9 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Royse v. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. of North Dakotagreen2 sentences2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc 2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc | 3 | 3 |
Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Whispell, 97 Fed.Cl. at 337 ; Elton Schmidt, 507 N.W.2d at 309 ; Bailey, 691 S.E.2d at 494 ; see also 20 Am. 2015See Whispell , 97 Fed. | 2 | 2 |
Mueller v. Stangelandgreen2 sentences2015This phrase resembles the phrase, “r[e]serves for the State,” contained in the warranty clause in Mueller , which undisputedly constituted a reservation of mineral interests to the State. 340 N.W.2d at 451, 452, 454 . 1999The warranty clause provided: “The Vendor excepts from this Contract all minerals, including oil and gas, and all mineral rights not now owned by the Vendor.” Id. at 452. | 2 | 2 |
Acoma Oil Corp. v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2012Id. at 484. [¶ 13] The Court’s holding in Acoma is succinctly stated in North Dakota Mineral Title Standards 7-05 and 7-05.1 (1989): If a mineral owner who owns a mineral interest subject to an outstanding royalty interest executes a mineral deed (with a warranty clause) to a party conveying mineral acres or “interests in oil, gas and other minerals in and under” without any reference to the outstanding royalty interest, the retained mineral interest of the mineral owner alone bears the outstanding royalty if the interest is large enough to satisfy the royalty interest. [¶ 14] The district cou 2012Id. at 484. [¶13] The Court’s holding in Acoma is succinctly stated in North Dakota Mineral Title Standards 7-05 and 7-05.1 (1989): If a mineral owner who owns a mineral interest subject to an outstanding royalty interest executes a mineral deed (with a warranty clause) to a party conveying mineral acres or “interests in oil, gas and other minerals in and under” without any reference to the outstanding royalty interest, the retained mineral interest of the mineral owner alone bears the outstanding royalty if the interest is large enough to satisfy the royalty interest. [¶14] The district court | 2 | 2 |
Stracka v. Petersongreen1 sentence2015See also Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 581-84 (N.D.1985) (ruling language “subject to the reservation of 50% of all oil or minerals” in special warranty deed was ambiguous and upholding district court finding that the language was intended to be a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests). [¶ 11] Here the disputed language, which appears in the warranty clause, is “but reserving, however, to the grantor fifty per cent (50%) of all of the oil, gas, hydro-carbons and minerals in or with respect to said real property[.]” Johnson argues placement of this lan | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Shield
green
2 sentences2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc 2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Elton Schmidt & Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib
green
1 sentence2015See Whispell, 97 Fed.Cl. at 337 ; Elton Schmidt, 507 N.W.2d at 309 ; Bailey, 691 S.E.2d at 494 ; see also 20 Am. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Kloeckner
green
2 sentences2015Wagner , at ¶ 8. [¶ 8] While the purpose of a granting clause is to define and designate the estate conveyed, exceptions inserted in a warranty clause generally “are intended only to protect the grantor on the warranty and are not intended as a limitation on the nature of the interest conveyed by the granting clause.” Miller v. Kloeckner, 1999 ND 190, ¶ 15 , 600 N.W.2d 881 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 2015Wagner , at ¶ 8. [¶ 8] While the purpose of a granting clause is to define and designate the estate conveyed, exceptions inserted in a warranty clause generally “are intended only to protect the grantor on the warranty and are not intended as a limitation on the nature of the interest conveyed by the granting clause.” Miller v. Kloeckner, 1999 ND 190, ¶ 15 , 600 N.W.2d 881 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bailey v. TOWN OF SALTVILLE
green
1 sentence2015See Whispell, 97 Fed.Cl. at 337 ; Elton Schmidt, 507 N.W.2d at 309 ; Bailey, 691 S.E.2d at 494 ; see also 20 Am. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Seely v. White Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1992The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d, at 18 , 45 Cal.Rptr., at 23 , 403 P.2d, at 151 . * * * * * * “Damage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim. 1992The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d, at 18 , 45 Cal.Rptr., at 23 , 403 P.2d, at 151 . * * * * * * “Damage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.