presentment requirement in Texas

2025“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.’”1 Id. (quoting Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 21 ).

2023The purpose of the presentment requirement is to “put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.” Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. Crim.

2025“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.’”1 Id. (quoting Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 21 ).

2023“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.’” Navarro, 588 S.W.3d at 691 (quoting Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20 , 21 3 (Tex. Crim.

2019The Butler court analyzed the presentment requirement in depth and concluded: Considering the policy reasons behind the presentment requirement (calling the motion to the trial court’s attention), the court coordinator’s role (serving as the trial court’s agent in scheduling and monitoring the court’s caseload), and the Court Administration Act’s purpose (providing “a prompt, efficient, and just hearing and disposition of all disputes”), it is clear that presentation to the court coordinator satisfies the presentment requirement of giving actual notice to the trial court. 6 S.W.3d at 641 .

2015See Butler v. State, 6 S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that presentation to the court coordinator satisfies the presentment requirement of giving actual notice to the trial court).

2022“In a breach of contract case, where the amount of damages i[s] not already fixed in advance, the presentment requirement can be met by presenting the contract claim to the opposing party and that party fails to tender performance.” Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp. of Tex. Inc., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ denied) (citing Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981)).

2021“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the party against whom the claim is asserted an opportunity to pay it or tender performance within 30 days after they have notice of the claim without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Gibson v. Cuellar, 440 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (applying predecessor statute)).

2015“The purpose of the presentment requirement is tó allow the person against whom a claim is asserted an opportunity to pay within thirty days of receiving notice of the claim, without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. v. Home Health of Tarrant Cnty., Inc., 393 S.W.3d 492, 515 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (citing Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ denied)).

2015“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the person against whom a claim is asserted an opportunity to pay within thirty days of receiving notice of the claim, without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. v. Home Health of Tarrant Cnty., Inc., 393 S.W.3d 492, 515 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (citing Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied)).

2003The court stated that "the presentment requirement is concerned with promoting settlement, whereas the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] requirement seeks to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute--the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute." Essenburg , 988 S.W.2d at 189 .

2003The court stated that “the presentment requirement is concerned with promoting settlement, whereas the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] requirement seeks to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute — the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute.” Essenburg, 988 S.W.2d at 189 .

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2015In Estrella, the San Antonio court found that a court coordinator’s filling out a “case setting form” and setting the case for a hearing satisfied the presentment requirement sufficiently to allow the court to consider whether the motion for new trial merited a hearing. 82 S.W.3d at 486 .

2015In Estrella, the San Antonio court found that a court coordinator’s filling out a “case setting form” and setting the case for a hearing satisfied the presentment requirement sufficiently to allow the court to consider whether the motion for new trial merited a hearing. 82 S.W.3d at 486 .

2026Id. “[M]erely filing a motion is insufficient” to satisfy the presentment requirement.

2025Id. “[M]erely filing a motion is insufficient” to satisfy the presentment requirement.

2018Citing the reasoning in Dotson and Helsley, we then explained that “[a] signed indictment featuring an original file stamp of the district clerk’s office is strong evidence that a returned indictment was ‘presented’ to the court clerk within the meaning of Article 20.21.” Mediano, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6548 , at *3–4 (citing Dotson, 224 S.W.3d at 204 (indictment bearing original file stamp “convincingly show[ed] the presentment requirement was satisfied”); Helsley, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 1986 , at *2); see Mayes, 536 S.W.3d at 107–08.

2018“The fact that a signed indictment features an original file stamp of the district clerk’s office is strong evidence that a returned indictment was ‘presented’ to the court clerk within the meaning of Article 20.21.” Dotson, 224 S.W.3d at 204 (because indictment “bears an original file stamp, that fact convincingly shows the presentment requirement was satisfied”).

2008While it is true that the filing of suit, in and of itself, does not constitute the requisite presentment, Panizo v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Greater Houston Area , 938 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1996, no writ), a presentment of a claim is timely even if made after suit is filed, if it is made at least 30 days before trial.

2002While it is true that the filing of suit, in and of itself, does not constitute the requisite presentment, Panizo v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Houston Area , 938 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1996, no writ), a presentment of a claim is timely even if made after suit is filed, if it is made at least 30 days before trial.

2021“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the party against whom the claim is asserted an opportunity to pay it or tender performance within 30 days after they have notice of the claim without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Gibson v. Cuellar, 440 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (applying predecessor statute)).

2019“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the party against whom the claim is asserted an opportunity to pay it or tender performance within 30 days after they have notice of the claim without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Gibson v. Cuellar, 440 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (same; interpreting predecessor statute to section 38.001); Lyon v. Bldg.

2021Presentment is a “demand or request for payment or performance, whether written or oral.” Genender v. USA Store Fixtures, LLC, 451 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Genender v. USA Store Fixtures, LLC, 451 S.W.3d 916 (2014) “presentment” of claim, as prerequisite to the purpose of the presentment requirement to seller’s right to recover attorney fees on claim provide the defendant with the opportunity, by against buyer for breach of contract.

2015“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the party against whom the claim is asserted an opportunity to pay it or tender performance within 30 days after they have notice of the claim without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Id. (citing Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 ).13 12 See also Gutierrez v. Wright Lawfirm, PLLC, No. 05-10-00725-CV, 2012 WL 1898950 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Harrison v. Gemdrill Int’l, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 19

2015Such evidence is insufficient to prove presentment because it does not satisfy the purpose of the presentment requirement: to provide the defendant with “the opportunity, by undertaking specific action, to avoid paying attorney’s fees.” Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849 , 856–57 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2006, no pet.) (evidence that counsel “had some settlement discussions” was insufficient).

2020“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.’” Id. (quoting Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 21 (quoting Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 78 )); see Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim.

2011P. 21.6; Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a hearing on it.’”); Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (concluding that defendant does not preserve any error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing if no request for a hearing was presented).

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, 8 no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

1988See Mackey v. Mackey, 721 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no writ); see also Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1988Preis, 695 S.W.2d at 589 ; Manges, 658 S.W.2d at 730 .

2026In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2008 , orig. proceeding); In re Hardy, No. 03-25-00028-CV, 2025 WL 352167 , at *1 (Tex. App. Austin Jan. 31, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 ).

2026In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2008 , orig. proceeding); In re Hardy, No. 03-25-00028-CV, 2025 WL 352167 , at *1 (Tex. App. Austin Jan. 31, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 ).

2022“In a breach of contract case, where the amount of damages i[s] not already fixed in advance, the presentment requirement can be met by presenting the contract claim to the opposing party and that party fails to tender performance.” Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp. of Tex. Inc., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ denied) (citing Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981)).

2017In breach-of- contract cases, the presentment requirement can be met when a plaintiff presents the contract claim to the opposing party and that party fails to tender performance. 11 Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp. of Tex., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ denied) (citing Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 ).

2015Compare Caldwell & Hurst v. Myers, 714 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Proper presentment is the assertion of a claim and a request for payment made 30 days before initiation of a suit.”), with Peissel v. Peissel, 620 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. Civ.

2013Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ denied); see Caldwell & Hurst v. Myers, 714 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“Proper presentment is the assertion of a claim and a request for payment made 30 days before initiation of *516 a suit.”)- In order to recover attorney’s fees in a suit founded on a written contract under section 38.002, a plaintiff must plead and prove that presentment of a contract claim was made to the opposing party and he failed to tender performance.

2015“The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the party against whom the claim is asserted an opportunity to pay it or tender performance within 30 days after they have notice of the claim without incurring an obligation for attorney’s fees.” Id. (citing Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 ).13 12 See also Gutierrez v. Wright Lawfirm, PLLC, No. 05-10-00725-CV, 2012 WL 1898950 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Harrison v. Gemdrill Int’l, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 19

2011See Harrison v. Gemdrill Int’l, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (holding appellant’s trial testimony that, when he informed appellee of his resignation, he told appellee he wanted to “collect his pay ‘without fail,’ ” constituted sufficient evidence of presentment); see also Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins.

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2002See Anderson v. Ashe, 99 Tex. 447 , 90 S.W. 872, 874 (1906) (holding that rejection by the county auditor, rather than the commissioners court, fulfilled the presentment requirement, but not discussing whether compliance with the presentment statute alone established jurisdiction over a suit against a county); Greer v. Hunt County, 249 S.W. 831, 834-35 (Tex.Comm’n App.1923, judgm’t adopted) (holding that county auditor’s audit was not a prerequisite to filing suit and thus plaintiffs presentment to the commissioners court satisfied the presentment requirement).

2002See Anderson v. Ashe, 99 Tex. 447 , 90 S.W. 872, 874 (1906) (holding that rejection by the county auditor, rather than the commissioners court, fulfilled the presentment requirement, but not discussing whether compliance with the presentment statute alone established jurisdiction over a suit against a county); Greer v. Hunt County, 249 S.W. 831, 834-35 (Tex.Comm’n App.1923, judgm’t adopted) (holding that county auditor’s audit was not a prerequisite to filing suit and thus plaintiffs presentment to the commissioners court satisfied the presentment requirement).

2013Id. (citing W.

1981Data Processing, etc., 542 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.), the court held that an oral request for payment met the presentment requirement of art. 2226.

2006See Gateley v. Humphrey , 151 Tex. 588, 591 , 254 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1952) (interpreting the predecessor statute); see also Stuckey v. White , 647 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (There is no requirement that a presentment for claim must be made prior to the time suit is filed to recover attorney’s fees, only that the claim is not paid within 30 days once demand is made.).

2006See Gateley v. Humphrey , 151 Tex. 588, 591 , 254 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1952) (interpreting the predecessor statute); see also Stuckey v. White , 647 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (There is no requirement that a presentment for claim must be made prior to the time suit is filed to recover attorney’s fees, only that the claim is not paid within 30 days once demand is made.).