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14 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hassett v. Carrollgreen2 sentences2026Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 35–36, 81 A. 1013 (1911) (‘[o]ne pub- lishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice’). ‘[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.’ . . . ‘Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted.) Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn. App. 404, 409 , 13 A.3d 1134 (2011). 14 General Statutes § 52-597 provides: “No action of li 2026Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 35–36, 81 A. 1013 (1911) (‘[o]ne pub- lishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice’). ‘[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.’ . . . ‘Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted.) Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn. App. 404, 409 , 13 A.3d 1134 (2011). 14 General Statutes § 52-597 provides: “No action of li | 3 | 4 |
Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2007See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 28 , 662 A.2d 89 (1995) (“[w]hether the privilege was abused . . . depends upon whether there was malice in fact” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). 2007See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 28 , 662 A.2d 89 (1995) (“[w]hether the privilege was abused . . . depends upon whether there was malice in fact” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miles v. Perry
green
2 sentences1998In Miles v. Perry , 11 Conn. App. 584 , 594 n. 8 (1987) the Appellate Court stated: A qualified or conditional privilege arises out of an `occasion,' such as, when one acts in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty. . . . 1996"A qualified or conditional privilege arises out of an `occasion,' such as, when one acts in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty." (Citations omitted.) Miles v. Perry , 11 Conn. App. 584 , 594 n. 8, 529 A.2d 199 (1987). | 5 | 1996–2000 |
Flanagan v. McLane
green
2 sentences1995"A qualified or conditional privilege arises out of an `occasion,' such as, when one acts in a bona fide discharge of a public or private duty." Miles v. Perry, supra, 11 Conn. App. 594 n. 8, citing Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220 , 221-22 , 88 A. 96 (1913). 1995"A qualified or conditional privilege arises out of an `occasion,' such as, when one acts in a bona fide discharge of a public or private duty." Miles v. Perry, supra, 11 Conn. App. 594 n. 8, citing Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220 , 221-22 , 88 A. 96 (1913). | 4 | 1987–2002 |
Mara v. Otto
neutral
2 sentences2026Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 35–36, 81 A. 1013 (1911) (‘[o]ne pub- lishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice’). ‘[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.’ . . . ‘Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted.) Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn. App. 404, 409 , 13 A.3d 1134 (2011). 14 General Statutes § 52-597 provides: “No action of li 2026Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 , 35–36, 81 A. 1013 (1911) (‘[o]ne pub- lishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice’). ‘[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.’ . . . ‘Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted.) Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn. App. 404, 409 , 13 A.3d 1134 (2011). 14 General Statutes § 52-597 provides: “No action of li | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Chadha v. Shimelman
green
2 sentences2011Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). “[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.” Chadha v. Shimelman, 75 Conn. App. 819, 826 , 818 A.2d 789 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003). 2011Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). “[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.” Chadha v. Shimelman, 75 Conn. App. 819, 826 , 818 A.2d 789 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Davila
green
2 sentences2011Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). “[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.” Chadha v. Shimelman, 75 Conn. App. 819, 826 , 818 A.2d 789 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003). 2011Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 81 A. 1013 (1911) (“[o]ne publishing defamatory words under a qualified or conditional privilege is only liable upon proof of express malice”). “[T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.” Chadha v. Shimelman, 75 Conn. App. 819, 826 , 818 A.2d 789 , cert, denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lyons v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2003"Libel per se . . . is a libel the defamatory meaning of which is apparent on the face of the statement and is actionable without proof of actual damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyons v. Nichols , 63 Conn. App. 761 , 767 , 778 A.2d 246 (2001). 2003"Libel per se . . . is a libel the defamatory meaning of which is apparent on the face of the statement and is actionable without proof of actual damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyons v. Nichols , 63 Conn. App. 761 , 767 , 778 A.2d 246 (2001). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hallas v. Boehmke & Dobosz, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Finally, Pepin argues in the alternative that if the court finds that Ilowitz's statements are protected by a qualified or conditional privilege then a material issue of fact exists as to whether he has abused that privilege. "[A]gency is normally a question of fact." Hallas v. Boehmke Dobosz, Inc. , 239 Conn. 658 , 674 , 686 A.2d 491 (1997). 2002Finally, Pepin argues in the alternative that if the court finds that Ilowitz's statements are protected by a qualified or conditional privilege then a material issue of fact exists as to whether he has abused that privilege. "[A]gency is normally a question of fact." Hallas v. Boehmke Dobosz, Inc. , 239 Conn. 658 , 674 , 686 A.2d 491 (1997). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Petyan v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1995"There is a `long-standing common law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.'" (Citations omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 245-46 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986), quoting Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 60 , 657 P.2d 101 (1983). 1995"There is a `long-standing common law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.'" (Citations omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 245-46 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986), quoting Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 60 , 657 P.2d 101 (1983). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon
green
2 sentences1995"There is a `long-standing common law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.'" (Citations omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 245-46 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986), quoting Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 60 , 657 P.2d 101 (1983). 1995"There is a `long-standing common law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.'" (Citations omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 245-46 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986), quoting Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 60 , 657 P.2d 101 (1983). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.