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8 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 2002–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roxana Santos v. Frederick County Board of Commissionersgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that each of the three different categories of police-citizen encounters identified by the Supreme Court—“consensual” encounters, “brief investigative detentions,” and arrests—“represents differing degrees of restraint and, accordingly, requires differing levels of justification”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1541 (2014); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (remarking that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is not susceptible to a “neat set of legal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
Mobility Med., Inc. v. Miss. Dep't of Revenuegreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that each of the three different categories of police-citizen encounters identified by the Supreme Court—“consensual” encounters, “brief investigative detentions,” and arrests—“represents differing degrees of restraint and, accordingly, requires differing levels of justification”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1541 (2014); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (remarking that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is not susceptible to a “neat set of legal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that each of the three different categories of police-citizen encounters identified by the Supreme Court—“consensual” encounters, “brief investigative detentions,” and arrests—“represents differing degrees of restraint and, accordingly, requires differing levels of justification”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1541 (2014); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (remarking that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is not susceptible to a “neat set of legal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 712981green1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
cluster 458753green1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
Betty Lester v. City of Chicago, Officer Daniel Leahy, Officer Ernest Cain, and Sergeant John McNultygreen1 sentence2010Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir.1987). 15 . | 1 | 1 |
John Dewitt McDowell v. R.R. Rogers, D.E. Ross, and R.L. Martingreen1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
Torres v. City of Maderagreen1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
TORRES v. McLAUGHLINgreen1 sentence2010See also DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602-03 (3rd Cir.2005); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3rd Cir.1998) (stating that “there may be some circumstances during pre-trial detention that implicate Fourth Amendment rights”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276-81 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating that an individual who is released from police custody pending trial should be considered “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because such a person “is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his | 1 | 1 |
Robert Wilson v. David Spain, Mike Jonesgreen1 sentence2010See Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure “continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers”); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000) (analyzing claims of excessive police force after an arrest | 1 | 1 |
cluster 790197green1 sentence2010See also DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602-03 (3rd Cir.2005); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3rd Cir.1998) (stating that “there may be some circumstances during pre-trial detention that implicate Fourth Amendment rights”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276-81 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating that an individual who is released from police custody pending trial should be considered “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because such a person “is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), 2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen2 sentences2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), 2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. State
green
2 sentences2002In particular, prolonging “a detention because the K-9 unit is detained elsewhere must be viewed as contrary to the diligence required under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.” Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468 , 705 A.2d 82 . 2002In particular, prolonging “a detention because the K-9 unit is detained elsewhere must be viewed as contrary to the diligence required under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.” Graham, 119 Md.App. at 468 , 705 A.2d 82 . | 2 | 2002–2006 |
White v. United States
green
1 sentence2025As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated in White v. United States, 68 A.3d 271 , 283- 84 (2013): The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether the actions of the police were reasonable—i.e., whether they were taken with adequate justification. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Okwa v. Harper
green
2 sentences2016We “take the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene of the incident at issue and pay close attention to the particular facts of each case.” Okwa, 360 Md. at 204 , 757 A.2d at 141 . 2016We “take the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene of the incident at issue and pay close attention to the particular facts of each case.” Okwa, 360 Md. at 204 , 757 A.2d at 141 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Albright v. Oliver
green
2 sentences2010See also DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602-03 (3rd Cir.2005); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3rd Cir.1998) (stating that “there may be some circumstances during pre-trial detention that implicate Fourth Amendment rights”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276-81 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating that an individual who is released from police custody pending trial should be considered “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because such a person “is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his 2010See also DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602-03 (3rd Cir.2005); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3rd Cir.1998) (stating that “there may be some circumstances during pre-trial detention that implicate Fourth Amendment rights”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276-81 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating that an individual who is released from police custody pending trial should be considered “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because such a person “is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested in his | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Henson v. State
green
2 sentences2004In addition, as this Court already had done, see Henson, 236 Md. at 523-25 , 204 A.2d at 519-20 , 13 Wilson made clear that the announcement requirement is not rigid; the Fourth Amendment privacy interests must be balanced with the need for effective law enforcement and police safety. 2004In addition, as this Court already had done, see Henson, 236 Md. at 523-25 , 204 A.2d at 519-20 , 13 Wilson made clear that the announcement requirement is not rigid; the Fourth Amendment privacy interests must be balanced with the need for effective law enforcement and police safety. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), 2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977), | 1 | 2004–2004 |
South Dakota v. Opperman
green
2 sentences2003The Court explained that when automobiles are taken into the custody of local police departments, in furtherance of their community caretaking functions, the departments ordinarily follow “a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents!,]” to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and from danger; and that in applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in prior opinions, the Court “ha[d] consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at 2003The Court explained that when automobiles are taken into the custody of local police departments, in furtherance of their community caretaking functions, the departments ordinarily follow “a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents!,]” to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and from danger; and that in applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in prior opinions, the Court “ha[d] consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wilkes v. State
green
1 sentence2002In Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 570 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001), the Court of Appeals held that because an investigation incident to a traffic stop was still legitimately underway at the time the canine scan occurred, there was no second stop. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Wilkes v. State
green
1 sentence2002In Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 570 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001), the Court of Appeals held that because an investigation incident to a traffic stop was still legitimately underway at the time the canine scan occurred, there was no second stop. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.