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8 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co.green2 sentences2016In Alabama, where a communication concerning'a-private person is protected by a qualified or conditional privilege,[ 8 ] such a person cannot recover in a defa mation action unless that person can show that the communication was made with actual or common law malice (shown by evidence of previous ill will, hostility, threats, other actions, former libels or slanders, and the like, emanating from the defendant, or by the violence of the defendant’s language, the mode and extent of the publication, and the like).” Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co., 482 So.2d 1209, 1213 (Ala.1986). 1988(Citations omitted.) “In Alabama, where a communication concerning a private person is protected by a qualified or conditional privilege, such a person cannot recover in a defamation action unless that person can show that the communication was made with actual or common law malice (shown by evidence of previous ill will, hostility, threats, other actions, former libels or slanders, and the like, emanating from the defendant, or by the violence of the defendant’s language, the mode and extent of the publication, and the like).” Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co., 482 So.2d 1209, 1213 (Ala.1986). | 2 | 3 |
Fulton v. Advertiser Co.green2 sentences1989See Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980)." Cousins v. T.G. 1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. | 2 | 3 |
Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Roystergreen1 sentence2016“Ordinarily, ‘[t]he determination of whether a statement is privileged is a question of law for the trial judge.’" Wiggins v. Mallard, 905 So.2d 776, 783 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Royster, 560 So.2d 197, 200 (Ala.1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Wiggins v. Mallardgreen1 sentence2016“Ordinarily, ‘[t]he determination of whether a statement is privileged is a question of law for the trial judge.’" Wiggins v. Mallard, 905 So.2d 776, 783 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Royster, 560 So.2d 197, 200 (Ala.1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co.green1 sentence1988The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need not be one having the force of legal obligation, but it is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and defendant in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof, although in fact he is mistaken.” ’ ” Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co., 510 So.2d 176, 179 (Ala.1987). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc.green1 sentence1987See Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980). 2 Our decision in White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc. , 514 So.2d 902 (Ala. 1987), is not in conflict with this holding because White involves actual malice as opposed to common law malice. 3 The United States Supreme Court has recently clarified the law in regard to presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases involving private figure plaintiffs and matters not of public concern. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1989This Court has recently noted: "The 'actual or common law' malice that must be shown by private-figure plaintiffs to overcome a qualified or conditional privilege is to be distinguished from the 'actual malice' required in cases of the defamation of public figures and set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). 1989This Court has recently noted: "The 'actual or common law' malice that must be shown by private-figure plaintiffs to overcome a qualified or conditional privilege is to be distinguished from the 'actual malice' required in cases of the defamation of public figures and set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). | 3 | 1987–1989 |
Mead Corp. v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. 1986Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Bronner v. Fulton
green
2 sentences1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. 1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Kenney v. Gurley
green
2 sentences1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. 1987Mead Corp. v. Hicks , 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981); Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 95 So. 34 (1923)." Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co. , 482 So.2d 1209 (Ala. 1986). 1 We find that the evidence of "the mode and extent of the publication" in this case included a scintilla of evidence that malice accompanied the communication. | 2 | 1986–1987 |
DeStafney v. University of Alabama
green
2 sentences1988(Citations omitted.) See also, Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co., supra. This Court in DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So.2d 391 (Ala.1982), quoted with approval the tort liability rule proposed by Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, Public Officers (1974), stating in part: “ ‘(3) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if “ ‘(a) he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function, “‘(b) he is privileged and does not exceed or abuse the privilege, or “ ‘(c) his conduct was 1988(Citations omitted.) See also, Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co., supra. This Court in DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So.2d 391 (Ala.1982), quoted with approval the tort liability rule proposed by Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, Public Officers (1974), stating in part: “ ‘(3) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if “ ‘(a) he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function, “‘(b) he is privileged and does not exceed or abuse the privilege, or “ ‘(c) his conduct was | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn
green
1 sentence1988Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn , 161 F.2d 102 , 104 (5th Cir. 1947); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway , 240 Miss. 230 , 126 So.2d 271 , 275 (1961). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway
neutral
2 sentences1988Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn , 161 F.2d 102 , 104 (5th Cir. 1947); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway , 240 Miss. 230 , 126 So.2d 271 , 275 (1961). 1988Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn , 161 F.2d 102 , 104 (5th Cir. 1947); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway , 240 Miss. 230 , 126 So.2d 271 , 275 (1961). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Ex Parte Corbin
neutral
1 sentence1976In Phillips , supra, this Court held that communications by an employer to the superintendent of his property concerning the care and protection of that property is confidential and thus conditionally privileged. *Page 1120 In Berry , supra, this Court set forth the requirements for a qualified or conditional privilege: "`Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privi | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1976In Phillips , supra, this Court held that communications by an employer to the superintendent of his property concerning the care and protection of that property is confidential and thus conditionally privileged. *Page 1120 In Berry , supra, this Court set forth the requirements for a qualified or conditional privilege: "`Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privi | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.