presentment requirement in Massachusetts

2015The purpose of the presentment requirement is to “ensure[ ] that the responsible public official receives *1011 notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985).

2012Instead, the Commonwealth Defendants suggest that the suit should be dismissed because “absent ancillary appointment, the Commonwealth cannot know whether the presentment made by a foreign administrator constitutes a valid claim.” As previously noted, the purpose of the presentment requirement is to enable the appropriate official to “investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid.” Lodge, 21 Mass.App.Ct. at 283 , emphasis added.

2020See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (a) ("a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant . . . written notification of an incident"). 6 Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 .6 The presentment requirement furthers the act's second purpose by providing the Commonwealth and other public employers with "the opportunity to investigate and settle claims and to prevent future claims through notice to executive officers.".

2020The definition of the act's presentment requirement as occurring upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer aligns with this purpose of the presentment requirement When considering these dual 6 purposes, we seek to strike an "appropriate balance . . . between the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective government." Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 . 7 by ensuring that the government has adequate time to investigate and respond to such claims.7 See Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268 ; Lopez v. Lynn Hous Auth., 440 Mass.

2014The facts of this case do not require us to consider this issue, and we see no need here to revisit the principle stated in Weaver, 387 Mass. at 48 , that relation back principles in rule 15 (c) do not apply to the presentment requirement.

2013The subsequent appointment of an executor or administrator did not, and could not, timely cure that failed presentment. “[T]he relation back principles of Mass.R.Civ.R 15(c) . . . have no application to the presentment requirement of the Act.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. at 48 . 7 We reject any suggestion that the Commonwealth’s response lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security that its present ment met statutory requirements.

2011Several years later, the Supreme Judicial Court said of the presentment requirement: “(T]he purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the public employer to investigate any claim in full and to ‘arbitrate, compromise or settle’ any such claims as it sees fit.” Holohan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 189 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §5. 3 The Act requires that presentment be made to the “executive officer,” which is defined in §1 of the Act, because that is the person with the authority to settle a claim on behalf of the public employer before a suit is filed.

2006A condition precedent to bringing a suit under the Tort Claims Act is the presentment of the claim “in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.” Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 283 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §4. “(T]he purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the public employer to investigate any claim in full and to ‘arbitrate, compromise or settle’ any such claim as it sees fit.” Holihan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 189 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §5.

2015The purpose of the presentment requirement is to “ensure[ ] that the responsible public official receives *1011 notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985).

2010Strict compliance with the presentment requirement is required, and “a presentment letter should be precise in identifying the legal basis of a plaintiffs claim.” 5 See Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721, 723 (1994); see also Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635 , 637 n.3 (1992) (constructive notice of claim not sufficient where “actual presentment to the designated executive officer is required”).

1994Since the presentment requirement is viewed as “a condition precedent to the assertion of a right created by the Act,” George v. Saugus, 394 Mass. 40, 41 (1985), presentment must occur prior to bringing suit.

1986“If the presentment requirement of the act is tolled during the minority of a claimant, it is conceivable that a municipality would not receive notice until a decade or more after the claim arose.” Id. at 44.

2009In contrast, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has found that the Commonwealth’s status as the employer of a defendant is “not inherently unknowable and that therefore the discovery rule [does] not delay the accrual of the claim against the Commonwealth for purposes of the presentment requirement.” Sheila S. v. Commonwealth, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 423 , 427-28 n.9 (2003), citing Krasnow v. Allen, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 562, 570 (1990) (finding knowledge of harm was sufficient to initiate further inquiry into whether defendant was a Commonwealth employee for the purpose of presentment requirement).

2003“Underlying that strict, and often harsh, interpretation of the presentment requirement is a recognition of the need for public bodies to make prompt investigations in the interest of disproving fraudulent claims and settling meritorious ones out of court, and the desirability of enabling them to take preventative steps to avoid future claims.” Krasnow v. Allen, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 562, 567 (1990).

2008Because RMC did not wait for the statutory six-month period to elapse before filing its action, RMC did not satisfy the presentment requirement. 5 See G.L.c. 258, §4; Pruner, 382 Mass. at 351 ; Martin, 53 Mass.App.Ct. at 528 (“[P]resentment must be made ‘in strict compliance with the statute,’ “ quoting Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47 (1982)).

2004It is important to remember, “the presentment requirement was not intended to demand such rigid particularization as to reincarnate sovereign immunity and bar legitimate claims for failing to invoke perfectly the correct ‘Open Sesame.’ ” Id. at 530 .

2025Health Comm'n, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 407 (2007).

2023Health Comm'n, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 406-409 (2007).

2006A condition precedent to bringing a suit under the Tort Claims Act is the presentment of the claim “in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.” Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 283 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §4. “(T]he purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the public employer to investigate any claim in full and to ‘arbitrate, compromise or settle’ any such claim as it sees fit.” Holihan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 189 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §5.

2006A condition precedent to bringing a suit under the Tort Claims Act is the presentment of the claim “in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.” Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 283 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §4. “(T]he purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the public employer to investigate any claim in full and to ‘arbitrate, compromise or settle’ any such claim as it sees fit.” Holihan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 189 (1985), quoting G.L.c. 258, §5.

1994Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50, 53 (1985). 3 “Presentment ensures that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721-22 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 283 (1985), rev. denied, 396 Mass. 1106 (1986).

1994Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50, 53 (1985). 6 “Presentment ensures that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721-22 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 283 (1985), rev. denied, 396 Mass. 1106 (1986).

2010Strict compliance with the presentment requirement is required, and “a presentment letter should be precise in identifying the legal basis of a plaintiffs claim.” 5 See Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721, 723 (1994); see also Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635 , 637 n.3 (1992) (constructive notice of claim not sufficient where “actual presentment to the designated executive officer is required”).

2001The filing of a complaint is insufficient to constitute presentment under the Tort Claims Act, Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 637 (1992), and constructive notice is not sufficient to meet the presentment requirement under the Act.

2020The definition of the act's presentment requirement as occurring upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer aligns with this purpose of the presentment requirement When considering these dual 6 purposes, we seek to strike an "appropriate balance . . . between the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective government." Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 . 7 by ensuring that the government has adequate time to investigate and respond to such claims.7 See Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268 ; Lopez v. Lynn Hous Auth., 440 Mass.

2015We held that it did because “[a]s with the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity, the presentment requirement is collateral to the substantive aspects of the Act, and the city’s right to avoid harassing litigation would be lost forever if it were unable to appeal immediately the judges’ orders that the presentment requirement does not apply retroactively . . . .” Id.

1993We call defendant’s attention to the more recent decision in Carifio v. Town of Watertown, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 571 (1989), which argues for a more liberal approach to the presentment requirement. 2 In Carifio the court upheld a presentment which failed to specify the date of the accident giving rise to the claim; rather, “(t]he court . . . read two presentment letters together to find adequate presentment, and upheld presentment though neither of these letters was addressed to the proper executive officer.” 3 The Carifio court rejected the defendant’s technical objections to presentment, noting th

1993We call defendant’s attention to the more recent decision in Carifio v. Town of Watertown, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 571 (1989), which argues for a more liberal approach to the presentment requirement. 2 In Carifio the court upheld a presentment which failed to specify the date of the accident giving rise to the claim; rather, “(t]he court . . . read two presentment letters together to find adequate presentment, and upheld presentment though neither of these letters was addressed to the proper executive officer.” 3 The Carifio court rejected the defendant’s technical objections to presentment, noting th

2012The requirement is not a “trick means to save government entities from their just liabilities.’’ Pickett v. Commonwealth, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 645, 648 (1992), quoting Carifo v. Watertown, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 576 (1989).

2007See, e.g., Weaver v. Commonwealth, supra at 47-48; Pickett v. Commonwealth, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 647 (1992).

2025While the plaintiff did attempt to comply with the presentment requirement's intent by sending her presentment letter to the leadership of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation and the Fiscal and Management Control Board, which governed the MBTA at the time, see Murray, 472 Mass. at 384 , the fact that the board governing the MBTA is involved in the "investigation, settlement and defense," G.

2025The purpose of the presentment requirement is to "ensure[] that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that the official can investigate." Murray v. Hudson, 472 Mass. 376, 384 (2015).

2010See Moran v. Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681 (1984) (presentment requirement of Massachusetts Tort Claims Act can be waived); Lord v. Commercial Union Ins.

1985See Moran v. Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681 (1984).

2003See Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 803 (1982); Heck , 397 Mass, at 340 (holding that the discoveiy rule affects the presentment requirement in medical malpractice cases).

2003See Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 803 (1982); Heck , 397 Mass, at 340 (holding that the discoveiy rule affects the presentment requirement in medical malpractice cases).

2002See Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 119, 126-27 (1993).

1998See Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 119, 126-27 (1993).

2000McGrath v. Stanley, 397 Mass. 775, 779 (1985), citing Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 Conn. L.

1992That statute provides in pertinent part that “this section shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted by third-party complaint, cross claim, or counter-claim.” While lack of compliance with the presentment requirement does not affect the contribution rights of third-party plaintiffs, McGrath v. Stanley, 397 Mass. 775, 780 (1986), no analogous provision suggests a legislative intent to exempt original plaintiffs from the notice provisions of the statute.

2020The definition of the act's presentment requirement as occurring upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer aligns with this purpose of the presentment requirement When considering these dual 6 purposes, we seek to strike an "appropriate balance . . . between the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective government." Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 . 7 by ensuring that the government has adequate time to investigate and respond to such claims.7 See Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268 ; Lopez v. Lynn Hous Auth., 440 Mass.

2020See Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 125 n.3, 135 (interpreting "claimant" to include decedent's estate, "in the circumstances of the present case"); Lopez, 440 Mass. at 1030-1031 ("in the unique circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the purpose of the presentment requirement has been fulfilled" even 7 We also note that this definition does not run afoul of the act's other purpose of allowing injured parties with valid claims to recover from the government, as the definition does not decrease the statutory time frame within which those injured persons must make their claims known to the

2008Because RMC did not wait for the statutory six-month period to elapse before filing its action, RMC did not satisfy the presentment requirement. 5 See G.L.c. 258, §4; Pruner, 382 Mass. at 351 ; Martin, 53 Mass.App.Ct. at 528 (“[P]resentment must be made ‘in strict compliance with the statute,’ “ quoting Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47 (1982)).

1984See Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47-48 (1982) (notice not sent to official designated by statute until after two-year limitation period had run); Pruner v. Clerk of the Superior Ct., 382 Mass. 309, 316 (1981) (unexplained failure to comply with § 4).

2001Robinson v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 6 (1992), review denied, 412 Mass. 1101 .

1998Robinson v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 6, 10 (1992).

2000In Wightman v. Town of Methuen, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 279 (1988), the Court adopted a narrow and strict view of the presentment requirement of G.L.c. 258, §4.

1990See Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47-48 (1982); Holahan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 188-190 (1985); Johnson v. Trustees of Health & Hosps. of Bos *567 ton, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 933, 935-936 (1986); and Wightman v. Methuen, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 279, 281-282 (1988), as to the form and recipient of the notice; and Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. at 50 ; George v. Saugus, 394 Mass. 40, 42 (1985); Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50, 52 (1985); and Heck v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 336, 339 (1986), as to the inapplicability of the tolling provisions of G.

2025"If a sensible construction is available, we shall not construe a statute to make a nullity of pertinent provisions or to produce absurd results." Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375-376 (2000). "[U]nder the 'actual notice' exception, the presentment requirement will be deemed fulfilled if the plaintiff can show that, despite defective presentment, the designated executive officer had actual notice of the written claim." Bellanti v. Boston Pub.

2023As for lulling, there was no evidence that any State official or employee with authority over the hospital "affirmatively indicate[d] that the presentment requirement ha[d] been met or is waived." Garcia v. Essex County Sheriff's Dep't, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 111 (2005).

2023As for lulling, there was no evidence that any State official or employee with authority over the hospital "affirmatively indicate[d] that the presentment requirement ha[d] been met or is waived." Garcia v. Essex County Sheriff's Dep't, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 111 (2005).

2020See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (a) ("a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant . . . written notification of an incident"). 6 Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 .6 The presentment requirement furthers the act's second purpose by providing the Commonwealth and other public employers with "the opportunity to investigate and settle claims and to prevent future claims through notice to executive officers.".

2020The definition of the act's presentment requirement as occurring upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer aligns with this purpose of the presentment requirement When considering these dual 6 purposes, we seek to strike an "appropriate balance . . . between the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective government." Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131 , quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at 57 . 7 by ensuring that the government has adequate time to investigate and respond to such claims.7 See Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268 ; Lopez v. Lynn Hous Auth., 440 Mass.

2017See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015).