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8 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kelly v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini 2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini | 5 | 5 |
Reynolds v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005“One concession to reasonableness, the emergency exception, recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1990), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).7 “It rests on the commonsense rationale 6 The dissent’s understanding of the standard of review relies on a single sentence lifted from Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990), stating that the “reasonableness of a police officer’s response in 2005“One concession to reasonableness, the emergency exception, recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1990), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).7 “It rests on the commonsense rationale 6 The dissent’s understanding of the standard of review relies on a single sentence lifted from Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990), stating that the “reasonableness of a police officer’s response in | 1 | 1 |
Wactor v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini 2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini | 1 | 1 |
Medici v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings 2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings | 1 | 1 |
Barrett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings 2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings | 1 | 1 |
Cantrell v. Crewsgreen2 sentences2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings 2003The juror said that, although being robbed at gunpoint affected her emotionally, causing her to “relive” the robbery from time to time, she did so only when she was “by [herjself and somebody [was] behind [her].” She insisted that “[her] verdict was strictly on the evidence, nothing about [her] personal life,” and that her prior bad experience had “[absolutely” nothing to do with the outcome of appellant’s trial. *429 The trial court accepted her testimony, finding she had “an impartial mind, an understanding of the presumption of innocence, and [an] indifference to the outcome.” The holdings | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kyer v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2005“One concession to reasonableness, the emergency exception, recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1990), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).7 “It rests on the commonsense rationale 6 The dissent’s understanding of the standard of review relies on a single sentence lifted from Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990), stating that the “reasonableness of a police officer’s response in | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2005“One concession to reasonableness, the emergency exception, recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1990), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).7 “It rests on the commonsense rationale 6 The dissent’s understanding of the standard of review relies on a single sentence lifted from Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 437 , 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990), stating that the “reasonableness of a police officer’s response in | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini 2004It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 1 *8 This understanding of the standard of review, which serves as a restatement of due process principles, 2 ensures that we remain faithful to our duty not to “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,” Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 (citation omitted), “even were our opini | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Taylor v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2003Those cases involved challenges that occurred before the jury was sworn, which did not give rise to the same concerns for balancing fairness with finality embodied in McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553-56 , 104 S.Ct. at 848-50 , and recognized in Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 18 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 111 n. 3. 2003Those cases involved challenges that occurred before the jury was sworn, which did not give rise to the same concerns for balancing fairness with finality embodied in McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553-56 , 104 S.Ct. at 848-50 , and recognized in Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 18 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 111 n. 3. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood
green
2 sentences2003Those cases involved challenges that occurred before the jury was sworn, which did not give rise to the same concerns for balancing fairness with finality embodied in McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553-56 , 104 S.Ct. at 848-50 , and recognized in Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 18 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 111 n. 3. 2003Those cases involved challenges that occurred before the jury was sworn, which did not give rise to the same concerns for balancing fairness with finality embodied in McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553-56 , 104 S.Ct. at 848-50 , and recognized in Taylor, 25 Va.App. at 18 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 111 n. 3. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Nolan v. Central Georgia Power Co.
green
2 sentences1925The objection is, I think, not well taken.” See also Nolan v. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201 , 67 S. E. 656 ; Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370 , 111 N. E. 308 . 1925The objection is, I think, not well taken.” See also Nolan v. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201 , 67 S. E. 656 ; Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370 , 111 N. E. 308 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co.
green
2 sentences1925The objection is, I think, not well taken.” See also Nolan v. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201 , 67 S. E. 656 ; Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370 , 111 N. E. 308 . 1925The objection is, I think, not well taken.” See also Nolan v. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201 , 67 S. E. 656 ; Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370 , 111 N. E. 308 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.