qualified or conditional privilege in New York

2025The "flow of information between parties sharing a common interest should not be impeded" (Liberman v. Ge/stein. 80 NY2d at 437) but that goal is achieved by ensuring that the communication bears some relation to the commonality of the interest.

1993The shield provided by a qualified privilege may be dissolved, however, if plaintiff can demonstrate that defendant made the statements with "malice” or with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity (see, Liberman v Gelstein, supra, at 437-438; Park Knoll Assocs. v Schmidt, supra, at 211; Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, supra, at 376; O’Rorke v Carpenter, 55 NY2d 798, 799 ).

1993The shield provided by a qualified privilege may be dissolved, however, if plaintiff can demonstrate that defendant made the statements with "malice” or with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity (see, Liberman v Gelstein, supra, at 437-438; Park Knoll Assocs. v Schmidt, supra, at 211; Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, supra, at 376; O’Rorke v Carpenter, 55 NY2d 798, 799 ).

1991Our review of the record indicates that defendant’s remarks about the plaintiff’s sidewalk cafe, quoted supra, are entitled to a qualified or conditional privilege, since they were made "in the conduct of his own affairs, in a matter where his interest [was] concerned” (44 NY Jur 2d, Defamation and Privacy, §73, at 37; Park Knoll Assocs. v Schmidt, 59 NY2d 205, 210-211 [1983]).

2025"Statements among employees in furtherance of the common interest of the employer, made at a confidential meeting, may well fall within the ambit of a qualified or conditional privilege" (Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 67 NY2d at 376 ), but that does not mean that all statements made between co-employees that could be described as related to the business fall under the umbrella of the common interest privilege.

1993Here, we conclude that the communication between the two bank employees in furtherance of the common interest of their employer fell within the ambit of a qualified or conditional privilege (see, Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, supra).

2002F. Privileges Defendants are not protected by an absolute privilege, but are protected by the qualified or conditional privilege known as the “common interest privilege.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1197 [6th ed]; Foster, supra at 751 .) Specifically, in Dillon (supra at 40 ), the Court held that memoranda prepared for internal employee reviews and statements about employees made in the employment context to persons having a common interest in the subject are protected by a qualified, common interest privilege.

2002(Black’s Law Dictionary 1197 [6th ed.]; Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 751 [1996].) Its foundation complements the First Amendment protection, so that a democracy should not inhibit nor stifle the “flow of information between persons sharing a common interest,” unless the privilege is abused.

1973Jackson was" conditionally privileged to comment about the fitness of such a public figure as plaintiff to serve as pastor or bishop of his church (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 31-33, 43-44 ; Trails West v. Wolff, 32 N Y 2d 207; Washington v. New York News, 37 A D 2d 557), under standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ( 376 U. S. 254 ) and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (supra), so long as he did not act with knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.

1973Jackson was" conditionally privileged to comment about the fitness of such a public figure as plaintiff to serve as pastor or bishop of his church (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 31-33, 43-44 ; Trails West v. Wolff, 32 N Y 2d 207; Washington v. New York News, 37 A D 2d 557), under standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ( 376 U. S. 254 ) and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (supra), so long as he did not act with knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.