value claim in Connecticut

1932Commonwealth v. Lancaster Savings Bank (1878) 123 Mass. 493, 496 .

1931“That amount would disclose its capacity and the value of the privilege and benefit it enjoyed under its charter on the day when the tax was assessed.” Commonwealth v. Lancaster Savings Bank (1878) 123 Mass. 493, 496 .

1997See Federal Rules of Evidence 408 , advisory committee note"; McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240 , 247 .

1991In Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 , 830 (New Hampshire 1980), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that, although not a fundamental right, "the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right." In Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562 , 585 (1986), the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that injuries suffered in an automobile accident could be linked to the preconstitutional common law action of trespass on the case and, as such, could be considered a constitutionally incorporated common law right: It is clear then that the framers of the state constitution inte

1991In Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 , 830 (New Hampshire 1980), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that, although not a fundamental right, "the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right." In Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562 , 585 (1986), the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that injuries suffered in an automobile accident could be linked to the preconstitutional common law action of trespass on the case and, as such, could be considered a constitutionally incorporated common law right: It is clear then that the framers of the state constitution inte

1986The value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways are so great that the practice may amount to little more than a mere subterfuge . . . .” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 , 473-74 n.4, 69 S. Ct. 213 , 93 L.

1986The value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways are so great that the practice may amount to little more than a mere subterfuge . . . .” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 , 473-74 n.4, 69 S. Ct. 213 , 93 L.

1958It followed the rule laid down in Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 600 , 262 P.2d 305 , which *194 held that the damages are to be measured by the value rule when the improvements are to be made upon another’s property, though the reasonable cost rule applies where the improvements are to be made on one’s own property.

1958It followed the rule laid down in Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 600 , 262 P.2d 305 , which *194 held that the damages are to be measured by the value rule when the improvements are to be made upon another’s property, though the reasonable cost rule applies where the improvements are to be made on one’s own property.

1948The fact that the tax is measured by a percentage of net income, or, in the case of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, by a percentage of a part of its net income proportioned to the amount of its tangible property in this State, does not, of course, prevent it from being an excise or privilege tax.” We said further (p. 64): “The legislature evidently intended to make the tax proportionate to the value of the privilege.” In a report of a temporary tax commission appointed under an act passed by the General Assembly at its 1933 session, and mistakenly referred to in the opinion of th