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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corporationgreen2 sentences1978(See Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Eaton Manufacturing Co. (N.D.Ohio 1964) 37 F.R.D. 51, 60 .) [11] Under the comparable federal rule, it has been held that if the answer is available in a more convenient form, the proponent should not be required to search through records in order to obtain the proper data. ( Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp. (10th Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 221, 226 .) [12] Under federal practice, the general rule is that where a party fails to object within the time fixed by the federal rules, the objection is waived. 1978(Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp. (10th Cir. 1976) •534 F.2d 221,226.) Under federal practice, the general rule is that where a party fails to object within the time fixed by the federal rules, the objection is waived. | 1 | 2 |
Solis v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988Under the governing California statutes, although search warrants, as a general rule, are to be executed in the daytime, a magistrate may authorize nighttime service of a warrant in a particular case for “good cause.” (§§ 1529, 1533; Solis v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 774, 776-777 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 408 P.2d 945 ].) 6 In recent years, a number of Court of Appeal opinions have offered different verbal formulations in an attempt to clarify the “good cause” standard in this context. 7 It is difficult, however, to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of 1988Under the governing California statutes, although search warrants, as a general rule, are to be executed in the daytime, a magistrate may authorize nighttime service of a warrant in a particular case for “good cause.” (§§ 1529, 1533; Solis v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 774, 776-777 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 408 P.2d 945 ].) 6 In recent years, a number of Court of Appeal opinions have offered different verbal formulations in an attempt to clarify the “good cause” standard in this context. 7 It is difficult, however, to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kimblegreen2 sentences1988As the Supreme Court recently clarified in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 494 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 749 P.2d 803 ]: “It is difficult, however, to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of a nighttime search and we think that the Sixth Circuit—in interpreting *1468 the comparable federal rule on nighttime searches—adopted the proper perspective in suggesting that ‘[t]he Rule requires only some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the exigencies of the situation. 1988As the Supreme Court recently clarified in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 494 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 749 P.2d 803 ]: “It is difficult, however, to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of a nighttime search and we think that the Sixth Circuit—in interpreting *1468 the comparable federal rule on nighttime searches—adopted the proper perspective in suggesting that ‘[t]he Rule requires only some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the exigencies of the situation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mardianred2 sentences1988The procedural requirements of the Rule ensure that the fact that nighttime search is contemplated by the police is brought to the attention of a magistrate and that he or she consciously decide[s] whether such a particularly abrasive intrusion is called for in a given situation.” (United States v. Searp (6th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1117, 1121 , 58 A.L.R.Fed. 743, italics added.) In the present case, we cannot say that the magistrate erred in concluding that the “exigencies of the situation”—as revealed by the facts set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant (see, e.g., People v. 1988The procedural requirements of the Rule ensure that the fact that nighttime search is contemplated by the police is brought to the attention of a magistrate and that he or she consciously decide[s] whether such a particularly abrasive intrusion is called for in a given situation.” (United States v. Searp (6th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1117, 1121 , 58 A.L.R.Fed. 743, italics added.) In the present case, we cannot say that the magistrate erred in concluding that the “exigencies of the situation”—as revealed by the facts set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant (see, e.g., People v. | 1 | 1 |
Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1983Code, § 1160.8; Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 343-346 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) While the administrative agency under this test is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make its own credibility determination, ‘the test of substantiality must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations 1983Code, § 1160.8; Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 343-346 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) While the administrative agency under this test is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make its own credibility determination, ‘the test of substantiality must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations | 1 | 1 |
Martori Bros. Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1983Code, § 1160.8; Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 343-346 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) While the administrative agency under this test is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make its own credibility determination, ‘the test of substantiality must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations 1983Code, § 1160.8; Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 343-346 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) While the administrative agency under this test is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make its own credibility determination, ‘the test of substantiality must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Clark
yellow
2 sentences2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the 2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Jones v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the 2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Fields
green
2 sentences2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the 2017(In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 .) However, a writ of habeas corpus serves a “traditional function as a flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 803 , italics added (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236, 243 .) Under the | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Jerry Wayne Searp
green
2 sentences1988The procedural requirements of the Rule ensure that the fact that nighttime search is contemplated by the police is brought to the attention of a magistrate and that he or she consciously decide[s] whether such a particularly abrasive intrusion is called for in a given situation.” (United States v. Searp (6th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1117, 1121 , 58 A.L.R.Fed. 743, italics added.) In the present case, we cannot say that the magistrate erred in concluding that the “exigencies of the situation”—as revealed by the facts set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant (see, e.g., People v. 1988The procedural requirements of the Rule ensure that the fact that nighttime search is contemplated by the police is brought to the attention of a magistrate and that he or she consciously decide[s] whether such a particularly abrasive intrusion is called for in a given situation.’ (United States v. Searp (6th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1117, 1121 , . . .)” (Fns. omitted.) Detective Ward testified here that the basis for his “request” (presumably the signing of the form paragraph) was, “Nighttime service is any time you got people dealing in drugs there’s always a danger of being shot or hurt, and I d | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Trabon Engineering Co. v. Eaton Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1978(See Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Eaton Manufacturing Co. (N.D.Ohio 1964) 37 F.R.D. 51, 60 .) [11] Under the comparable federal rule, it has been held that if the answer is available in a more convenient form, the proponent should not be required to search through records in order to obtain the proper data. ( Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp. (10th Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 221, 226 .) [12] Under federal practice, the general rule is that where a party fails to object within the time fixed by the federal rules, the objection is waived. 1978(See Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Eaton Manufacturing Co. (N.D.Ohio 1964) 37 F.R.D. 51, 60 .) Under the comparable federal rule, it has been held that if the answer is available in a more convenient form, the proponent should not be required to search through records in order to obtain the proper data. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Haworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
2 sentences2015Adopting a comparable federal standard, the court wrote that “the appearance-of-partiality ‘standard “must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he partisan litigant emotionally involved in the controversy underlying the lawsuit is not the disinterested objective 5 observer whose doubts concer 2015Adopting a comparable federal standard, the court wrote that “the appearance-of-partiality ‘standard “must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he partisan litigant emotionally involved in the controversy underlying the lawsuit is not the disinterested objective 5 observer whose doubts concer | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.