qualified or conditional privilege in Maryland

2026The parties stipulated “that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege[.]”8 Id. at 239 . 8 Although our Supreme Court observed parenthetically that “there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants[,]” the approved concession was not that statements regarding sexual orientation are defam

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007At the trial it was stipulated (a) that the credit company, as a mercantile rating agency, had a qualified or conditional privilege to fairly publish to its own legitimately interested business customers the information it received in the course of its investigations, without being liable for defamatory matter therein, provided it did not exceed or abuse the privilege; (there appears to be a sound basis for this concession by the appellants; see Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (Cir.Ct.D. of Md.[1883], Morris, J.); Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515 , 174 N.E.2d 376 [(

2007Judge Karwacki wrote for this Court in Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 63 Md.App. 24, 31 , 491 A.2d 1210 (1985): The conditional privilege accorded the defamatory remarks published to the fellow employees of the appellee was grounded upon the well settled privilege accorded to statements made within the context of the employer-employee relationship.

2007Judge Karwacki wrote for this Court in Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 63 Md.App. 24, 31 , 491 A.2d 1210 (1985): The conditional privilege accorded the defamatory remarks published to the fellow employees of the appellee was grounded upon the well settled privilege accorded to statements made within the context of the employer-employee relationship.

1984Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604 , 141 A. 416 (1928); Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.Supp. 511 (D.Md. 1966) (construing Maryland law).” The public has a vital and legitimate concern in the affairs of government and in the performance of governmental officials and agencies — executive, legislative, and judicial.

1984Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604 , 141 A. 416 (1928); Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.Supp. 511 (D.Md. 1966) (construing Maryland law).” The public has a vital and legitimate concern in the affairs of government and in the performance of governmental officials and agencies — executive, legislative, and judicial.

1984If it did, the law is now clear that the malice necessary to defeat the qualified privilege in a defamation case is “constitutional malice” within the contemplation of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

1984If it did, the law is now clear that the malice necessary to defeat the qualified privilege in a defamation case is “constitutional malice” within the contemplation of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

1984Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604 , 141 A. 416 (1928); Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.Supp. 511 (D.Md. 1966) (construing Maryland law).” The public has a vital and legitimate concern in the affairs of government and in the performance of governmental officials and agencies — executive, legislative, and judicial.

1984In holding that the defendant newspaper enjoyed a qualified or conditional privilege in relying upon an official version of events furnished to it by a representative of a law enforcement agency, we said at 22 Md.App. 581 , 325 A.2d 140 : “Even if the underlying arrest or the underlying criminal charges turn out to be ill-founded, it is well settled that in *205 Maryland a newspaper enjoys a qualified privilege to publish reports of arrests and charges on which arrests are made, as well as other matters involving violation of the law.