understanding doctrine in Michigan

2006In other words, while the defamation definition of “actual malice” might arguably be warranted if MCL 331.531 used that term and the statute dealt only with a communication, the legal definition of “malice” must apply because MCL 331.531 specifically deals with “act[s] or communication[s].” Further, I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s theory that the defamation law definition of “actual malice” must pertain to MCL 331.531 because the Legislature amended the statute to include a malice exception sometime after New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 ; 84 S Ct 710 ; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), w

2006In other words, while the defamation definition of “actual malice” might arguably be warranted if MCL 331.531 used that term and the statute dealt only with a communication, the legal definition of “malice” must apply because MCL 331.531 specifically deals with “act[s] or communication[s].” Further, I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s theory that the defamation law definition of “actual malice” must pertain to MCL 331.531 because the Legislature amended the statute to include a malice exception sometime after New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 ; 84 S Ct 710 ; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964), w

2026Defendant in this case was arrested with respect to one crime, and his effects were then searched without a warrant in connection with another crime; as stated in Carr, such a search can only be justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement “to prove the charge on which the prisoner has been arrested . . . .” Carr, 370 Mich at 256 . 12 This understanding of the exception is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Edwards and Cooper.

2023“However, the omission from the plea proceedings of one or another of the rights attendant to a trial, other than a Jaworski right, or the imprecise recital of any such right, including a Jaworski right, does not necessarily require reversal.” Id. at 273-274 . -7- In Al-Shara, this Court set aside the defendant’s no-contest plea because the trial court failed to mention two of the three Jaworski rights on the record, and because there was no mention in the record of the signed form purportedly confirming the defendant’s understanding waiver of these rights.

2022The judge must be able to ease the defendant’s uncertainty after a reasonable inquiry, or the judge should deny the defendant’s request to proceed in propria persona. [Adkins, 452 Mich at 725 n 25.] -9- Overall, the trial court’s instructions fell short of providing Butterfield with a “methodical assessment of the wisdom of self-representation” at sentencing.

2017To the extent Dlaikan and other decisions are inconsistent with this understanding of the doctrine, they are overruled. [ Winkler v. MaristFathers of Detroit, Inc. , 500 Mich. 327 , 330, 901 N.W.2d 566 (2017). ] The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider defendant's alternative argument that it was entitled to summary disposition because the PWDCRA does not apply to defendant's school.

2017To the extent Dlaikan and other decisions are inconsistent with this understanding of the doctrine, they are overruled. [ Winkler v. MaristFathers of Detroit, Inc. , 500 Mich. 327 , 330, 901 N.W.2d 566 (2017). ] The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider defendant's alternative argument that it was entitled to summary disposition because the PWDCRA does not apply to defendant's school.

2015VanderVliet expressly dispelled this mischaracterization and its resulting incongruity, emphasizing that MRE 404(b) reflects an “inclusionary theory of admissibility” and clarifying that, while “Golochowicz identified] the requirements of logical relevance [for other-acts evidence] when the proponent is utilizing a modus operandi theory to prove identity,” that case did “not set the standard for the admissibility of other acts evidence” and “the courts of this state, including this Court,. .. have been too quick to recite the Golochowicz test even when it was probably inapplicable.” VanderVlie

2006United States v Dixon, 509 US ___ ; 113 S Ct 2849, 2860 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993) (holding that the same conduct test "is wholly inconsistent with ... the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy," and accepting as dispositive Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508 ; 110 S Ct 2084 ; 109 L Ed 2d 548 [1990]); id. at 529-536 (Scalia, J.) (finding that the English common law and early American jurisprudence reject any transactional or same conduct test, and accepting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 [1932], as the correct a

2006United States v Dixon, 509 US ___ ; 113 S Ct 2849, 2860 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993) (holding that the same conduct test "is wholly inconsistent with ... the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy," and accepting as dispositive Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508 ; 110 S Ct 2084 ; 109 L Ed 2d 548 [1990]); id. at 529-536 (Scalia, J.) (finding that the English common law and early American jurisprudence reject any transactional or same conduct test, and accepting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 [1932], as the correct a

2006United States v Dixon, 509 US ___ ; 113 S Ct 2849, 2860 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993) (holding that the same conduct test "is wholly inconsistent with ... the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy," and accepting as dispositive Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508 ; 110 S Ct 2084 ; 109 L Ed 2d 548 [1990]); id. at 529-536 (Scalia, J.) (finding that the English common law and early American jurisprudence reject any transactional or same conduct test, and accepting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 [1932], as the correct a

2006United States v Dixon, 509 US ___ ; 113 S Ct 2849, 2860 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993) (holding that the same conduct test "is wholly inconsistent with ... the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy," and accepting as dispositive Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508 ; 110 S Ct 2084 ; 109 L Ed 2d 548 [1990]); id. at 529-536 (Scalia, J.) (finding that the English common law and early American jurisprudence reject any transactional or same conduct test, and accepting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 [1932], as the correct a

1872Neither does it resemble Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich., 266 , where the court declined to consider a party’s claim to damages for the non-delivery of a chattel in due season, after he had accepted delivery on an understanding that no such claim should be made.