information violation in Michigan

2022Having acquired jurisdiction over defendant and the case, MCR 6.112(H) authorized the circuit court to amend the information before, during, or after trial unless the proposed amendment would 9 This Court further explained that even if the trial court had “erred by amending the information in violation of [the] defendant’s statutory right to a preliminary examination, the error was harmless.” McGee, 258 Mich App at 697-699 . -12- unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant. [Id. at 696 (quotations and citations omitted).] In its analysis, this Court noted that in People v Monick, 283 Mich 195

2022Having acquired jurisdiction over defendant and the case, MCR 6.112(H) authorized the circuit court to amend the information before, during, or after trial unless the proposed amendment would 9 This Court further explained that even if the trial court had “erred by amending the information in violation of [the] defendant’s statutory right to a preliminary examination, the error was harmless.” McGee, 258 Mich App at 697-699 . -12- unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant. [Id. at 696 (quotations and citations omitted).] In its analysis, this Court noted that in People v Monick, 283 Mich 195

2022Having acquired jurisdiction over defendant and the case, MCR 6.112(H) authorized the circuit court to amend the information before, during, or after trial unless the proposed amendment would 9 This Court further explained that even if the trial court had “erred by amending the information in violation of [the] defendant’s statutory right to a preliminary examination, the error was harmless.” McGee, 258 Mich App at 697-699 . -12- unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant. [Id. at 696 (quotations and citations omitted).] In its analysis, this Court noted that in People v Monick, 283 Mich 195

2022McGee, 258 Mich App at 694 .

2021Just as this Court held in Jendrusina v Mishra, 316 Mich App 621, 635 ; 892 NW2d 423 (2016), “it would [] be highly disruptive to the doctor-patient relationship for courts to advise patients that they ‘should’ consider every new diagnosis as evidence of possible malpractice until proven otherwise.” And, in this case, the failure of the UM defendant to inform plaintiffs of the critical information that their test results were incorrect arguably prevented plaintiffs from benefiting from the essential purpose of the genetic testing in the first place: to take precautionary measures and modify be

2021Just as this Court held in Jendrusina v Mishra, 316 Mich App 621, 635 ; 892 NW2d 423 (2016), “it would [] be highly disruptive to the doctor-patient relationship for courts to advise patients that they ‘should’ consider every new diagnosis as evidence of possible malpractice until proven otherwise.” And, in this case, the failure of the UM defendant to inform plaintiffs of the critical information that their test results were incorrect arguably prevented plaintiffs from benefiting from the essential purpose of the genetic testing in the first place: to take precautionary measures and modify be

2019Id.

2009The only information that defense counsel had given the prosecutor regarding Dr. VanHorn’s proposed testimony indicated that Dr. VanHorn would testify about defendant’s diminished capacity, which, as noted, is a defense restricted by Carpenter, supra. Under these circumstances, the trial court attempted to limit defense counsel’s ambush. 5 Because the trial court could have properly precluded Dr. VanHorn from testifying at all, 6 its rulings regarding the scope of her testimony were harmless error. 7 2.

1985Next, defendant argues that since he did not receive notice of the filing of the habitual offender information until more than 14 days after he was arraigned on the original information the rule set out in People v Shelton, 412 Mich 565 ; 315 NW2d 537 (1982), was violated.

1985Next, defendant argues that since he did not receive notice of the filing of the habitual offender information until more than 14 days after he was arraigned on the original information the rule set out in People v Shelton, 412 Mich 565 ; 315 NW2d 537 (1982), was violated.

1970The Supreme Court discussed the point in People v. Hopper (1936), 274 Mich 418 .

1931People v. Tamosaitis, 244 Mich. 258 .

1912We have a right to go behind the date charged in the information under the rule of the 166 Mich. 654 . “ The Court: You have asked to go back 16 months.