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9 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1843–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Byrd v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State 2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State | 1 | 1 |
Marr v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State 2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1049 , 304 Ill.Dec. 823, 829 , 853 N.E.2d 900, 906 (2006)(“While there is no separate remedy for violation of the presentment rule, Illinois courts have held that the delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the confession was voluntary.”); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 166 , 759 A.2d 327, 334 (2000) (“[T]he delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer after an arrest is ‘only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.’ ”); Wright v. State | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Floyd v. Clayton
green
2 sentences1992This Court stated in Barrett that the “commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded.” Barrett, 262 Ala. at 540 , 80 So.2d at 245 (quoting Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265 (1880)). 1898HARALSON, J. — By construction of the statute of non-claim, the rule is settled in this State, that while in the presentment of the claim which may be made to the executor or administrator in person, technical accuracy or such certainty of description as is essential in pleading is not required to be observed, yet the statement must,- of itself, inform the personal representative, on an inspection of it, of the nature, character and amount of the liability it imports, and must distinguish it with reasonable certainty from all similar claims. —Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265 ; Bibb v. Mitchell, 5 | 2 | 1898–1992 |
Hunley's Exr'x v. Shuford
green
2 sentences1955They all seem to stem from Hunley v. Shuford, 11 Ala. 203 . 1880The commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded. — Hunley v. Shuford, 11 Ala. 203 . | 2 | 1880–1955 |
Pollard v. Scears' Adm'r.
neutral
2 sentences1898If the presentation informs the administrator of the nature and amount of the demand, and that the claimant looks to him for payment, it is sufficient. —Pollard v. Scears, 28 Ala. 484, 487 . 1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 2 | 1877–1898 |
Pipkin v. Hewlett
neutral
2 sentences1880But if the suit is voluntarily abandoned, it will not operate a presentment. — Bigger v. Hutchings, 2 Stew. 445 ; Dilbore v. Moorer, 14 Ala. 426 ; Pipkin v. Hewlett, 17 Ala. 291 . 1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 2 | 1877–1880 |
Ford v. Jefferson County
green
2 sentences2011Therefore, they argue, because count III of the complaint seeks injunctive relief, that count was not barred. *16 Count III of the Hobbses’ complaint sets forth the following allegations and prayer for relief: “[The Hobbses] aver that while the damage to the [Hobbses’] property is continuing in nature, the harm is abata-ble. [The Hobbses] further aver that absent the intervention of this Court’s equitable jurisdiction, [the Hobbses] will continue to suffer damage and irreparable harm to their property, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, and will continue to suffer personally if acti 2011Therefore, they argue, because count III of the complaint seeks injunctive relief, that count was not barred. *16 Count III of the Hobbses’ complaint sets forth the following allegations and prayer for relief: “[The Hobbses] aver that while the damage to the [Hobbses’] property is continuing in nature, the harm is abata-ble. [The Hobbses] further aver that absent the intervention of this Court’s equitable jurisdiction, [the Hobbses] will continue to suffer damage and irreparable harm to their property, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, and will continue to suffer personally if acti | 1 | 2011–2011 |
City of Clanton v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2006In City of Clanton v. Johnson , 245 Ala. 470 , 475 , 17 So.2d 669 , 672 (1944), our supreme court held that an action against a city for an abatable nuisance arising from the operation of the city's sewage system was presented within six months of its accrual despite the fact that the sewer system had been installed more than six months before the presentment of the claim. 2006In City of Clanton v. Johnson , 245 Ala. 470 , 475 , 17 So.2d 669 , 672 (1944), our supreme court held that an action against a city for an abatable nuisance arising from the operation of the city's sewage system was presented within six months of its accrual despite the fact that the sewer system had been installed more than six months before the presentment of the claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Barrett v. Fondren
neutral
2 sentences1992This Court stated in Barrett that the “commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded.” Barrett, 262 Ala. at 540 , 80 So.2d at 245 (quoting Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265 (1880)). 1992This Court stated in Barrett that the “commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded.” Barrett, 262 Ala. at 540 , 80 So.2d at 245 (quoting Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265 (1880)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Stakely v. Ex Com. of Foreign Missions of Presbyterian Church
neutral
2 sentences1955In the Clayton case it was distinctly held that the “commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded.” This latter case was also cited with approval of that principle in Stakely v. Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, 145 Ala. 379 , 39 So. 653 . 1955In the Clayton case it was distinctly held that the “commencement of a suit within the statutory period, and its continued prosecution, operates as a presentment of the claim on which the suit is founded.” This latter case was also cited with approval of that principle in Stakely v. Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, 145 Ala. 379 , 39 So. 653 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Bibb v. Mitchell
neutral
1 sentence1898HARALSON, J. — By construction of the statute of non-claim, the rule is settled in this State, that while in the presentment of the claim which may be made to the executor or administrator in person, technical accuracy or such certainty of description as is essential in pleading is not required to be observed, yet the statement must,- of itself, inform the personal representative, on an inspection of it, of the nature, character and amount of the liability it imports, and must distinguish it with reasonable certainty from all similar claims. —Floyd v. Clayton, 67 Ala. 265 ; Bibb v. Mitchell, 5 | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Dilbone v. Moorer
neutral
1 sentence1880But if the suit is voluntarily abandoned, it will not operate a presentment. — Bigger v. Hutchings, 2 Stew. 445 ; Dilbore v. Moorer, 14 Ala. 426 ; Pipkin v. Hewlett, 17 Ala. 291 . | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Bigger v. Hutchings
neutral
1 sentence1880But if the suit is voluntarily abandoned, it will not operate a presentment. — Bigger v. Hutchings, 2 Stew. 445 ; Dilbore v. Moorer, 14 Ala. 426 ; Pipkin v. Hewlett, 17 Ala. 291 . | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Badger v. Kelly
neutral
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Hallet v. Branch Bank at Mobile
neutral
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Posey v. Decatur Bank
green
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Pharis v. Leachman
neutral
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Harrison's Adm'r v. Jones' Adm'r
neutral
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Frazier's Executors v. Praytor
neutral
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Fretwell v. McLemore
green
1 sentence1877Bank, 12 Ala. 193 , this court ruled that a notice of protest, coming from a notary public, and served on the personal representative, or otherwise shown to' have come to his hands, “will be sufficient to withdraw the claim from the influence of the statute of non-claim, if it describe the bill or note with accuracy, and informs the representative who the holder is, and that he looks to the administrator for payment.” This is put on the ground that the notary, in that capacity, is authorized to receive payment of the bill or note. — See, also, Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662, 678 ; Pollard v. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Acre v. Ross
neutral
1 sentence1843Where there are more executors than one, there may be acts to be done, which require the concurrent .action of all; but in relation to the point here presented, one has authority to act for all. [Acre v. Ross, 3 Stewart 288 .] The person appointed by law to receive the presentment must have authority to acknowledge that such presentment was made, and this acknowledgment cannot be deprived of its efficacy, as evidence by his subsequent act. | 1 | 1843–1843 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.