statutory construction rule in Ohio

2026Absent an irreconcilable conflict, "the statutory construction rule in R.C. 1.51 does not apply" and "special and general provisions should be construed so as to give effect to both provisions." State v. Knox, 102 Ohio App.3d 147, 149 (9th Dist. 1995); Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. State, 64 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 (1980). {¶ 29} At the outset, we note that although appellant concedes that R.C. 2945.72(E) applies here, he nonetheless challenges the applicability as a general principle of R.C. 2945.72(H).

2024Absent an irreconcilable conflict, "the statutory construction rule in R.C. 1.51 does not apply" and "special and general provisions should be construed so as to give effect to both provisions." State v. Knox, 102 Ohio App.3d 147, 149 (9th Dist. 1995); Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. State, 64 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 (1980). {¶ 18} R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) and 2953.33(A)(3) are not in irreconcilable conflict as to invoke application of R.C. 1.51.

2026Absent an irreconcilable conflict, "the statutory construction rule in R.C. 1.51 does not apply" and "special and general provisions should be construed so as to give effect to both provisions." State v. Knox, 102 Ohio App.3d 147, 149 (9th Dist. 1995); Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. State, 64 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 (1980). {¶ 29} At the outset, we note that although appellant concedes that R.C. 2945.72(E) applies here, he nonetheless challenges the applicability as a general principle of R.C. 2945.72(H).

2024Absent an irreconcilable conflict, "the statutory construction rule in R.C. 1.51 does not apply" and "special and general provisions should be construed so as to give effect to both provisions." State v. Knox, 102 Ohio App.3d 147, 149 (9th Dist. 1995); Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. State, 64 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 (1980). {¶ 18} R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) and 2953.33(A)(3) are not in irreconcilable conflict as to invoke application of R.C. 1.51.

1996See Stow v. Summit Cty. (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 298, 300 , 590 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (holding that the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius dictates that the expression of one or more items of a class implies that those not identified are to be excluded).

1996See Stow v. Summit Cty. (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 298, 300 , 590 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (holding that the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius dictates that the expression of one or more items of a class implies that those not identified are to be excluded).

2023“Further interpretation is necessary only when the statutory language is ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at ¶ 12, 25-26 (after finding a term in a statute to be ambiguous, applying a statutory construction rule to consider other statutes relating to the same general subject matter); see also State v. Arnold, 61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178 , 573 N.E.2d 1079 (1991) (“[w]hile we are required to strictly construe statutes defining criminal penalties against the state, see R.C. 2901.04(A), this ‘rule of lenity’ applies only where there is ambiguity in or conflict between the statutes

2023“Further interpretation is necessary only when the statutory language is ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at ¶ 12, 25-26 (after finding a term in a statute to be ambiguous, applying a statutory construction rule to consider other statutes relating to the same general subject matter); see also State v. Arnold, 61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178 , 573 N.E.2d 1079 (1991) (“[w]hile we are required to strictly construe statutes defining criminal penalties against the state, see R.C. 2901.04(A), this ‘rule of lenity’ applies only where there is ambiguity in or conflict between the statutes

2023“Further interpretation is necessary only when the statutory language is ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at ¶ 12, 25-26 (after finding a term in a statute to be ambiguous, applying a statutory construction rule to consider other statutes relating to the same general subject matter); see also State v. Arnold, 61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178 , 573 N.E.2d 1079 (1991) (“[w]hile we are required to strictly construe statutes defining criminal penalties against the state, see R.C. 2901.04(A), this ‘rule of lenity’ applies only where there is ambiguity in or conflict between the statutes

2023“Further interpretation is necessary only when the statutory language is ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at ¶ 12, 25-26 (after finding a term in a statute to be ambiguous, applying a statutory construction rule to consider other statutes relating to the same general subject matter); see also State v. Arnold, 61 Ohio St.3d 175, 178 , 573 N.E.2d 1079 (1991) (“[w]hile we are required to strictly construe statutes defining criminal penalties against the state, see R.C. 2901.04(A), this ‘rule of lenity’ applies only where there is ambiguity in or conflict between the statutes

2019See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2016-Ohio-8434 , 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8 .

2019See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2016-Ohio-8434 , 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8 .