65 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1975–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2021The “newly-discovered facts” exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove that “1) the facts upon which the claim was predicted were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382 , 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2007) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). 2020The “newly-discovered facts” exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove that “1) the facts upon which the claim was predicted were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382 , 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2007) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Com. v. Seeney, T.green2 sentences2026See -8- J-A17039-24 Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645 , 651 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2024). 2026See -8- J-A17039-24 Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645 , 651 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2024). | 2 | 2 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). 2019Accordingly, Appellant's instant PCRA petition, which was filed on March 1, 2016, is patently untimely. -4 J -S78036-18 However, this does not end our inquiry as Appellant invokes Montgomery v. Louisiana, U.S. , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),3 and contends that he has met the following timeliness exception: "the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). | 1 | 5 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). 2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).1 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the timeliness exception under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). | 1 | 3 |
Zappacosta, J. v. McAvoy, C.green1 sentence2026See Zappacosta, 325 A.3d at 788 .4 On November 18, 2024, the trial court entered the Second Default Judgment against Rillema pursuant to Rule 1037(c). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Harrisgreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
Triffin v. DiSalvogreen2 sentences2026See In re Est. of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73 , 73 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2005) (noting that failure to address issue in argument section of the appellate brief renders the claim waived). - 19 - J-A24002-25 This does not end our inquiry, because although the attorney–client privilege only protects communications with licensed attorneys, “[t]he privilege for communications of a client with his lawyer hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.” Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118, 120 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation o 2026“It is sufficient if he reasonably believes that the person consulted is a lawyer, though in fact he is not.” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of S.G.L.green1 sentence2026See In re Est. of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73 , 73 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2005) (noting that failure to address issue in argument section of the appellate brief renders the claim waived). - 19 - J-A24002-25 This does not end our inquiry, because although the attorney–client privilege only protects communications with licensed attorneys, “[t]he privilege for communications of a client with his lawyer hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.” Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118, 120 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation o | 1 | 1 |
Gurecka, F. v. Carroll, R.green1 sentence2025See Gurecka v. Carroll, 155 A.3d 1071 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Parrishgreen1 sentence2024However, this does not end our inquiry since, as Appellant acknowledges, the element of “[p]ossession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.” - 17 - J-S30037-24 Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Orman, L. v. Mortgage I.T.green1 sentence2024See Orman, supra. This does not end our inquiry, however, since the Bakers aver that, assuming, arguendo, Lackawanna County is an indispensable party, the trial court “should have afforded [the Bakers] the opportunity to join [the County] in the litigation[.]” The Bakers’ Brief at 34. | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Est. of D.A.B., Appeal of: Byerley, D.green2 sentences2023See Byerley, 284 A.3d at 1239. 2023See Byerley, 284 A.3d at 1239 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2023“To establish a voluntary consensual search, the Commonwealth must prove that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice - not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne - under the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170, 179 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Heckathorngreen1 sentence2022See Smith, supra at 539 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hiller v. Fauseygreen1 sentence2020Consequently, I agree that there is a compelling state interest at issue here. 46 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (outlining four factors to consider when determining the constitutionality of a content-neutral speech regulation). 47 See D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 211 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he state, acting pursuant to its parens patriae power, has a compelling interest in safeguarding children from various kinds of physical and emotional harm and promoting their wellbeing”); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006) (finding protection of children to be a compelling state i | 1 | 1 |
United States v. O'Briengreen1 sentence2020Consequently, I agree that there is a compelling state interest at issue here. 46 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (outlining four factors to consider when determining the constitutionality of a content-neutral speech regulation). 47 See D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 211 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he state, acting pursuant to its parens patriae power, has a compelling interest in safeguarding children from various kinds of physical and emotional harm and promoting their wellbeing”); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006) (finding protection of children to be a compelling state i | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pursellgreen1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 303-04 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1999 ). | 1 | 1 |
D.P. v. G.J.P.green1 sentence2020Consequently, I agree that there is a compelling state interest at issue here. 46 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (outlining four factors to consider when determining the constitutionality of a content-neutral speech regulation). 47 See D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 211 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he state, acting pursuant to its parens patriae power, has a compelling interest in safeguarding children from various kinds of physical and emotional harm and promoting their wellbeing”); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006) (finding protection of children to be a compelling state i | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Snydergreen1 sentence2019See Snyder, supra at 170 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Edmistonred2 sentences2019The proper question with respect to Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i)’s timeliness exception is “whether the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549 , 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citations omitted). 2019The proper question with respect to Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i)’s timeliness exception is “whether the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549 , 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Alcorngreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 , 1056–57 (Pa.Super. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Prestongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Com. v. AGgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Heidlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Julianogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rickabaughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Noelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Petrollgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ardingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Kylegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dorsey v. Beardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McClendongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lowenfield v. Phelpsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Acostagreen | 1 | 1 |
| McClintock v. Worksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Opie v. Richartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slaughter v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
green
2 sentences2021The “newly-discovered facts” exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove that “1) the facts upon which the claim was predicted were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382 , 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2007) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). 2020The “newly-discovered facts” exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove that “1) the facts upon which the claim was predicted were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382 , 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2007) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2017This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the “new constitutional right” exception based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne, supra, and Montgomery, supra. -6- J-S24032-17 To invoke the “new constitutional right” exception of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), the petitioner must plead and prove that “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 2016This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alleges he is entitled to the “new constitutional right” exception based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), as well as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Dickson, 591 Pa. 364 , 918 A.2d 95 (2007). | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Colon
green
1 sentence2026This does not end our inquiry, however, as the Commonwealth was also required to establish “corroboration by other evidence of record.” Id. at 1040 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jones v. Mississippi
green
1 sentence2023However, this does not end our inquiry as Appellant contends that he is entitled to the timeliness exception set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) since Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), fashioned a new constitutional right that applies retroactively. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Davis
green
1 sentence2021However, this does not end our inquiry, as the second step of the test requires that we “inspect[] the underlying facts that led to the conviction to determine if dishonesty or false statement facilitated the commission of the crime.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Small, E., Aplt.
green
1 sentence2020However, this does not end our inquiry, as the Small Court held that, even if new evidence is “upon the same point,” the evidence is not cumulative if it “is of a different and ‘higher’ grade or character.” Id. at 974 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2019As the record reveals, Appellant did not object to the admission of the autopsy report, and, thus, he has waived his claim of error. 7 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."); Commonwealth v. Rivera , 603 Pa. 340 , 983 A.2d 1211 , 1229 (2009) (holding lack of contemporaneous objection results in waiver of issue on appeal). 8 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant has preserved his claim that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights when it permitted Dr. Collins to offer expert opin 2019As the record reveals, Appellant did not object to the admission of the autopsy report, and, thus, he has waived his claim of error. 7 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."); Commonwealth v. Rivera , 603 Pa. 340 , 983 A.2d 1211 , 1229 (2009) (holding lack of contemporaneous objection results in waiver of issue on appeal). 8 This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant has preserved his claim that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights when it permitted Dr. Collins to offer expert opin | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Carpenter v. United States
green
1 sentence2019Specifically, he avers the -6- J-S43032-19 warrantless seizure of his cell-site location information3 violated the United States Supreme Court’s recent Opinion in Carpenter v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), which was filed on June 22, 2018.4 In Carpenter, the High Court addressed the issue of cell-site location information and an individual’s expectations of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Barndt
green
1 sentence2017Barndt, supra. This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alternatively argues that his counsel directly and specifically misinformed him about the consequences of pleading guilty at lower court docket number CP-33-CR- -8- J-S69038-17 0000171-2015. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Dickson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Peugh v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Natividad green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commonwealth v. Freeman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Maxim Crane Works v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Kriston green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Commonwealth v. Stafford green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Commonwealth v. Clark green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Commonwealth v. Touw green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Roe v. Flores-Ortega green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Hinson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Prince v. Massachusetts green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Wisconsin v. Yoder green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Commonwealth v. Aponte green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Hoetzel green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Green v. Mizner green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Clymire v. McKivitz green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Hinkson green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Smith v. Hooey green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.