ill. App. 3d 964, 970 (2004). 8 Thus, “[i]t is clear that our supreme court has held that a trial court has broad authority at a temporary custody hearing to control the custody of a minor and the services given to him or his parents, even if the DCFS has been granted temporary custody of the minor.” Id. at 971 (citing In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408 , 419-20 (2001)); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 530 (1996). ¶ 2 | 1 | 1 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marinered1 sentence2013See Sprietsma, 197 Ill. 2d at 119 . ¶ 57 Plaintiff, however, argues that the Farm Fresh decision is unreasonable and leads to an absurd result where notice under the direct notice exception is treated differently than notice under the central filing exception. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maggettegreen2 sentences2003People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 350 , 747 N.E.2d 339, 347 (2001). 2003People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 350 , 747 N.E.2d 339, 347 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Van's Material Co. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1998Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131 Ill. 2d 196, 201 , 545 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1989). 1998Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131 Ill. 2d 196, 201 , 545 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eads v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003The appellate court applied this statutory construction principle. 325 Ill. 2003The appellate court applied this statutory construction principle. 325 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority
green
2 sentences2002App. 3d 793 , 594 N.E.2d 1334 (1992) , plaintiffs argue that the statutory construction rule of expressio unis est exclusio alterius applies, pursuant to which a court may find that when certain things are listed or specified in a statute, the legislative intent to exclude all other things from the statute’s operation may be inferred. 2002App. 3d 793 , 594 N.E.2d 1334 (1992), plaintiffs argue that the statutory construction rule of expressio unis est exclusio alterius applies, pursuant to which a court may find that when certain things are listed or specified in a statute, the legislative intent to exclude all other things from the statute’s operation may be inferred. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton
green
2 sentences1999Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389 , 475 N.E.2d 536 (1985); Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wagner, 286 Ill. 1999Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389 , 475 N.E.2d 536 (1985); Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wagner, 286 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. McCarthy
green
1 sentence2025The defendant, however, asks this court to undergo a statutory construction analysis and find that the plain language of section 8-4(c)(1)(E) encompasses different situations on a case-by-case basis depending on the factual circumstances of the offense at issue, and as such, would apply to longstanding relationships comparable to that of husband and wife. ¶ 31 We decline to do so as we find the reasoning in People v. McCarthy, 132 Ill. 2d 331 (1989), instructive on this issue. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Farm Credit Midsouth, Pca, Formerly Known as Eastern Arkansas Production Credit Association v. Farm Fresh Catfish Company
green
1 sentence2013Farm Fresh, 371 F.3d at 454 . ¶ 56 We find the statutory construction analysis undertaken by the Eighth Circuit to be sound. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mazur v. Quarters Designs, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009Mazur, 248 Ill. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist.
green
1 sentence2009“The purpose of a section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation.” Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359 , 367 (2003). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Eads v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003The majority briefly acknowledges and agrees with the appellate court's conclusion that the Act should apply because it is more specifically applicable to plaintiff's cause of action than section 2-622. 203 Ill.2d at 102-03, 272 Ill.Dec. at 590-91 , 787 N.E.2d at 776-77 . 2003The majority briefly acknowledges and agrees with the appellate court's conclusion that the Act should apply because it is more specifically applicable to plaintiff's cause of action than section 2-622. 203 Ill.2d at 102-03, 272 Ill.Dec. at 590-91 , 787 N.E.2d at 776-77 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wagner
green
1 sentence1999Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389 , 475 N.E.2d 536 (1985); Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wagner, 286 Ill. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Monahan v. Village of Hinsdale
green
1 sentence1996Monahan v. Village of Hinsdale, 210 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission
green
1 sentence1995(See Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 24, 52 .) The collector contends that the Debt Reform Act was intended to allow taxing districts a degree of timing flexibility in the sale and issuance of bonds so that they might financially benefit by obtaining lower interest rates. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lunde v. Rockford Public Library Board
green
1 sentence1992(See Lunde v. Rockford Public Library Board (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809-10 .) We agree that application of that rule to section 1(c) of the Act leads to the inference that the legislature did not intend to make municipal corporations subject to the Act. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co.
green
2 sentences1986(Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432 , 328 N.E.2d 318 .) We find no plausible reason why this doctrine should not be applied here, where a specific listing follows a general reference to glazed doors. 1986(Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432 , 328 N.E.2d 318 .) We find no plausible reason why this doctrine should not be applied here, where a specific listing follows a general reference to glazed doors. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Village of Schaumburg v. Franberg
green
1 sentence1986App. 3d 1 , 424 N.E.2d 1239 .) Under the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdem generis, when general words, such as “including others” or “among others,” follow the enumeration of several specific classes of things or persons, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those specifically enumerated. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Bartkus v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1984Ed. 2d 684 , 79 S. Ct. 676 .) The State employs the statutory construction rule that identical or similar terms appearing in different sections of the same statute should be given a consistent meaning. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.