admission test in Pennsylvania

2026In 2022, our Supreme Court decided Pownall, which revisited its prior holding that, as a categorical matter[,] “the Commonwealth’s right to interlocutory appeals does not extend to appealing the admission of defense evidence.” Cosnek, 836 A.2d at 876 …; see [Matis, … 710 A.2d at 18-19] (allowing Commonwealth to appeal rulings admitting defense evidence would force the accused “to balance his right to a trial without delay with his fundamental right to present evidence”; “[t]he chilling effect of such a choice would give the Commonwealth an unwarranted and unfettered influence over the defense

2025Importantly, “the Commonwealth’s right to interlocutory appeals does not - 10 - J-A21015-25 extend to appealing the admission of defense evidence.” Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 836 A.2d 871, 876 (Pa. 2003).7 As our Supreme Court has stated, “in every case in which we have permitted a Commonwealth appeal as of right, the order appealed from had a tangible or practical effect on the Commonwealth’s actual ability to prosecute its case.” Pownall, 278 A.3d at 901-02 (Pa. 2022) (footnote omitted).

2025See Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818 , 825 n.11 (Pa. 2014) (reiterating that, “[facts] cannot - 12 - J-A29012-24 consist of what one hears on the news” (citation omitted)); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1146 (holding, a judicial decision is not a fact to support the newly-discovered facts exception because “an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law[;] it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events.

2023See Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818 , 825 n.11 (Pa. 2014) (reiterating that “[facts] cannot consist of what one hears on the news”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 , 1146 (Pa. 2020) (holding, a judicial decision is not a fact to support the newly-discovered facts exception because “an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law[;] it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events.

2019Voluntary extra-judicial statements “differ from confessions in that they do not acknowledge all essential elements of a crime, [and] are generally considered to qualify for introduction into evidence under the admission exception to the hearsay rule.” Id.

1989These extrajudicial statements, which differ from confessions in that they do not acknowledge all essential elements of a crime, are generally considered to qualify for introduction into evidence under the admission exception to the hearsay rule. *450 Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463 Pa. 581, 590 , 345 A.2d 671, 676 (1975) (footnote and citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15 , 540 A.2d 246 (1988) (citing Tervalon).

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1986In footnote 5 in this last opinion., the Superior Court partly repeated the views expressed in civil cases that “Attempts to relate back alcohol/blood levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism.” 1 Despite the dicta, no court has held relation back opinions to be per se inadmissible despite language such as “(test results, where test given three hours after accident, may not be extrapolated by expert who will testify as to probable blood alcohol level at time of accident).” Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa. Super. 569, 576 , 486 A.2d 410, 414 (1984).

1986In footnote 5 in this last opinion., the Superior Court partly repeated the views expressed in civil cases that “Attempts to relate back alcohol/blood levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism.” 1 Despite the dicta, no court has held relation back opinions to be per se inadmissible despite language such as “(test results, where test given three hours after accident, may not be extrapolated by expert who will testify as to probable blood alcohol level at time of accident).” Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa. Super. 569, 576 , 486 A.2d 410, 414 (1984).

2026Although in Cosnek[, the Supreme Court] seemed to imply Rule 311(d) is “limit[ed]” to pretrial rulings resulting “in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence[,]” [Cosnek, 836 A.2d] at 877, two years later [the Supreme Court] clarified that statement in Shearer, supra. There, [the Court] explained Cosnek simply “made clear that the application of Rule 311(d) in the suppression context is limited to circumstances in which a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” [Shearer, 882 A.2d at] 467 (internal quotations and ci

2022Although in Cosnek we seemed to imply Rule 311(d) is “limit[ed]” to pretrial rulings resulting “in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence[,]” id. at 877 , two years later we clarified that statement in Shearer, supra. There, we explained Cosnek simply “made clear that the application of Rule 311(d) in the suppression context is limited to circumstances in which a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” 882 A.2d at 467 (internal quotations and citation omitted; emphasis added).

2025Commonwealth v. Kitchen, [ 730 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 1999)].

2015The extrajudicial statements, which differ from confession in that they do not acknowledge all essential elements of a crime, are generally considered to qualify for introduction into evidence under the admission exception to the hearsay rule." Com. v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513, 519-20 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted). 10 Circulated 10/20/2015 11:47 AM Appellant seems to argue, however, that making statements refusing to voluntarily give DNA evidence is akin to a defendant asserting his right against self-incrimination.

2016Duong’s reliance upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 515 A.2d 847 (Pa. 1986), is misplaced.

2008Such an application of the approval requirements is consistent with the clear, unambiguous language of the statute which permits for purposes of trial the introduction of the test results which are conducted on departmentally approved equipment. 515 A.2d at 849-50 (emphasis added).

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

2026See id. at 586 .

2026Id. at 875 . -8- J-S09011-26 However, the Cosnek Court ultimately concluded that “the Commonwealth’s right to file an interlocutory appeal does not extend to appealing the admission of defense evidence.” Id. at 876 (emphasis added).

2026Id. at 875 . -8- J-S09011-26 However, the Cosnek Court ultimately concluded that “the Commonwealth’s right to file an interlocutory appeal does not extend to appealing the admission of defense evidence.” Id. at 876 (emphasis added).

2022In our prior Opinion, we did not reach Appellant’s second question, having concluded that the JSGC Report did not meet the criteria for a newly- discovered fact under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), because there was “no revelation in the JSGC Report of a specific error in Appellant’s case, an admission of such an error by the prosecutor or the District Attorney’s office, nor an admission of a systemic error that necessarily impacted Appellant’s case.” Howard, 249 A.3d at 1239.

2022In our prior Opinion, we did not reach Appellant’s second question, having concluded that the JSGC Report did not meet the criteria for a newly- discovered fact under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), because there was “no revelation in the JSGC Report of a specific error in Appellant’s case, an admission of such an error by the prosecutor or the District Attorney’s office, nor an admission of a systemic error that necessarily impacted Appellant’s case.” Howard, 249 A.3d at 1239 .

2017In this vein, the High Court held that the Commonwealth’s right to interlocutory appeals “does not extend to appealing the admission of defense evidence.” Id. at 876 ; See also Commonwealth v. White, 910 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2006) (clarifying the holding in Cosnak, and applying Rule 311(d) to certain non-evidentiary rulings -5- J-S20011-17 J-S20012-17 terminating or substantially handicapping the Commonwealth’s case); Woodard, supra (citing Cosnak and examining White in finding Rule 311(d) did not apply to denial of motion to consolidate).

2003See Drummond, supra. ¶ 31 Based upon the foregoing, we hold the trial court properly admitted into evidence at trial the results of Appellant’s blood test from Allegheny General Hospital, because this blood draw was conducted for independent medical purposes and the police obtained a properly executed search warrant before requesting the results.

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any