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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Skelly v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F 2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F | 1 | 1 |
Beaudreau v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F 2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Bursongreen2 sentences2011We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’ [Fn. omitted.] Boddie v. Connecticut[, supra,] 401 U.S. 371 , 379 . . . (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 ] (1971).” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ].) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under al 2011We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’ [Fn. omitted.] Boddie v. Connecticut[, supra,] 401 U.S. 371 , 379 . . . (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 ] (1971).” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ].) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under al | 1 | 1 |
Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F 2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F | 1 | 1 |
Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculturegreen2 sentences2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F 2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F | 1 | 1 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences2011We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’ [Fn. omitted.] Boddie v. Connecticut[, supra,] 401 U.S. 371 , 379 . . . (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 ] (1971).” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ].) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under al 2011We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’ [Fn. omitted.] Boddie v. Connecticut[, supra,] 401 U.S. 371 , 379 . . . (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 ] (1971).” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ].) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under al | 1 | 1 |
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Districtgreen2 sentences1995It survives only in the vestigial principle that if the government acted "reasonably" in the design, construction, or operation of a flood control project, or of other public improvements which increase the flow of surface water into a natural watercourse, it may be immune from liability for resulting flood damage. ( Locklin v. City of Lafayette, supra, 7 Cal.4th 327, 367 ; Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 565-566 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].) [6] I pass no judgment on whether the result of Patel v. U.S., supra, 823 F. Supp. 696 , was right or wro 1995It survives only in the vestigial principle that if the government acted "reasonably" in the design, construction, or operation of a flood control project, or of other public improvements which increase the flow of surface water into a natural watercourse, it may be immune from liability for resulting flood damage. ( Locklin v. City of Lafayette, supra, 7 Cal.4th 327, 367 ; Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 565-566 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].) [6] I pass no judgment on whether the result of Patel v. U.S., supra, 823 F. Supp. 696 , was right or wro | 1 | 1 |
Albers v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995(Id. at p. 305; see Albers v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 62 Cal.2d 250, 262 .) But modem recognition that inverse condemnation liability is not limited by common law principles has led to further limitation of this “flood control” exception. 1995The root of the exception was that the government, like a private riparian owner at common law, had the right to confine surface waters within their natural channels without liability for resulting flood damage to adjacent lands. ( Id. at p. 305; see Albers v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 62 Cal.2d 250, 262 .) But modern recognition that inverse condemnation liability is not limited by common law principles has led to further limitation of this "flood control" exception. | 1 | 1 |
Holloway v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica 1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2011Co., supra, 339 U.S. at p. 314 .) “ ‘We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a deprivation of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires some form of notice and a hearing.’ ” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53 , 562 P.2d 1302 ], quoting Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 535 P.2d 713 ].) “Normally notice and an opportunity for a hearing must precede even a temporary deprivation of a property interest.” (Menefee & Son v. Department of F | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Boddie v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence2011We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’ [Fn. omitted.] Boddie v. Connecticut[, supra,] 401 U.S. 371 , 379 . . . (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 ] (1971).” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 ].) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under al | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Lang
green
2 sentences2003Ineffective assistance of counsel It is settled that the failure to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial does not, in and of itself, render a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang) ; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) As we observed in Lang , "To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount 2003Ineffective assistance of counsel It is settled that the failure to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial does not, in and of itself, render a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang) ; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) As we observed in Lang , "To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Bloom
green
2 sentences2003Ineffective assistance of counsel It is settled that the failure to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial does not, in and of itself, render a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang) ; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) As we observed in Lang , "To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount 2003Ineffective assistance of counsel It is settled that the failure to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial does not, in and of itself, render a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang) ; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) As we observed in Lang , "To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Patel v. United States
green
2 sentences1995It survives only in the vestigial principle that if the government acted "reasonably" in the design, construction, or operation of a flood control project, or of other public improvements which increase the flow of surface water into a natural watercourse, it may be immune from liability for resulting flood damage. ( Locklin v. City of Lafayette, supra, 7 Cal.4th 327, 367 ; Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 565-566 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].) [6] I pass no judgment on whether the result of Patel v. U.S., supra, 823 F. Supp. 696 , was right or wro 1995It survives only in the vestigial principle that if the government acted "reasonably" in the design, construction, or operation of a flood control project, or of other public improvements which increase the flow of surface water into a natural watercourse, it may be immune from liability for resulting flood damage. ( Locklin v. City of Lafayette, supra, 7 Cal.4th 327, 367 ; Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 565-566 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].) [6] I pass no judgment on whether the result of Patel v. U.S., supra, 823 F. Supp. 696 , was right or wro | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Locklin v. City of Lafayette
green
1 sentence1995It survives only in the vestigial principle that if the government acted "reasonably" in the design, construction, or operation of a flood control project, or of other public improvements which increase the flow of surface water into a natural watercourse, it may be immune from liability for resulting flood damage. ( Locklin v. City of Lafayette, supra, 7 Cal.4th 327, 367 ; Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 565-566 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ].) [6] I pass no judgment on whether the result of Patel v. U.S., supra, 823 F. Supp. 696 , was right or wro | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence1992In our view, both of these conclusions are born of the root error of failing to grasp the conceptual impact of Wardair, supra, 477 U.S. 1, on dormant foreign commerce clause doctrine. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Fox v. Shapiro
green
2 sentences1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica 1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Brazile
green
2 sentences1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica 1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica | 1 | 1980–1980 |
American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co.
green
1 sentence1980Nevertheless, the division suggested is an appropriate vehicle to address the issues presented, and we follow it. 8 See Fox v. Shapiro (1975) 84 Misc.2d 223 [ 375 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 ]; State v. Brazile (1956) 231 La. 90 [ 90 So.2d 789, 790 ]; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 435 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 ], 9 See: In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust, supra, 470 F.2d 495 (New York firm associated Hawaiian firm that proved to have a conflict; latter, not former, disqualified); American Can Company v. Citrus Feed Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1125 (new partners of vica | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital District
green
2 sentences1972Directly in point is Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital Dist. (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 709 [ 345 P.2d 93 ]. 1972Directly in point is Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital Dist. (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 709 [ 345 P.2d 93 ]. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co.
green
1 sentence1899(Glock v. Howard etc. Co., 123 Cal. 1 .) The present case is a striking illustration of the wisdom and justice lying at the root of this rule. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.