Archer exception in California

2002(Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 304 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ] (Holtz).) Although Albers had held that the inverse condemnation plaintiff was entitled to compensation without regard to fault, Albers left open two exceptions to that rule—the Gray exception, which is not pertinent here, and the Archer exception.

2002(Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 304 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ] (Holtz).) Although Albers had held that the inverse condemnation plaintiff was entitled to compensation without regard to fault, Albers left open two exceptions to that rule—the Gray exception, which is not pertinent here, and the Archer exception.

2008(Ibid.; Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 23 [ 119 P.2d 1 ].) This unique immunity recognized in inverse condemnation became known as the “Archer exception” and “involved the circumstances, peculiar to water law, in which a landowner had a right to inflict damage upon the property of others for the purpose of protecting his or her own property.

2008(Ibid.; Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 19 Cal.2d 19, 23 [ 119 P.2d 1 ].) This unique immunity recognized in inverse condemnation became known as the “Archer exception” and “involved the circumstances, peculiar to water law, in which a landowner had a right to inflict damage upon the property of others for the purpose of protecting his or her own property.

2002(See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 563-564 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ] (Belair); Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 24-26; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 350 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ] (Locklin).) Presumably, under the Archer exception, a public entity would be completely immune from liability if the entity’s conduct were of the type that would have been immune under these water law principles.

2002(See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 563-564 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ] (Belair); Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 24-26; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 350 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ] (Locklin).) Presumably, under the Archer exception, a public entity would be completely immune from liability if the entity’s conduct were of the type that would have been immune under these water law principles.

2002(See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 563-564 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ] (Belair); Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 24-26; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 350 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ] (Locklin).) Presumably, under the Archer exception, a public entity would be completely immune from liability if the entity’s conduct were of the type that would have been immune under these water law principles.

2002(See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 563-564 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ] (Belair); Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 24-26; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 350 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ] (Locklin).) Presumably, under the Archer exception, a public entity would be completely immune from liability if the entity’s conduct were of the type that would have been immune under these water law principles.

2002(Albers, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 263 ; and see Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500 (1917) 174 Cal. 622 [ 163 P. 1024 ]; Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 24 .) In brief, the so-called Archer exception involved the circumstances, peculiar to water law, in which a landowner had a right to inflict damage upon the property of others for the purpose of protecting his or her own property.

2002(Albers, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 263 ; and see Gray v. Reclamation District No. 1500 (1917) 174 Cal. 622 [ 163 P. 1024 ]; Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 24 .) In brief, the so-called Archer exception involved the circumstances, peculiar to water law, in which a landowner had a right to inflict damage upon the property of others for the purpose of protecting his or her own property.

1994Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d 19 , was among the cases cited in a discussion of the common law concept of the "right to inflict damage." Rather than indicate approval of those cases, all of which predated Keys v. Romley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 396 , we stated that we need not examine their continued validity. ( Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 307 .) And, far from reaffirming the Archer rule in Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., supra, 47 Cal.3d 550 , we expressly recognized that the Keys v. Romley rule of reasonableness had been applied by the Court of Appeal to actions involvi

1994Archer, supra, 19 Cal.2d 19 , was among the cases cited in a discussion of the common law concept of the "right to inflict damage." Rather than indicate approval of those cases, all of which predated Keys v. Romley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 396 , we stated that we need not examine their continued validity. ( Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 307 .) And, far from reaffirming the Archer rule in Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., supra, 47 Cal.3d 550 , we expressly recognized that the Keys v. Romley rule of reasonableness had been applied by the Court of Appeal to actions involvi

2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined.

2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined.

1998(Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 384 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ].) Here, defendants do not assert their actions were an exercise of police power. 15 The Supreme Court has more recently characterized Belair as eliminating the Archer exception.

1998(Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 384 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ].) Here, defendants do not assert their actions were an exercise of police power. 15 The Supreme Court has more recently characterized Belair as eliminating the Archer exception.

1997The Bunches also rely on Locklin’s observation that Belair involved an activity formerly “privileged under the Archer doctrine.” (Locklin, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 16; see also Los Osos Valley Associates v. City of San Luis Obispo (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1670, 1680 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 ] [dictum interpreting Locklin as creating exception to Albers in limited cases where the state at common law had privilege to inflict damage].) As the District and its amici curiae observe, however, Belair’s policy reasons for imposing a reasonableness rule in common enemy cases—to avoid discouraging benef

1997The Bunches also rely on Locklin’s observation that Belair involved an activity formerly “privileged under the Archer doctrine.” (Locklin, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 16; see also Los Osos Valley Associates v. City of San Luis Obispo (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1670, 1680 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 ] [dictum interpreting Locklin as creating exception to Albers in limited cases where the state at common law had privilege to inflict damage].) As the District and its amici curiae observe, however, Belair’s policy reasons for imposing a reasonableness rule in common enemy cases—to avoid discouraging benef

1994As noted above (see fn. 13), traditional rules of property law forbid overburdening an easement or servitude and unreasonable conduct in exercising rights under either. "[T]he owner of a dominant tenement must use his easement and rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement." ( Baker v. Pierce (1950) 100 Cal. App.2d 224, 226 [ 223 P.2d 286 ].) "Every easement includes ... the right to do such things as are necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.

1994As noted above (see fn. 13), traditional rules of property law forbid overburdening an easement or servitude and unreasonable conduct in exercising rights under either. "[T]he owner of a dominant tenement must use his easement and rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement." ( Baker v. Pierce (1950) 100 Cal. App.2d 224, 226 [ 223 P.2d 286 ].) "Every easement includes ... the right to do such things as are necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.

1994The court observed that the Archer rule had been followed in Deckert v. County of Riverside (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 885, 895, 896 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 865 ], and elected to join the Deckert court, rather than the courts which had concluded that the rule of absolute immunity had been replaced by a rule of reasonableness.

1994The court observed that the Archer rule had been followed in Deckert v. County of Riverside (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 885, 895, 896 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 865 ], and elected to join the Deckert court, rather than the courts which had concluded that the rule of absolute immunity had been replaced by a rule of reasonableness.

1988(Van Alstyne, pp. 498-499.) *Page 571 The Archer exception traces its origins to the "common enemy" doctrine of water law, which recognizes a private landowner's right to protect his land by erecting defensive barriers against the "common enemy" of floodwaters. ( Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 635-636 [ 220 P.2d 897 ].) Such conduct is privileged, and any resulting injury inflicted on downstream property owners is not compensable. ( Id. at p. 636.) The initial rationale for the rule was to foster private land development: "Not to permit an upper land owner to protect

1988(Van Alstyne, pp. 498-499.) *Page 571 The Archer exception traces its origins to the "common enemy" doctrine of water law, which recognizes a private landowner's right to protect his land by erecting defensive barriers against the "common enemy" of floodwaters. ( Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 635-636 [ 220 P.2d 897 ].) Such conduct is privileged, and any resulting injury inflicted on downstream property owners is not compensable. ( Id. at p. 636.) The initial rationale for the rule was to foster private land development: "Not to permit an upper land owner to protect

1988Because of this, and because of the necessity of permitting the utilization for drainage of the means afforded by nature for the purpose ... a riparian owner has no right to complain because the volume of water in the stream is increased by artificially draining surface water into it above, provided only the stream is the natural drainage channel for the lands so drained.’ ” (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 27 , quoting San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 401-402 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ].) Archer’s rule was summarized in Hol

1988Because of this, and because of the necessity of permitting the utilization for drainage of the means afforded by nature for the purpose ... a riparian owner has no right to complain because the volume of water in the stream is increased by artificially draining surface water into it above, provided only the stream is the natural drainage channel for the lands so drained.’ ” (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 27 , quoting San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392, 401-402 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ].) Archer’s rule was summarized in Hol

1970As we explained fully in Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 730-731 [ 123 P.2d 505 ], the “police power” doctrine “[generally . . . operates in the field of regulation,” rendering “damages” occasioned by the adoption of administrative or legislative provisions noncompensable (e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian (1915) 239 U.S. 394 [ 60 L.Ed. 348 , 36 S.Ct. 143 ] (reduction in property value resulting from zoning ordinance need not be compensated); Chicago & Alton R.R.

1970As we explained fully in Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 730-731 [ 123 P.2d 505 ], the “police power” doctrine “[generally . . . operates in the field of regulation,” rendering “damages” occasioned by the adoption of administrative or legislative provisions noncompensable (e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian (1915) 239 U.S. 394 [ 60 L.Ed. 348 , 36 S.Ct. 143 ] (reduction in property value resulting from zoning ordinance need not be compensated); Chicago & Alton R.R.