admission test in Maine

2020We therefore conclude that the spreadsheet is “evidence in the record.” Int’l Paper Co., 1999 ME 135, ¶ 29 , 737 A.2d 1047 . [¶14] The Superior Court appears to have determined otherwise because it interpreted the spreadsheet as a “decision” that the hearing officer was charged with reviewing in some sort of appellate capacity.

2020We therefore conclude that the spreadsheet is “evidence in the record.” Int’l Paper Co., 1999 ME 135, ¶ 29 , 737 A.2d 1047 . [¶14] The Superior Court appears to have determined otherwise because it interpreted the spreadsheet as a “decision” that the hearing officer was charged with reviewing in some sort of appellate capacity.

2018Specifically, the Court held that "[s]ection 2522(3) allows the admission of the test results, in the absence of consent, a warrant, or the existence of probable cause in advance of the test, only if: (1) the State presents evidence gathered after the fact demonstrating that, but for the exigencies at the scene of the collision, probable cause for the test would have been discovered; and (2) the test would have been administered based on the probable cause established by this independent lawfully obtained information." Cormier, 2007 ME 112 , ~ 26.

2007Although the Court upheld as reasonable the blood testing of railroad workers after certain major accidents and the admission of their test results in disciplinary proceedings, see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 611, 633 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , the Court concluded that the public hospital’s policy of drug testing certain pregnant women resulted in unreasonable searches that violated the Fourth Amendment, see Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-86 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 . [¶ 33] The Ferguson hospital policy provided for the testing of a pregnant woman if she met one of nine criteria, which included prior known drug or alcohol

2007Although the Court upheld as reasonable the blood testing of railroad workers after certain major accidents and the admission of their test results in disciplinary proceedings, see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 611, 633 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , the Court concluded that the public hospital’s policy of drug testing certain pregnant women resulted in unreasonable searches that violated the Fourth Amendment, see Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-86 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 . [¶ 33] The Ferguson hospital policy provided for the testing of a pregnant woman if she met one of nine criteria, which included prior known drug or alcohol

2007See 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(3); Bento, 600 A.2d at 1096 . [¶ 27] The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable.

1990In support of his argument, defendant cites In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and its progeny, contending that any ruling that creates a mandatory presumption relieving the State of its burden of proof is a violation of due process.

1990In support of his argument, defendant cites In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and its progeny, contending that any ruling that creates a mandatory presumption relieving the State of its burden of proof is a violation of due process.

1989Defendant’s theory is that the samples were actually exculpatory and that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny even good faith failure to preserve discoverable evidence results in a violation of due process.

1989Defendant’s theory is that the samples were actually exculpatory and that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny even good faith failure to preserve discoverable evidence results in a violation of due process.