warranty clause in Texas

2012Ranch, Ltd,., 192 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (citations omitted), The warranty clause does not convey title nor does it determine the character of the title conveyed.

2012Ranch, Ltd. , 192 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (citations omitted), The warranty clause does not convey title nor does it determine the character of the title conveyed.

2008See RepublicBank, 653 S.W.2d at 282 .

2008See RepublicBank , 653 S.W.2d at 282 .

2026The warranty clause does not limit the intent to grant a fee.”); see also Duhig, 144 S.W.2d at 879 (general warranty referred to “‘the said premises,’ meaning the land described in the granting clause”).

1965I have no quarrel with cases cited by the defendants which hold that the warranty clause in a deed warrants the title of the grantee, nor do I question the rule announced in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940), which the defendants say "prohibits the assertion of title in contradiction or breach of warranty." The record in this case simply does not call for a holding that there has been a breach of warranty in the sense that Ivy Lord has denied the representation of ownership of the Martha Lord 162/3 acres conveyed in the 1942 warranty deed by the subsequent a

2005The court compared a DTPA claim with a warranty claim, explaining that "there must be a `personal' aspect in being `duped' that does not pass to subsequent buyers the way a warranty *864 does." Id.

2005The court compared a DTPA claim with a warranty claim, explaining that “there must be a ‘personal’ aspect in being ‘duped’ that does not pass to subsequent buyers the way a warranty does.” Id.

2015The warranty clause does not convey title nor does it determine the character of the title conveyed.” Humber explained that the predecessor to property code section 5.023 “relates to covenants of title which arise out of conveyances and not to collateral covenants such as the suitability of a house for human habitation.” Id. at 556 . –12– But the implied covenant on which Orca relies is a promise that the grantor has not conveyed the property interest to anyone else.

2006Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2026See Hidalgo Cnty., 443 S.W.2d at 85–86 (“In fact the legal description refers to the premises herein conveyed as being a part of the premises conveyed by warranty deed of the grantors’ predecessors in title. . . .

2026In BNSF Railway, the habendum clause allowed “the grantee ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, together with all appurtenances.” 528 S.W.3d at 134 (emphasis in original).

2023See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 796–98 (recognizing that a mineral deed’s subject-to clause that limits a conveyance may be viewed as expressing an intent “to protect a grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when some mineral interest is already outstanding”).

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2023In arguing that the warranty clause demonstrates an intent to convey a fee simple interest to the McNeil Grantees unburdened by the State’s NPRI, the McNeil Group relies on our sister court’s holding in Farm & Ranch for the proposition that “[a] general warranty deed conveys all of the grantor’s interest unless there is language in the instrument that clearly shows an intention to convey a lesser interest.” See Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 12 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus

2018Contractors, Inc. v. Larco Const., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 876 , 887 & n.8 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (noting that caselaw and statutes supported appellee’s assertion of six elements of claims for breach of warranty for services provided); and (2) the Maroneys lacked capacity to bring a claim due to lack of privity of contract and because they suffered 14 purely economic loss, see Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enters., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Civ.

2015See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

2014This is apparent when the parenthetical is read in conjunction with other portions of the Assignment, such as its reference to “the thirty-five sixty-fourths of seven-eighths working interest hereby transferred.” Additionally, the warranty clause provides the fractional interest of the mineral estate underlying Surveys 36 and 37 that is attributable to each of the individual leases. 5 We agree that while all of the information necessary to determine a reduction of the production payment in the event of a lease termination is present within the four corners of the Assignment, there is no expres

2008Church v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. , 694 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2004See The Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (“jurisdictions are divided on the issue ... whether a buyer must also notify the manufacturer in order to sue the manufacturer for breach of warranties.”); Halprin v. Ford Motor Co., 107 N.C.App. 423 , 420 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1992) (“the jurisdictions are split on whether this notice provision of the Code requires notice to the remote manufacturer”).

2004See The Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (“jurisdictions are divided on the issue ... whether a buyer must also notify the manufacturer in order to sue the manufacturer for breach of warranties.”); Halprin v. Ford Motor Co., 107 N.C.App. 423 , 420 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1992) (“the jurisdictions are split on whether this notice provision of the Code requires notice to the remote manufacturer”).

2004See The Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (“jurisdictions are divided on the issue ... whether a buyer must also notify the manufacturer in order to sue the manufacturer for breach of warranties.”); Halprin v. Ford Motor Co., 107 N.C.App. 423 , 420 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1992) (“the jurisdictions are split on whether this notice provision of the Code requires notice to the remote manufacturer”).

1999See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Texas law) ("The negative implication of the warranty requirement that goods be ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used’ is that the goods not be unreasonably dangerous.”); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir.1971) (applying Va. law) (holding that the safety standard is the same under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability theories); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir.1969) (applying Conn, law) ("[T]he ‘defect’ necessary for the imposition o

1999See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Texas law) ("The negative implication of the warranty requirement that goods be ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used’ is that the goods not be unreasonably dangerous.”); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir.1971) (applying Va. law) (holding that the safety standard is the same under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability theories); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir.1969) (applying Conn, law) ("[T]he ‘defect’ necessary for the imposition o

1999Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir.1987) (applying S.C. law) ("I]n order to prevail on a negligence or breach of warranty theory, a plaintiff must prove that 'the product, as designed, was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user....’"); Morgen Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60 , 471 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1996) ("In order to recover under either a negligence or a breach of implied warranty theory [in a products liability case] ... a plaintiff must show ... that the goods were unreasonably dangerous”).

1999See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Texas law) ("The negative implication of the warranty requirement that goods be ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used’ is that the goods not be unreasonably dangerous.”); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir.1971) (applying Va. law) (holding that the safety standard is the same under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability theories); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir.1969) (applying Conn, law) ("[T]he ‘defect’ necessary for the imposition o

1999See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Texas law) ("The negative implication of the warranty requirement that goods be ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used’ is that the goods not be unreasonably dangerous.”); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir.1971) (applying Va. law) (holding that the safety standard is the same under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability theories); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir.1969) (applying Conn, law) ("[T]he ‘defect’ necessary for the imposition o

1999Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir.1987) (applying S.C. law) ("I]n order to prevail on a negligence or breach of warranty theory, a plaintiff must prove that 'the product, as designed, was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user....’"); Morgen Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60 , 471 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1996) ("In order to recover under either a negligence or a breach of implied warranty theory [in a products liability case] ... a plaintiff must show ... that the goods were unreasonably dangerous”).

1999Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir.1987) (applying S.C. law) ("I]n order to prevail on a negligence or breach of warranty theory, a plaintiff must prove that 'the product, as designed, was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user....’"); Morgen Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60 , 471 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1996) ("In order to recover under either a negligence or a breach of implied warranty theory [in a products liability case] ... a plaintiff must show ... that the goods were unreasonably dangerous”).

1996Compare Lewis & Lambert Metal Contractors v. Jackson, 914 S.W.2d 584, 587-88 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1994, writ granted) (holding that employees acquired repairs to employer’s ventilation system by requesting the repairs and then relying on the defendant’s representations that system was repaired and safe). 16 .