information defense in California

2019That motion to compel was granted, and the evidence was fully presented at trial. [¶] So the Court is denying the request to instruct on untimely disclosure of evidence.” The decision to give an instruction on the untimely disclosure of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b); People v. Lamb (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 575, 581 .) Here, Glick’s testimony was before the jury, as was the information that the bar was “gang central” of Chico.

2019That motion to compel was granted, and the evidence was fully presented at trial. [¶] So the Court is denying the request to instruct on untimely disclosure of evidence.” The decision to give an instruction on the untimely disclosure of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b); People v. Lamb (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 575, 581 .) Here, Glick’s testimony was before the jury, as was the information that the bar was “gang central” of Chico.

2017In Johnson , the police department "informed the district attorney that the officers' personnel records might contain Brady material...." ( *456 Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 715 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 .) Johnson observed that "[n]o one disputes" that the prosecution then "had a duty under Brady ... to provide this information to the defense." ( Ibid. ) The question in Johnson was "whether the [ Brady ] obligation goes beyond that." ( Ibid. ) The answer was "no," because, "[i]f the prosecution informs the defense of what it knows regarding information in confidential personnel

2017In Johnson , the police department "informed the district attorney that the officers' personnel records might contain Brady material...." ( *456 Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 715 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 .) Johnson observed that "[n]o one disputes" that the prosecution then "had a duty under Brady ... to provide this information to the defense." ( Ibid. ) The question in Johnson was "whether the [ Brady ] obligation goes beyond that." ( Ibid. ) The answer was "no," because, "[i]f the prosecution informs the defense of what it knows regarding information in confidential personnel

2015The Scope of the Prosecutor’s Brady Obligation Regarding Confidential Personnel Records When the police department informed the district attorney that the officers’ personnel records might contain Brady material, the prosecution had a duty under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , to provide this information to the defense.

2014However, she had concluded plaintiff had been untruthful during an official investigation, and, as a result, her office was mandated under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , to disclose this information to the defense in any ongoing cases in which plaintiff was a material witness.

2026Such practice would result, in legal effect, in wiping out all provisions of the [C]onstitution and the Penal Code providing for a preliminary examination, and in clothing the district attorney with unlimited authority to file information against whomsoever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime.’ ”].) In any event, a defendant’s conviction of a charge that was improperly added to a charging instrument is “unquestionably prejudicial.” (People v. Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 868 .) Here, Ardeleanu could not have been convicted of the charge of failure to appear if the trial

2025Such practice would result, in legal effect, in wiping out all provisions of the [C]onstitution and the Penal Code providing for a preliminary examination, and in clothing the district attorney with unlimited authority to file information against whomsoever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime.’ ”].) In any event, a defendant’s conviction of a charge that was improperly added to a charging instrument is “unquestionably prejudicial.” (People v. Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 868 .) Here, Ardeleanu could not have been convicted of the charge of failure to appear if the trial

2025Proc., § 2031.230.)2 Likewise, for approximately 29 of the challenged special interrogatories, the referee recommended granting or granting in part the motion and directed that Anne must furnish information available from sources under her control and that if she did not have sufficient personal knowledge to respond, she “ ‘must “make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations,” unless the information is “equally available to the propounding party.” ’ ” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants

2024Those obligations include: (1) providing all responsive information of which it has personal knowledge, which includes that from sources under its control (§ 2030.220; Gordon v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 157, 167 ); and (2) “mak[ing] a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations,” except to the extent the information is equally available to plaintiffs (§ 2030.220, subd. (c); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406 ).

2023(People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 .) That is, he 28 People’s motion was defective, K.R.’s attorney was able to learn the relevant information and challenge the scope of the evaluation before it occurred.

2023(People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 .) That is, he 28 People’s motion was defective, K.R.’s attorney was able to learn the relevant information and challenge the scope of the evaluation before it occurred.

2016The statute could reasonably accommodate either meaning proposed by the parties. 4 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.285 states, in part: “(a) If electronically stored information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as attorney work product, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for the claim. [¶] (b) After being notified of a claim of privilege or of protection under subdivision (a), a party that received the information shall immediately sequester the information and either return the

2015The statute could reasonably accommodate either meaning proposed by the parties. 4 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.285 states, in part: “(a) If electronically stored information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as attorney work product, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for the claim. [¶] (b) After being notified of a claim of privilege or of protection under subdivision (a), a party that received the information shall immediately sequester the information and either return the

2013The pre-Muniz cases cited by that court involve questions designed to gather “mere pedigree information” or “routine background information.” (United States v. Avery, supra, 717 F.2d at pp. 1024- 1025 [“subjects such as defendant’s date of birth and address” in order to complete the identification form which “did not relate, even tangentially, to criminal activity”]; United States v. Mata-Abundiz, supra, 717 F.2d 1277 [background questions, which were not asked during routine booking procedure, were directly related to an element of crime the interrogating officer suspected of defendant did no

2013The pre-Muniz cases cited by that court involve questions designed to gather “mere pedigree information” or “routine background information.” (United States v. Avery, supra, 717 F.2d at pp. 1024- 1025 [“subjects such as defendant’s date of birth and address” in order to complete the identification form which “did not relate, even tangentially, to criminal activity”]; United States v. Mata-Abundiz, supra, 717 F.2d 1277 [background questions, which were not asked during routine booking procedure, were directly related to an element of crime the interrogating officer suspected of defendant did no

2007The Legislature recognized the potential danger to which law enforcement officers and their families could be exposed if the officers were required to disclose their home addresses during the course of testimony, making such information available to discontented defendants and their associates. [¶] ... [Disclosure of the officers' home addresses without their authorization is specifically foreclosed by section 1328.5." ( People v. Lewis, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 321-322, 184 Cal.Rptr. 31 , fns. omitted.) Barnett contends we are "not bound by Lewis " because " Lewis did not discuss alternat

2006The Legislature recognized the potential danger to which law enforcement officers and their families could be exposed if the officers were required to disclose their home addresses during the course of testimony, making such information available to discontented defendants and their associates. [¶] ... [Disclosure of the officers' home addresses without their authorization is specifically foreclosed by section 1328.5." ( People v. Lewis, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 321-322, 184 Cal.Rptr. 31 , fns. omitted.) Barnett contends we are "not bound by Lewis" because "Lewis did not discuss alternativ

1928The court of appeal, upholding the trial court’s ruling, said, quoting from People v. Arras, 89 Cal. 223 [ 26 Pac. 766 ]: “A material variance between the proof and information arises when an acquittal of the defendant under the information would be no bar to a further prosecution for the same offense,” and, proceeding further, expressed the following views, which are peculiarly applicable to the instant case, in so far as the present consideration is concerned: “As we view the evidence, there could have been no question but that the check offered in evidence was the one by the use of which th

1928The court of appeal, upholding the trial court’s ruling, said, quoting from People v. Arras, 89 Cal. 223 [ 26 Pac. 766 ]: “A material variance between the proof and information arises when an acquittal of the defendant under the information would be no bar to a further prosecution for the same offense,” and, proceeding further, expressed the following views, which are peculiarly applicable to the instant case, in so far as the present consideration is concerned: “As we view the evidence, there could have been no question but that the check offered in evidence was the one by the use of which th

2026He asserts his need for the information to challenge M.W.’s credibility outweighs her interest in confidentiality. “[T]he due process clause requires the ‘government’ to give the accused all ‘material’ exculpatory evidence ‘in its possession,’ even where the evidence is otherwise subject to a state privacy privilege, at least where no clear state policy of ‘absolute’ confidentiality exists.” (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 517 .) “[T]he mental illness or emotional instability of a witness can be relevant on the issue of credibility, and a witness may be cross-examined on that subject, if

2026(People v. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 820, 826 , first bracketed insertion added, quoting Evid.

2026He asserts his need for the information to challenge M.W.’s credibility outweighs her interest in confidentiality. “[T]he due process clause requires the ‘government’ to give the accused all ‘material’ exculpatory evidence ‘in its possession,’ even where the evidence is otherwise subject to a state privacy privilege, at least where no clear state policy of ‘absolute’ confidentiality exists.” (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 517 .) “[T]he mental illness or emotional instability of a witness can be relevant on the issue of credibility, and a witness may be cross-examined on that subject, if

2025(In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451 .) Rather, the process is intended solely “to preserve information relevant to the defendant’s eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291 , 300.) The trial court has broad discretion “to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1132 .) As it turned out, the prosecution did not object to any of the information defense counsel file

2025On April 29, 2025, this court requested a response to the petition and authorized petitioner to file a reply, asking the parties to “discuss whether trial in the [Lopez Perez] matter was ‘in progress’ for purposes of [Section 1050(g)(2)] at the time petitioner’s trial was continued, under the reasoning expressed in [ Burgos, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 828–836 & fn. 13].

2025(In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451 .) Rather, the process is intended solely “to preserve information relevant to the defendant’s eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291 , 300.) The trial court has broad discretion “to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1132 .) As it turned out, the prosecution did not object to any of the information defense counsel file

2024Those obligations include: (1) providing all responsive information of which it has personal knowledge, which includes that from sources under its control (§ 2030.220; Gordon v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 157, 167 ); and (2) “mak[ing] a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations,” except to the extent the information is equally available to plaintiffs (§ 2030.220, subd. (c); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406 ).

2023On appeal, the defendants urged that as a matter of law, they did not violate Penal Code section 550 or submit fraudulent claims within the meaning of Insurance Code section 1871.7, subdivision (b) because although the insureds were not actually represented by attorneys, the information in the claim forms was accurate—i.e., “ ‘[t]here was no allegation of staged accidents, nor any claim that injuries were inflated or that treatment was not provided.’ ” ( Suh, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 255, 259.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the defendants “read the insurance fraud statutes

2022(People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696 .) “To the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s explanation.’” (Ibid.) Relevant considerations included the fact defendant waited four years to allege the existence of an alibi witness and inexplicably withheld the information from defense counsel until after his acceptance of the plea bargain.

2021(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674 ; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 ; People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257, 263 .) Even assuming the prosecutor were required to furnish this information to defense counsel, Dominguez fails to persuade us that evidence of Lugo’s immigration status would have been admissible at trial.

2021(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674 ; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 ; People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257, 263 .) Even assuming the prosecutor were required to furnish this information to defense counsel, Dominguez fails to persuade us that evidence of Lugo’s immigration status would have been admissible at trial.

2021(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674 ; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 ; People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257, 263 .) Even assuming the prosecutor were required to furnish this information to defense counsel, Dominguez fails to persuade us that evidence of Lugo’s immigration status would have been admissible at trial.

2021Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , defendant requests we order remand for the trial court to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing so that it may amend the fines and fees as indicated by the information provided at that hearing.

2021Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision in Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , defendant requests we order remand for the trial court to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing so that it may amend the fines and fees as indicated by the information provided at that hearing.

2019(See USC II, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 40 [“Doe does not indicate how his delay in reviewing” the information showing his academic dishonesty “prejudiced his case”].) Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81 , on which John relies, is distinguishable.

2016Perry and Viscaina executed additional felony advisement and waiver of rights forms, were fully advised of the rights they were waiving by the court, and entered no contest to pleas in accordance with the global negotiated disposition. 4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 3 The court’s voir dire included the following colloquy as to defendant: “The Court: Again, having reviewed a good deal of materials, in connection with the motions in limine, I’m personally aware that there is a factual basis for the plea. [¶] Mr. Perry, you’re charged in [amended] Count Two of the information

2016“It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. [Citations.] Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential.” (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445 ; see also Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 , 1044–1045, citing cases.) “Estoppel most commonly re

2016Defendant also points out that “the prosecution’s right to discover defendant’s witnesses under section 1054.3 is triggered by the intent of the defense to call that witness.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 375 ; and see People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 292 [“To establish on appeal a violation of section 1054.1, subdivision (a), in failing to disclose a witness, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that a specific witness or witnesses were known to and intended to be called by the prosecutor, but were undisclosed to the defense as required by the discovery chapter