fundamental legal principle in California

2026(See People v. Tessman (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293 , 1302-1304 [unlike statements indicating the trial court based its ruling on a fundamental legal error, general statements reflecting the trial court’s understanding of the evidence are not cause for reversal].) 20 Curiel contends the state should not be allowed to switch positions now and effectively disavow Lupe’s police statement in favor of Raul’s trial testimony.

2024As our Supreme Court recently explained: “ ‘ “[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.” [Citation.] “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” ’ [Citation.] We have therefore recognized that structural error is limited to circumstances in which the error ‘necessarily affected the whole framework within which the trial proceeded’ or ‘defies analysis for prejudice.’ ” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 461 .) Neither of th

2024Defense counsel concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and that the only way to avoid the death penalty would be to concede guilt and urge mercy at the penalty phase in view of McCoy’s “ ‘serious mental and emotional issues.’ ” (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 420 .) McCoy, however, “vociferously insisted” that he did not commit the killings, clearly instructed his counsel to pursue acquittal instead of any concession of guilt, and testified he was innocent.

2013Transportation Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 762, 782 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 1 ]), and need not correct the instruction unless the failure to do so would deny the jury guidance on a fundamental legal principle applicable to the case (Paverud v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 858, 863 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 585 ], overruled on another ground in Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 572 ).

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) [5] Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, "admitting the violation of the law," which *504 they must disclose as "the groundwork of [their] claim," from recovery of the money which was in actual use in their illegal gambling activities. ( Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585 [ 4 P.2d 712, 714 ].) It is not a question of the ultimate disposition of the seized money, but rather application of a "salutary rule invoked to uphold law and order." ( Asher v. Johnson, supra, 26

1951Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) [5] Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, "admitting the violation of the law," which *504 they must disclose as "the groundwork of [their] claim," from recovery of the money which was in actual use in their illegal gambling activities. ( Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585 [ 4 P.2d 712, 714 ].) It is not a question of the ultimate disposition of the seized money, but rather application of a "salutary rule invoked to uphold law and order." ( Asher v. Johnson, supra, 26

1951(Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585 [ 4 P.2d 712, 714 ].) It is not a question of the ultimate disposition of the seized money, but rather application of a “salutary rule invoked to uphold law and order.” (Asher v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.App.2d 403, 414 .) This principle of the law, grounded on public policy, is not affected by the independent considerations entering into the statutory declaration limiting forfeitures to those “expressly imposed by law.” (Pen.

1951Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) [5] Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, "admitting the violation of the law," which *504 they must disclose as "the groundwork of [their] claim," from recovery of the money which was in actual use in their illegal gambling activities. ( Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585 [ 4 P.2d 712, 714 ].) It is not a question of the ultimate disposition of the seized money, but rather application of a "salutary rule invoked to uphold law and order." ( Asher v. Johnson, supra, 26

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1951(Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449 [ 49 N.E.2d 523, 527 ]; Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill.App. 112 [ 74 N.E.2d 29, 30 ]; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100 [ 117 P.2d 468, 469-470 ]; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229 [ 195 P.2d 1017, 1020 ]; see, also, Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.Super. 367 [ 5 A.2d 419, 420-421 ]; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.Super. 22 [ 65 A.2d 542, 544 ].) Equally applicable here as in the Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding plaintiffs, “admitting the violation of the law,” which they mus

1932In People v. Spinato, 100 Cal. App. 600 [ 280 Pac. 691 ], quoting from People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702 [ 277 Pac. 747 ], the rule was expressed in the following language: “From previous rulings and the express language of the Constitution, it is at once obvious that this inviolate constitutional right may not be taken away in disregard of the fundamental legal privilege and power of election *160 guaranteed to the party charged, by attempting to vest in his representative the dual capacity and authority of counsel and accused.

1932In People v. Spinato, 100 Cal. App. 600 [ 280 Pac. 691 ], quoting from People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702 [ 277 Pac. 747 ], the rule was expressed in the following language: “From previous rulings and the express language of the Constitution, it is at once obvious that this inviolate constitutional right may not be taken away in disregard of the fundamental legal privilege and power of election *160 guaranteed to the party charged, by attempting to vest in his representative the dual capacity and authority of counsel and accused.

1932In People v. Spinato, 100 Cal. App. 600 [ 280 Pac. 691 ], quoting from People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702 [ 277 Pac. 747 ], the rule was expressed in the following language: “From previous rulings and the express language of the Constitution, it is at once obvious that this inviolate constitutional right may not be taken away in disregard of the fundamental legal privilege and power of election *160 guaranteed to the party charged, by attempting to vest in his representative the dual capacity and authority of counsel and accused.

1932In People v. Spinato, 100 Cal. App. 600 [ 280 Pac. 691 ], quoting from People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702 [ 277 Pac. 747 ], the rule was expressed in the following language: “From previous rulings and the express language of the Constitution, it is at once obvious that this inviolate constitutional right may not be taken away in disregard of the fundamental legal privilege and power of election *160 guaranteed to the party charged, by attempting to vest in his representative the dual capacity and authority of counsel and accused.