contingency clause in Connecticut

2022The legal conclusions of the trial court will stand, however, only if they are legally and logically correct and are consistent with the facts of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 694 , 992 A.2d 1219 (2010). ‘‘A mortgage contingency clause contained in a contract for the sale of real property generally allows the purchaser to recover his or her deposit if the purchaser is unable to secure a mortgage and has complied with the provisions of the contingency clause.

2022The legal conclusions of the trial court will stand, however, only if they are legally and logically correct and are consistent with the facts of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 694 , 992 A.2d 1219 (2010). ‘‘A mortgage contingency clause contained in a contract for the sale of real property generally allows the purchaser to recover his or her deposit if the purchaser is unable to secure a mortgage and has complied with the provisions of the contingency clause.

2014See Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706 , 724–25, 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (concluding that because ‘‘ ‘any action’ ’’ was used in conjunction with phrase ‘‘ ‘no person,’ ’’ it should be afforded broad- est possible formulation); Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1 , 14–15, 938 A.2d 576 (2008) (reading ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in conjunction with words ‘‘ ‘without limitation’ ’’ in contract dispute to have expansive meaning); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 414 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (noting that meaning of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ is context dependent bu

2014See Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706 , 724–25, 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (concluding that because ‘‘ ‘any action’ ’’ was used in conjunction with phrase ‘‘ ‘no person,’ ’’ it should be afforded broad- est possible formulation); Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1 , 14–15, 938 A.2d 576 (2008) (reading ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in conjunction with words ‘‘ ‘without limitation’ ’’ in contract dispute to have expansive meaning); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 414 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (noting that meaning of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ is context dependent bu

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014Zappone Co. v. Mark, 197 Conn. 264, 267 , 497 A.2d 32 (1985). 2 I agree with the plaintiff and the majority that the defendant’s interpreta- tion of the contingency clause as a profit sharing provision cannot be sus- tained in light of the language and structure of the buyout agreement.

2014Zappone Co. v. Mark, 197 Conn. 264, 267 , 497 A.2d 32 (1985). 2 I agree with the plaintiff and the majority that the defendant’s interpreta- tion of the contingency clause as a profit sharing provision cannot be sus- tained in light of the language and structure of the buyout agreement.

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706 , 724–25, 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (concluding that because ‘‘ ‘any action’ ’’ was used in conjunction with phrase ‘‘ ‘no person,’ ’’ it should be afforded broad- est possible formulation); Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1 , 14–15, 938 A.2d 576 (2008) (reading ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in conjunction with words ‘‘ ‘without limitation’ ’’ in contract dispute to have expansive meaning); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 414 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (noting that meaning of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ is context dependent bu

2014See Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706 , 724–25, 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (concluding that because ‘‘ ‘any action’ ’’ was used in conjunction with phrase ‘‘ ‘no person,’ ’’ it should be afforded broad- est possible formulation); Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1 , 14–15, 938 A.2d 576 (2008) (reading ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in conjunction with words ‘‘ ‘without limitation’ ’’ in contract dispute to have expansive meaning); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 414 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (noting that meaning of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ is context dependent bu

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Net of the North- east, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 14 (use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in phrase ‘‘ ‘any reason’ ’’ gives phrase broad and inclusive mean- ing [emphasis omitted]); see also AvalonBay Commu- nities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 405, 413 , 908 A.2d 1033 (2006) (legislature’s use of ‘‘ ‘any’ ’’ in statute is ‘‘broad and all-inclusive’’ [emphasis omitted]); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 422 , 862 A.2d 292 (2004) (court will not provide ‘‘exception or limitation’’ to language made broad by use of word ‘‘ ‘[a]ny’ ’’ [emphasis omitted]); Gipson v. Commission

2014For simplicity, we refer to the defendant and Vaughn, rather than the respective entity each of them used, when discussing their roles in the transactions at issue. 3 The defendant also challenged the trial court’s calculation of damages, but the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision; Salce v. Wolczek, supra, 141 Conn. App. 530 ; and the defendant has not appealed to this court on that basis. 4 The second certified question originally stated, in part: ‘‘If the answer to the first question is in the negative . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Salce v. Wolczek, 308 Conn. 944 , 66 A.3d 885 (

2014The defen- dant’s briefing on this argument is limited to a paragraph that points to lower prevailing federal interest rates over the relevant time period and notes that the Appellate Court recently upheld an interest award of 2 percent in Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 144 Conn. App. 755 , 762–63, 75 A.3d 700 , cert. granted, 310 Conn. 931 , 78 A.3d 857 (2013).

2014The defen- dant’s briefing on this argument is limited to a paragraph that points to lower prevailing federal interest rates over the relevant time period and notes that the Appellate Court recently upheld an interest award of 2 percent in Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 144 Conn. App. 755 , 762–63, 75 A.3d 700 , cert. granted, 310 Conn. 931 , 78 A.3d 857 (2013).

1996The objections filed by the plaintiff in this case, which are also included in his motion to correct, relate essentially to the following contention, which neatly sums up the controversy: "[t]he subordinate facts contained in the Corrected Findings . . . lead [inevitably] to the conclusion that had the Plaintiff filed an immediate application for the mortgage set forth in the contingency clause and diligently pursued the same that effort would have been futile." Thus, the motion to correct, the exceptions and the objections filed by the plaintiff present this issue: did the plaintiff comply wi

1996The objections filed by the plaintiff in this case, which are also included in his motion to correct, relate essentially to the following contention, which neatly sums up the controversy: "[t]he subordinate facts contained in the Corrected Findings . . . lead [inevitably] to the conclusion that had the Plaintiff filed an immediate application for the mortgage set forth in the contingency clause and diligently pursued the same that effort would have been futile." Thus, the motion to correct, the exceptions and the objections filed by the plaintiff present this issue: did the plaintiff comply wi

1992Winestine, et al. v. The Rose Cloak And Suit Company, et als, 93 Conn. 633 , 637 (1919).

1991Phillipe v. Thomas, 3 Conn. App. 471 , 475 , 489 A.2d 1056 (1985).

1991Phillipe v. Thomas, 3 Conn. App. 471 , 475 , 489 A.2d 1056 (1985).

1991Lach v. Cahill, supra, p. 422 .; 3 Corbin Contracts, p. 207.