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10 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boddie v. Connecticutgreen2 sentences1990The root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of a property interest. 2 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 S.Ct. 780, 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). 1990The root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of a property interest. 2 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 S.Ct. 780, 786 , 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). | 1 | 3 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court has “described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. 379 ). 1989Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 , 105 S.Ct. at 1493 , citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 S.Ct. 780 , 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). | 1 | 2 |
Lefkowitz v. Turleygreen2 sentences2015See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 , 83–84, 94 S.Ct. 316 , Clause as being “that an individual be given an opportunity 325–326, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his interest.” 7 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (emphasis in original); © 2015 Thomson Reuters. 2015See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 , 83–84, 94 S.Ct. 316 , Clause as being “that an individual be given an opportunity 325–326, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his interest.” 7 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 , 91 side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (emphasis in original); © 2015 Thomson Reuters. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Packergreen1 sentence2001Standard of Review Clear Abuse of Discretion A writ of mandamus will issue “only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Jacksongreen2 sentences1986In Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), we referred to the need for a hearing prior to a decision involving bail pending appeal as "one of the rudimentary constituents of due process and due course of law." See also Ex parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1982), PDR refused. 1986In Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), we referred to the need for a hearing prior to a decision involving bail pending appeal as “one of the rudimentary constituents of due process and due course of law.” See also Ex parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982), PDR refused. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Williamsgreen2 sentences1986In Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), we referred to the need for a hearing prior to a decision involving bail pending appeal as "one of the rudimentary constituents of due process and due course of law." See also Ex parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1982), PDR refused. 1986In Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), we referred to the need for a hearing prior to a decision involving bail pending appeal as “one of the rudimentary constituents of due process and due course of law.” See also Ex parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982), PDR refused. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015In In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.App. - Tyler 2001, no pet.), the Tyler Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Brown & Root’s motion to strike, withdraw or amend its deemed admissions, and that Brown & Root lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Deitrick v. Greaney
green
2 sentences1993“It is the ‘evil tendency’ of the acts to contravene the policy governing banking transactions which lies at the root of the rule.” D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 459 , 62 S.Ct. at 680 (citing Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 , 60 S.Ct. 480, 484 , 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940)). 1993“It is the ‘evil tendency’ of the acts to contravene the policy governing banking transactions which lies at the root of the rule.” D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 459 , 62 S.Ct. at 680 (citing Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 , 60 S.Ct. 480, 484 , 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
green
2 sentences1993“It is the ‘evil tendency’ of the acts to contravene the policy governing banking transactions which lies at the root of the rule.” D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 459 , 62 S.Ct. at 680 (citing Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 , 60 S.Ct. 480, 484 , 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940)). 1993“It is the ‘evil tendency’ of the acts to contravene the policy governing banking transactions which lies at the root of the rule.” D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 459 , 62 S.Ct. at 680 (citing Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 , 60 S.Ct. 480, 484 , 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Nacogdoches County v. Fore
green
1 sentence1984Rust and Salvucci also maintain that the summary judgments barring Justice’s claims against them bar Brown & Root’s claim for contribution and indemnity, relying on Nacogdoches County v. Fore, 655 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1983, no writ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, Inc.
green
2 sentences1975City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, 158 Tex. 318 , 311 S.W.2d 218 (1958). 1975City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, 158 Tex. 318 , 311 S.W.2d 218 (1958). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.