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6 Colorado opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sorrendinogreen1 sentence2013Welfare, 26 A.3d 1251, 1258 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2011) (construing the unqualified term "disability" as encompassing both temporary and permanent disability). 22 Because we can "not read into a statute an exception, limitation, or qualifier that its plain language does not suggest, warrant, or mandate," People v. Sorrendino, 37 P.3d 501, 504 (Colo.App.2001), we conclude that an injured officer is entitled to a maximum of one year disability leave at full salary, without regard to the temporary or permanent nature of his or her disability. | 1 | 1 |
McWreath v. Department of Public Welfaregreen1 sentence2013Welfare, 26 A.3d 1251, 1258 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2011) (construing the unqualified term "disability" as encompassing both temporary and permanent disability). 22 Because we can "not read into a statute an exception, limitation, or qualifier that its plain language does not suggest, warrant, or mandate," People v. Sorrendino, 37 P.3d 501, 504 (Colo.App.2001), we conclude that an injured officer is entitled to a maximum of one year disability leave at full salary, without regard to the temporary or permanent nature of his or her disability. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Morrisongreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 58 Fed.Appx. 381, 383 (10th Cir.2003) (pipe device was "a loaded makeshift firearm known as a 'zip gun' "); United States v. Gometz, 879 F.2d 256 , 258 & n. 1 (7th Cir.1989)(inmate attempted to shoot prison guard with "a homemade device commonly known as a zip gun"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beckgreen1 sentence2009See generally People v. Beck, 187 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Colo.App.2008)(under the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general term follows a list of things in a statute, the general term{[][is] applied only to those things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned") 2 Unconventional "firearms" of this type would include, for example, zip guns. | 1 | 1 |
Winter v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2008See Winter v. People, 126 P.3d 192, 195 (Colo.2006). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc.green2 sentences2004Further support for these two principles of statutory construction, which dictate that Cunefare's letter be exeluded from the prohibition of our felony forgery statute, comes from the rule of lenity, a statutory construction principle which this Court recently embraced in People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo.2003). 2004Further support for these two principles of statutory construction, which dictate that Cunefare's letter be excluded from the prohibition of our felony forgery statute, comes from the rule of lenity, a statutory construction principle which this Court recently embraced in People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Lunsford v. Western States Life Insurancegreen1 sentence1999See Lunsford v. Western States Life Ins ., 908 P.2d 79 , 84 (Colo. 1995) (stating, "when the legislature speaks with exactitude, we must construe the statute to mean that the inclusion or specification of a particular set of conditions necessarily excludes others"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Randy Gometz
green
1 sentence2009See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 58 Fed.Appx. 381, 383 (10th Cir.2003) (pipe device was "a loaded makeshift firearm known as a 'zip gun' "); United States v. Gometz, 879 F.2d 256 , 258 & n. 1 (7th Cir.1989)(inmate attempted to shoot prison guard with "a homemade device commonly known as a zip gun"). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gooch v. United States
green
2 sentences1992It then determined that “[hjolding an officer to prevent the captor’s arrest is something done with the expectation of benefit to the transgressor” and is encompassed by the broad term “otherwise.” Id. at 128 , 56 S.Ct. at 397 . 12 The Federal Kidnapping Act would appear to support a construction that holding someone to obtain any form of benefit would satisfy the statute’s intent requirement. 1992It then determined that “[hjolding an officer to prevent the captor’s arrest is something done with the expectation of benefit to the transgressor” and is encompassed by the broad term “otherwise.” Id. at 128 , 56 S.Ct. at 397 . 12 The Federal Kidnapping Act would appear to support a construction that holding someone to obtain any form of benefit would satisfy the statute’s intent requirement. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.