root doctrine in New York

2008(Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d at 813-814 .) On the other hand, such a claim may readily reveal that the root of the challenge is the activity and the decision to carry it out, which inevitably have fiscal consequences.

1990The root of our analysis takes us back to United States v Wade ( 388 US 218 , supra), where the Supreme Court, recognizing that "risks of suggestion attend” pretrial lineups and showups and "increase the dangers inhering in eyewitness identification” (id., at 229), held essentially that identification evidence may be inadmissible unless scrutinized for freedom from suggestiveness.

1990In People v Adams (53 NY2d 241, supra) and People v Riley and People v Rodriguez ( 70 NY2d 523 ), involving civilian showup identifications at a police precinct, we added that evidence of such inherently suggestive pretrial showup identifications had to be suppressed except in exigent circumstances.

1990In People v Adams (53 NY2d 241, supra) and People v Riley and People v Rodriguez ( 70 NY2d 523 ), involving civilian showup identifications at a police precinct, we added that evidence of such inherently suggestive pretrial showup identifications had to be suppressed except in exigent circumstances.

1987In the ordinary case of a freeze-out merger conducted in accordance with the statute, the statutory right of appraisal is, in the absence of a showing of fraud or blatant overreaching, the minority’s exclusive remedy (see, e.g., Green v Santa Fe Indus., 576 F Supp 269 , affd 742 F2d 1434, cert denied 469 US 917 , supra; Stauffer v Standard Brands, 41 Del Ch 7, 187 A2d 78 [1962]).

1987In the ordinary case of a freeze-out merger conducted in accordance with the statute, the statutory right of appraisal is, in the absence of a showing of fraud or blatant overreaching, the minority’s exclusive remedy (see, e.g., Green v Santa Fe Indus., 576 F Supp 269 , affd 742 F2d 1434, cert denied 469 US 917 , supra; Stauffer v Standard Brands, 41 Del Ch 7, 187 A2d 78 [1962]).

1987In the ordinary case of a freeze-out merger conducted in accordance with the statute, the statutory right of appraisal is, in the absence of a showing of fraud or blatant overreaching, the minority’s exclusive remedy (see, e.g., Green v Santa Fe Indus., 576 F Supp 269 , affd 742 F2d 1434, cert denied 469 US 917 , supra; Stauffer v Standard Brands, 41 Del Ch 7, 187 A2d 78 [1962]).

1987At the root of such a claim is the contention that the defendant, by taking advantage of its majority status, has unfairly placed the minority in the position of having to choose between two options — accepting the offer or resorting to statutory appraisal — neither of which it wants (see, Cole v National Cash Credit Assn., supra, 156 A, at 187-188).

1983Sales, 4 NY2d 403 ; Roney v Janis, 77 AD2d 555 ) and to estoppel (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442 , supra; Triple Cities Constr.

1983Since fraud lies at the root of the doctrine (see Mendenhall v Hall, 134 US 554 , supra; 2 James, Mortgages, § 841; see, also, Dorff v Bornstein, 277 NY 236 , supra; Byrnes v Owen, 243 NY 211 , supra) and reliance is a necessary element to proof of fraud (see Channel Master Corp. v Aluminum Ltd.

1983Sales, 4 NY2d 403 ; Roney v Janis, 77 AD2d 555 ) and to estoppel (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442 , supra; Triple Cities Constr.

1982At the root of the rule calling for special inquiry before a defendant may proceed pro se is recognition that implicit in a defendant’s exercise of the right to do so is a concomitant right to forego the advantages of counsel (Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1977There is, of course, no constitutional right to a plea bargain (People v Bullock, 80 Misc 2d 73, 78 ).

1976(Fisher v Tier Oil Co., 40 AD2d 930 ; Hughes v Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Binghamton, 39 AD2d 624 .)” (Ellis v Board of Educ., 46 AD2d 840 .) In the cited Lehigh case (supra, 924), the court said, "We find consistently the reference to 'inordinate’ or 'prolonged’ delays, and it is clear that the actual length of the delay, although not contained as a test in the statute, is an overriding consideration and is at the root of the requirement that the plaintiff justify his case as well as his delay. [Citations.]” The case at bar involves an over-all delay of nearly two years, or of eight months if t

1976(Fisher v Tier Oil Co., 40 AD2d 930 ; Hughes v Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Binghamton, 39 AD2d 624 .)” (Ellis v Board of Educ., 46 AD2d 840 .) In the cited Lehigh case (supra, 924), the court said, "We find consistently the reference to 'inordinate’ or 'prolonged’ delays, and it is clear that the actual length of the delay, although not contained as a test in the statute, is an overriding consideration and is at the root of the requirement that the plaintiff justify his case as well as his delay. [Citations.]” The case at bar involves an over-all delay of nearly two years, or of eight months if t

1976(Fisher v Tier Oil Co., 40 AD2d 930 ; Hughes v Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Binghamton, 39 AD2d 624 .)” (Ellis v Board of Educ., 46 AD2d 840 .) In the cited Lehigh case (supra, 924), the court said, "We find consistently the reference to 'inordinate’ or 'prolonged’ delays, and it is clear that the actual length of the delay, although not contained as a test in the statute, is an overriding consideration and is at the root of the requirement that the plaintiff justify his case as well as his delay. [Citations.]” The case at bar involves an over-all delay of nearly two years, or of eight months if t

1976The comprehensive and oft-cited opinion by (then) Mr. Justice Breitel in Sortino v Fisher ( 20 AD2d 25 ) 4 is helpful with respect to this as well as other aspects of the case.

1874No preliminary settlement of the issues is requisite. ( Colman v. Dixon, 50 N.Y., 572 .) This view of the case is strengthened by the fact that the common-law courts hold that if a tenant in common, or joint *Page 220 tenant or other person who is under a duty to repair, fails to contribute after a demand by a co-tenant or co-obligor, the latter, on incurring the necessary expense, may bring an action on the case to recover the proportionate share of the defaulting party. ( Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass., 575 ; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow., 475 ; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass., 65 .) This action is based on

1874No preliminary settlement of the issues is requisite. ( Colman v. Dixon, 50 N.Y., 572 .) This view of the case is strengthened by the fact that the common-law courts hold that if a tenant in common, or joint *Page 220 tenant or other person who is under a duty to repair, fails to contribute after a demand by a co-tenant or co-obligor, the latter, on incurring the necessary expense, may bring an action on the case to recover the proportionate share of the defaulting party. ( Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass., 575 ; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow., 475 ; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass., 65 .) This action is based on

1874No preliminary settlement of the issues is requisite. ( Colman v. Dixon, 50 N.Y., 572 .) This view of the case is strengthened by the fact that the common-law courts hold that if a tenant in common, or joint *Page 220 tenant or other person who is under a duty to repair, fails to contribute after a demand by a co-tenant or co-obligor, the latter, on incurring the necessary expense, may bring an action on the case to recover the proportionate share of the defaulting party. ( Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass., 575 ; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow., 475 ; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass., 65 .) This action is based on