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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 | 1 | 1 |
Atwater v. City of Lago Vistagreen2 sentences2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 | 1 | 1 |
Rawlings v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2014(Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111 [ 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 ] (“Rawlings”) [“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”].) The Court in Rawlings imposed no limitations on such a search, apart from the requirements that probable cause to arrest exist before the search and the arrest quickly follow the search. 2014(Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111 [ 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 ] (“Rawlings”) [“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”].) The Court in Rawlings imposed no limitations on such a search, apart from the requirements that probable cause to arrest exist before the search and the arrest quickly follow the search. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 453-454 [“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.”]; United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ] [“The reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.”].) Here, although the game warden’s observation of def 2011(See, e.g., Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 453-454 [“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.”]; United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ] [“The reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.”].) Here, although the game warden’s observation of def | 1 | 1 |
Duke v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v 2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2000Discussion I Defendant’s Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: “[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.” (Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 [ 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ] (Wilson).) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. 2000Discussion I Defendant’s Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: “[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.” (Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 [ 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ] (Wilson).) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gastelogreen2 sentences2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v 2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rosalesgreen2 sentences2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v 2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v 2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v | 1 | 1 |
Greven v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v 2000Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the charged offense and was placed on three years' probation. *559 I Discussion I Defendant's Right to Challenge the Knock-notice Violation The United States Supreme Court has declared as a matter of federal constitutional law: "[T]he common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry." ( Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 930 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980 ( Wilson) . ) Long before Wilson , the California courts had applied a Fourth Amendment standard to knock-notice questions. ( Duke v | 1 | 1 |
Soldal v. Cook Countygreen2 sentences1997The United States Supreme Court has held: “The plain view doctrine ‘merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment’s central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property. [Citations.]” (Soldal v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 66 [ 113 S.Ct. 538, 546 , 121 L.Ed.2d 450 ].) The Supreme Court described the limitations and the expanse of the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 134-136 [ 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306-2307 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ] as follows: “‘It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in 1997The United States Supreme Court has held: “The plain view doctrine ‘merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment’s central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property. [Citations.]” (Soldal v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 66 [ 113 S.Ct. 538, 546 , 121 L.Ed.2d 450 ].) The Supreme Court described the limitations and the expanse of the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 134-136 [ 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306-2307 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ] as follows: “‘It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in | 1 | 1 |
Horton v. Californiagreen2 sentences1997The United States Supreme Court has held: “The plain view doctrine ‘merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment’s central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property. [Citations.]” (Soldal v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 66 [ 113 S.Ct. 538, 546 , 121 L.Ed.2d 450 ].) The Supreme Court described the limitations and the expanse of the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 134-136 [ 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306-2307 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ] as follows: “‘It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in 1997The United States Supreme Court has held: “The plain view doctrine ‘merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment’s central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property. [Citations.]” (Soldal v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 66 [ 113 S.Ct. 538, 546 , 121 L.Ed.2d 450 ].) The Supreme Court described the limitations and the expanse of the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 134-136 [ 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306-2307 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ] as follows: “‘It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2024The Birchfield court’s language suggests it viewed the different consequences as part of a continuum, with the most severe consequence (criminal penalties) violating the Fourth Amendment because “[t]here must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” (Birchfield, supra, 579 U.S. at p. 477 .) Applying a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, the court concluded that “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” (Birchfield, at p. 477. 2024The Birchfield court made clear it was not recognizing an unqualified Fourth Amendment right (1) to refuse to take a blood test, and (2) to be free of any consequences flowing from the refusal. ( Birchfield, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 476–477.) Instead, the Birchfield court concluded only that, applying a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” (Birchfield, at p. 477, italics added.) Birchfield did not prohibit (and stressed it did not intend to “cast doubt” on) implied consent laws | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. McKay
green
1 sentence2014(Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [ 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 ] [violation of Texas law requiring passengers in front seat of vehicle to wear seat belts].) The fact that a state or federal statute does not permit an arrest for the offense is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. ( Moore, supra, 553 U.S. at pp. 164, 167, 169, fn. 2, 172 [defendant arrested in violation of a Virginia statute that required only a summons be issued for driving with a suspended license]; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 815 [ 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 8 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Insook Kim, AKA in Sook Kim
green
1 sentence2006(United States v. Kim (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 969, 976 .) To resolve the detention issue, courts examine whether handcuffing the defendant met the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Sewn Newton
green
1 sentence2006As Newton explains, “where an officer has a reasonable basis to think that the person stopped poses a present physical threat to the officer or others, the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to take ‘necessary *1406 measures ... to neutralize the threat’ without converting a reasonable stop into a de facto arrest. [Citations.]” (Newton, supra, 369 F.3d at p. 674 , original italics.) Thus, courts look to the reasonableness of the officer’s actions to determine whether handcuffing exceeded the scope of the detention and transformed it into a de facto arrest. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Seekamp v. Michaud
green
2 sentences1998The Fourth Amendment reasonableness test requires careful attention to the circumstances in the particular case.” (Seekamp v. Michaud, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 806 .) “Moreover, ‘a viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant’s] actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in the light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.’ ” (Ibid.) “Graham identifies three factors for evaluating whether the force used to effect a seizure was objectively reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether there w 1998The Fourth Amendment reasonableness test requires careful attention to the circumstances in the particular case.” (Seekamp v. Michaud, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 806 .) “Moreover, ‘a viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant’s] actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in the light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.’ ” (Ibid.) “Graham identifies three factors for evaluating whether the force used to effect a seizure was objectively reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether there w | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Jamieson v. Shaw
green
1 sentence1998(Jamieson v. Shaw, supra, 772 F.2d at p. 1211 .) *206 “A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.