does not end inquiry in District of Columbia

2017See United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1524 (D.C.

2017See United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1524 (D.C.

2013Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 474 A.2d 1274 , 1278 n. 2 (D.C.1984)) (emphasizing the importance of judicial review as a check on agency discretion); see also Martin v. District of Columbia Courts, 753 A.2d 987, 991 (D.C.2000) (the Superior Court’s general jurisdiction “extends to claims ... for equitable relief from allegedly unlawful actions by public officials ... [including] challenges by public employees of official decisions affecting their tenure”) (internal citations omitted). 7 One significant exception to the Superior Court’s general jurisdiction is this court’s jurisdiction und

2013This does not end our analysis, however, because the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction, see D.C.Code § ll-921(a) (2012 Repl.), and there is a “strong presumption of judicial review of agency action,” District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 358-59 (D.C.1996) (quoting People’s Counsel v. Public Serv.

2013Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 474 A.2d 1274 , 1278 n. 2 (D.C.1984)) (emphasizing the importance of judicial review as a check on agency discretion); see also Martin v. District of Columbia Courts, 753 A.2d 987, 991 (D.C.2000) (the Superior Court’s general jurisdiction “extends to claims ... for equitable relief from allegedly unlawful actions by public officials ... [including] challenges by public employees of official decisions affecting their tenure”) (internal citations omitted). 7 One significant exception to the Superior Court’s general jurisdiction is this court’s jurisdiction und

1984See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-1934 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (confrontation values may be violated even though evidence is admitted under a recognized hearsay exception).

1984See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-1934 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (confrontation values may be violated even though evidence is admitted under a recognized hearsay exception).

1979Code 1973, § 28:9-501(3) prohibits waiver: To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (1) of section 28:9-505) and with respect to redemption of collateral (section 28:9-506) but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable: . [Emphasis added.] [ 6 ] On the o

1979Code 1973, § 28:9-501(3) prohibits waiver: To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (1) of section 28:9-505) and with respect to redemption of collateral (section 28:9-506) but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable: . [Emphasis added.] [ 6 ] On the o

1979See Barnett v. Trussell Ford, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 176 , 198 S.E.2d 903 (1973); Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan, supra; Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, supra. 4 This does not end the inquiry, however, for even though the UCC notice requirements apply to “voluntary” or “non-adversary” repossessions, we still have the question whether the principles of waiver or estoppel can preclude a debtor from asserting lack of notice. 5 Arguably, D.C.

1979See Barnett v. Trussell Ford, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 176 , 198 S.E.2d 903 (1973); Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan, supra; Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, supra. 4 This does not end the inquiry, however, for even though the UCC notice requirements apply to “voluntary” or “non-adversary” repossessions, we still have the question whether the principles of waiver or estoppel can preclude a debtor from asserting lack of notice. 5 Arguably, D.C.

1978Although it is clear that “[t]here is no indication the government has attempted to delay the trial to obtain a tactical advantage or to harass or oppress the defense,” United States v. Bolden, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 624, 628 (1977), this does not end the inquiry.