warranty claim in Pennsylvania

1989Second, damage to the product is “most naturally understood as a warranty claim.” Id. at 872 , 106 S.Ct. at 2302 .

1989Second, damage to the product is “most naturally understood as a warranty claim.” Id. at 872 , 106 S.Ct. at 2302 .

2022This well-settled principle gives rise to the equally well-established rule that “an action for breach of the [Warranty] requires contractual privity between the parties.” Conway v. Cutler Group, Inc., 99 A.3d 67, 73 (Pa. 2014).[5] The Warranty’s ____________________________________________ 5 In the case sub judice, Appellants’ reliance on Tyus, supra, and Elderkin, supra, in support of their position that Rigante had standing to bring a breach of Warranty claim, as the implied warranty of habitability applies even in the (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A14004-22 mooring to contractual pr

2022This well-settled principle gives rise to the equally well-established rule that “an action for breach of the [Warranty] requires contractual privity between the parties.” Conway v. Cutler Group, Inc., 99 A.3d 67, 73 (Pa. 2014).[5] The Warranty’s ____________________________________________ 5 In the case sub judice, Appellants’ reliance on Tyus, supra, and Elderkin, supra, in support of their position that Rigante had standing to bring a breach of Warranty claim, as the implied warranty of habitability applies even in the (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A14004-22 mooring to contractual pr

2000However, Appellant cannot be equitably estopped from denying the existence of the warranty unless Appellant also “intentionally or through culpable negligence induce[d] [Appellee] to believe certain facts to exist....” See Tallarico, supra at 288 , 228 A.2d at 741 . ¶ 9 Appellant’s expert, John Webster, testified at trial that Appellant paid on a warranty claim for a new engine in February 1996, after the accident and prior to the vehicle’s sale to Appellee.

1989Lewis points out, and we agree, that the discovery rule applicable in personal injury and medical malpractice claims is a doctrine against a limitation defense separate and distinct from the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 2 Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1985).

1988Lee-Strauss Co. v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 403 , 141 A. 236 (1928); Hall’s Safe Company v. Walenk, 42 Pa.Super. 576 (1910).

1988Lee-Strauss Co. v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 403 , 141 A. 236 (1928); Hall’s Safe Company v. Walenk, 42 Pa.Super. 576 (1910).

1988Lee-Strauss Co. v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 403 , 141 A. 236 (1928); Hall’s Safe Company v. Walenk, 42 Pa.Super. 576 (1910).

1987Further, the Aloe court noted the five considerations made by the court in East River, supra, as follows: “(1) When the defective product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those limiting remedies to contract law are strong; (2) damage to the product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim; (3) contract law is well suited to commercial controversies because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements; (4) warranty law sufficiently protects purchasers by allowing them to obtain the benefit of their bargain; and (5) warranty law has a

1979See e. g., cases cited by the Superior Court at 384 A.2d 1240 and Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.App. 458 , 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54 , 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); see Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 11.1 (Rent Abatement).

1979See e. g., cases cited by the Superior Court at 384 A.2d 1240 and Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.App. 458 , 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54 , 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); see Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 11.1 (Rent Abatement).

1971Co., 195 F. 2d 83 (3d Cir. 1952), a warranty clause very similar to that presently before us was considered.

1947This act provided that a policy of life insurance should not be forfeited on account of incorrect statements of the applicant (insured), if such statements were immaterial to the risk and innocently made: Rigly v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 240 Pa. 332 ; Keatley v. Travelers Insurance Co., 187 Pa. 197 .

1947This act provided that a policy of life insurance should not be forfeited on account of incorrect statements of the applicant (insured), if such statements were immaterial to the risk and innocently made: Rigly v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 240 Pa. 332 ; Keatley v. Travelers Insurance Co., 187 Pa. 197 .

1933As it was prepared by or for defendant, its construction, if its meaning is involved in doubt, must be favorable to plaintiff : Coates v. Cotteral, 290 Pa. 237 .