notice requirements rule in Texas

2022Espinoza held that, “when a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice pursuant to Rule 404(b), it is incumbent on him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.” Id. at 39.

2011In that case, the Court held that ―when a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice pursuant to [Texas Rule of Evidence] 404(b), it is incumbent upon him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.‖ Id. at 39 .

2014In addition, we construe the document filed by the State as serving a dual purpose because it served as both a “Motion to Enhance Punishment Pursuant to Section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code,” and as “Notice to Defendant of Intent to Enhance Punishment.” Even if we agreed with Green that the document served only as a motion, the only law cited by Green in support of his contention that such a motion was not “some form” for pleading enhancement allegations is case law holding that “‘when a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice pursuant to Rule 404(b), it is incumbent upon

2010App. 1993) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice . . . it is incumbent upon him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.”); see also Mitchell v. State, 982 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. Crim.

2001See Cooper v. State , No. 1100-99, slip op. at 12, 2001 Tex. Crim.

2001Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

2014However, when a defendant relies on a pretrial motion to request notice of the State’s intent to introduce extraneous-offense evidence, “it is incumbent upon him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.” Simpson v. State, 991 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Crim.

2006Mitchell v. State, 982 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Simpson v. State, 991 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (holding defendant’s motion requesting the court to order the State to provide notice of intent to offer extraneous-offense evidence insufficient to trigger notice requirement); Espinosa v. State, 853 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (“when a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice pursuant to Rule 404(b), it is incumbent upon him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.”).

2001Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 132-34 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2001Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2000See, e.g., Marshall v. State , No. 13-99-153-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5427, at *6 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi August 10, 2000, n.pet.h.) (designated for publication); Davis v. State, 7 S.W.3d 695, 696 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).

2000See, e.g., Marshall v. State , No. 13-99-153-CR (Corpus Christi August 10, 2000, n.p.h.)(designated for publication); Davis v. State , 7 S.W.3d 695, 696 (Tex.App.­Houston [1 st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).

2000See Marshall v. State , 28 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).

2000See, e.g., Marshall v. State , No. 13-99-153-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5427, at *6 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi August 10, 2000, n.pet.h.) (designated for publication); Davis v. State, 7 S.W.3d 695, 696 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).

2004See Canadian Triton Int’l Ltd. v. JFP Energy, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ); Stephens v. Turtle Creek Apts., Ltd., 875 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (“reason for the twenty-one day notice provision is to give the party opposing the summary judgment a full opportunity to respond on the merits . . . [and because summary judgment] is such a harsh remedy, the notice provisions of Rule 1661(c) must be strictly construed”).

2004See Canadian Triton Int'l Ltd. v. JFP Energy, Inc. , 888 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, no writ); Stephens v. Turtle Creek Apts., Ltd. , 875 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) ("reason for the twenty-one day notice provision is to give the party opposing the summary judgment a full opportunity to respond on the merits . . . [and because summary judgment] is such a harsh remedy, the notice provisions of Rule 1661(c) must be strictly construed").

2013See President v. State, 926 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. ref'd). .

2001In Espinosa v. State, 853 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), the Court held that “when a defendant relies on a motion for discovery to request notice pursuant to Rule 404(b), it is incumbent on him to secure a ruling on his motion in order to trigger the notice requirements of that rule.” Id. at 39 ; Simpson, 991 S.W.2d at 801 ; President v. State, 926 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref'd).

2004See Canadian Triton Int’l Ltd. v. JFP Energy, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ); Stephens v. Turtle Creek Apts., Ltd., 875 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (“reason for the twenty-one day notice provision is to give the party opposing the summary judgment a full opportunity to respond on the merits . . . [and because summary judgment] is such a harsh remedy, the notice provisions of Rule 1661(c) must be strictly construed”).

2004See Canadian Triton Int'l Ltd. v. JFP Energy, Inc. , 888 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, no writ); Stephens v. Turtle Creek Apts., Ltd. , 875 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) ("reason for the twenty-one day notice provision is to give the party opposing the summary judgment a full opportunity to respond on the merits . . . [and because summary judgment] is such a harsh remedy, the notice provisions of Rule 1661(c) must be strictly construed").

2001Feagin v. State , 967 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Crim.

2001Feagin v. State, 967 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

1993Lynch v. Bank of Dallas, 746 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied).

1990Lynch v. Bank of Dallas, 746 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied).

2017“Because summary judgment is a harsh remedy, we must strictly construe the notice requirements of the rule.” Etheredge, 169 S.W.3d at 383 .

2014E.g., Dougherty-Williams, 2014 WL 2809827 , at *6; Myers v. Cnty. of Williamson, 2011 WL 6352288 , at *4; Waggoner v. Breland, No. 01-10-00226-CV, 2011 WL 2732687 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mark Rotella Custom Homes, 2008 WL 623785 , at *3-4; Etheredge, 169 S.W.3d at 382 Gonzales, 863 S.W.2d at 102 ; Roberts, 133 S.W.3d at 663 ; Approximately $U,980.00, 261 S.W.3d at 189 . 12 Here, the record 13 reflects that Morgan Stanley and IberiaBank were served with the writ on November 21, 2012, which was the Wednesday before Thanksgiving.

2015Indus., Inc., 735 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).

1997Stephens, 875 S.W.2d at 26 ; Sams, 735 S.W.2d at 487 .

2023Hernandez v. State, 176 S.W.3d 821, 825 (Tex. Crim.

2018In re I.L.S., 339 S.W.3d 156, 159 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); In re RPH Capital Partners, LP, No. 04-16-00424-CV, 2017 WL 2561562 , at *2 (Tex. App.— San Antonio June 14, 2017, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2004See id. at 695 .

2004See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. , 972 S.W.2d at 43 ; see also Raines v. Gomez , 118 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (conducting harm analysis of trial court's error in not providing requisite forty-five-day notice of trial setting).

2004See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. , 972 S.W.2d at 43 ; see also Raines v. Gomez , 118 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (conducting harm analysis of trial court's error in not providing requisite forty-five-day notice of trial setting).

2002Id. at 360 ( Kinkeade , J., dissenting).

2001Compare Lopez v. State, 25 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st.

1998See Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (applying former rule 40(b)(1)).