admission test in Wisconsin

2006We acknowledge the Doerr holding that results from an unapproved device are inadmissible unless the prosecution presents "evidence of the device's scientific accuracy and reliability and ... compliance with accepted scientific methods as a foundation for the admission of the test results." Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d at 625 .

2003In Doerr, we concluded that, in a trial on a charge other than a motor vehicle violation, admission of a PBT *425 result requires expert testimony to establish "the device's scientific accuracy and reliability and [to] prove compliance with accepted scientific methods as a foundation for the admission of the test results." Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d at 625 .

1982In motions after verdict, Humphrey renewed his objection and moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 809.30(1) (f), Stats., 1 and the court of appeals decision in State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20 , 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).

1982In motions after verdict, Humphrey renewed his objection and moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 809.30(1) (f), Stats., 1 and the court of appeals decision in State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20 , 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).

2010Perez argues that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the first requirement under Wis. Stat. § 804.11 (2) by relying on the quality of the evidence contrary to the admissions rather than on the centrality of the admissions to the issues in the case. 7 Perez argues that the focus of the first requirement under § 804.11(2) is the centrality of the admission to the claim, see Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 238 , and that the supreme court recently stated that the quality of evidence in the record regarding the admissions is irrelevant to whether withdrawal will subserve the presentation o

2010Perez argues that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the first requirement under Wis. Stat. § 804.11 (2) by relying on the quality of the evidence contrary to the admissions rather than on the centrality of the admissions to the issues in the case. 7 Perez argues that the focus of the first requirement under § 804.11(2) is the centrality of the admission to the claim, see Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 238 , and that the supreme court recently stated that the quality of evidence in the record regarding the admissions is irrelevant to whether withdrawal will subserve the presentation o

1981For the moment, the stipulation cases stand only for the proposition that the courts will permit the parties to take a reasonable gamble with an experimental device where all agree, but none will be forced to do so. "104 Oliver was written in terms of Frye's `general acceptance' test, 525 F.2d at 736 , yet its holding was limited to the admission of polygraph results on stipulation.

1981In view of the same court's rejection in United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 , 167 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1975), of a general acceptance test limited only to polygraphers and its refusal to allow the admission of test results absent a stipulation, both of the court's latter statements must be construed as either unintended dicta or as relevant solely in the context of stipulations.

1981In view of the same court’s rejection in United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 , 167 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1975), of a general acceptance test limited only to polygraphers and its refusal to allow the admission of test results absent a stipulation, both of the court’s latter statements must be construed as either unintended dicta or as relevant solely in the context of stipulations.

1967We have held in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 241 , 114 N. W. 2d 466 , and Grunwald v. Halron (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 433 , 147 N. W. 2d 543 , that for an agent’s statement to be admissible against his principal it must have been spoken within the scope of his authority to speak for the principal.

1967We have held in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 241 , 114 N. W. 2d 466 , and Grunwald v. Halron (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 433 , 147 N. W. 2d 543 , that for an agent’s statement to be admissible against his principal it must have been spoken within the scope of his authority to speak for the principal.

1967We have held in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 241 , 114 N. W. 2d 466 , and Grunwald v. Halron (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 433 , 147 N. W. 2d 543 , that for an agent’s statement to be admissible against his principal it must have been spoken within the scope of his authority to speak for the principal.

1967We have held in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 241 , 114 N. W. 2d 466 , and Grunwald v. Halron (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 433 , 147 N. W. 2d 543 , that for an agent’s statement to be admissible against his principal it must have been spoken within the scope of his authority to speak for the principal.

1943In the matter of the admission to the bar of Lavinia Goodell (1875), 39 Wis. 232, 240 , Chief Justice Ryan, speaking for the court, said: “The legislature has, indeed, from time to time, assumed power to prescribe rules for the admission of attorneys to practice.

1905On the whole, in face of the rule that the admission or claim of a person pretending to act as agent for another that he has authority to do so does not tend to prove the agency (Davis v. Henderson, 20 Wis. 520 ; 2 Jones, Evidence, § 359), and the further rule that evidence definite and clear is required to establish agency in respect to real-estate transactions, we cannot discover any reasonable ground in the record before us for holding that Stevenson was respondent’s agent at the time appellant claims to have dealt with him as such.

1884Roche v. Knight, 21 Wis. 324 ; Wicke v. Lake, 21 Wis. 410 ; Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71 .

1884Roche v. Knight, 21 Wis. 324 ; Wicke v. Lake, 21 Wis. 410 ; Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71 .

1884Roche v. Knight, 21 Wis. 324 ; Wicke v. Lake, 21 Wis. 410 ; Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71 .