61 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Shugarsgreen2 sentences2026The Commonwealth argues that, while “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range,” the trial court may consider a defendant’s prior criminal history where it is “used to supplement other extraneous sentencing information.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) (emphasis in Shugars; citation omitted)). 2026“It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range[.]” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) (emphasis added). | 20 | 23 |
Commonwealth v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2022“It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 339 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 2021Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 339 (Pa. Super. 2003). “[I]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range. | 14 | 20 |
Morgan, S. v. Morgan, D.green2 sentences2020Morgan v. Morgan, 99 A.3d 554, 558-559 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 2017We also consider the following discussion in Morgan v. Morgan, 99 A.3d 554 (Pa. Super. 2014), which sheds light on the arguments raised in this appeal: There is no requirement in the Rule that the trial court must adjust the earning capacity to reflect the "[a]ge, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities" of the party to which the earning capacity is - 7 - J -S05007-17 being assigned; the Rule requires only that the trial court consider these factors. | 2 | 3 |
Com. v. Watson, E.green2 sentences2026Generally, “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.” Id. at 937 (cleaned up, emphasis omitted). 2026We have confirmed that courts, however, “can use information included in the guidelines to supplement other peripheral sentencing information,” including “prior convictions in conjunction with past unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate, or the fact that the new crimes violated parole, or that the defendant’s ongoing criminal record demonstrated a threat to public safety . . ., even though the guidelines take into account those prior convictions.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Yuhaszgreen2 sentences2019See Yuhasz, 923 A.2d at 1118 . “[A] trial court judge has wide discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a sentence in the aggravated range.” Shugars, 895 A.2d at 1275 . -6- J-S61043-18 It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range. 2016See Yuhasz, 923 A.2d at 1118 . “[A] trial court judge has wide discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a sentence in the aggravated range.” Shugars, 895 A.2d at 1275 . -6- J-S23003-16 It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing a sentence into the aggravated range. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Brown , 982 A.2d 1017 , 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that "where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement specifying particular penalties, the defendant may not seek a discretionary appeal relating to those agreed-upon penalties" (citation omitted) ). 4 Because Appellant failed to meet the second element of Section 9760(1), we need not consider whether he was "in custody." 2018See Commonwealth v. Brown , 982 A.2d 1017 , 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that "where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement specifying particular penalties, the defendant may not seek a discretionary appeal relating to those agreed-upon penalties" (citation omitted) ). 5 As noted in Byrne , the written plea colloquy contained eight paragraphs relating to the defendant's waiver of his right to credit for time served, and the trial court conducted an oral colloquy on the same issue. | 2 | 2 |
Turner Construction v. Plumbers Local 690green1 sentence2022See Turner Const. v. Plumbers Local 690, 130 A.3d 47, 63 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“[I]t is improper for this Court to address the non-jurisdictional issue sua sponte as a grounds for reversal.”). - 15 - | 1 | 1 |
In Re Abgreen1 sentence2022Analysis A goal change request requires the court to consider the factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), including: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at le | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Clemat, P.green2 sentences2022Id. at 959-60 (citations omitted & paragraph break added). - 14 - J-A23022-22 With respect to aggravated-range sentences and so-called “double counting” factors, this Court has explained: Generally, “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.” However, “[t]rial courts are permitted to use factors already included in the guidelines if they are used to supplement other extraneous sentencing information.” When deciding whether a court improp 2022As stated above, it is generally “impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing . . . a sentence to the aggravated . . . range.” Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In the Int. of: D.R.-W., a Minor Appeal of: D.W.green1 sentence2022Analysis A goal change request requires the court to consider the factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), including: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at le | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Austingreen1 sentence2021See Austin, 66 A.3d at 808 ; Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 731 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lamondagreen1 sentence2020The imposition of these consecutive sentences resulted in what is essentially a guaranteed life sentence for Appellant, as he will remain in prison under the minimum term until age 92. 1 With regard to satisfying the fourth factor for this Court to consider a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence, see Majority at 5-7, I note that this Court has recognized “the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature o | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mourygreen1 sentence2018Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report . . . we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. -9- J-S50005-18 Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “‘It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range. | 1 | 1 |
Krankowski v. O'NEILgreen1 sentence2017See Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16.2(d)(4). ... "[T]he trial court, as the finder of fact, is entitled to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses." Krankowski v. O'Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 287 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Shellergreen1 sentence2017Nevertheless, “[e]ven if a sentencing court relies on a factor that should not have been considered, there is no abuse of discretion when the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 192 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 666 , 980 A.2d 607 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Krumgreen1 sentence2014See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (“[T]he court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 210 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc) (“[I]f a sentencing court considers improper factors in imposing sentence upon a defendant, the court thereby abuses its discretion[.]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Archergreen1 sentence2014See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (“[T]he court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 210 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc) (“[I]f a sentencing court considers improper factors in imposing sentence upon a defendant, the court thereby abuses its discretion[.]”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Padillagreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1259 (Pa. 2013) (holding that the “[a]ppellant had no right to hybrid representation and thus no right to demand that the trial court address his pro se motions on the merits”). - 17 - J-S74010-14 the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.”). | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of Dublinskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McNabbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGrath v. State Board of Dentistrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bartlow
green
2 sentences2020Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334 [, 339] ([Pa. Super.] 2003), citing Commonwealth v. Bartlow, 512 A.2d 34 ([Pa. Super.] 1986). 2003Commonwealth v. Barblow, 354 Pa.Super. 444 , 512 A.2d 34 (1986) (held impermissible for trial court use prior conviction history as the sole reason to elevate sentence to aggravated range); Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa.Super. 468 , 491 A.2d 1352 (1985) (in dicta, Court stated it is impermissible to use lack of prior convictions as sole reason to sentence in the mitigated range). | 2 | 2003–2020 |
Com. v. Watson, E.
green
2 sentences2020As a general rule, “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.” Commonwealth v. Watson, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 PA Super 28 (Pa. Super. 2020), (citing Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) (emphasis added)). - 14 - J-A09012-20 Therefore, we will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.6 In light of our disposition, Judge McDaniel’s retirement from the bench will require the President Judge of the Co 2020Id. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2007The Order of the Superior Court is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for the court to consider the claim, which was raised in his brief below, but not addressed by the panel, of whether petitioner’s confession should be suppressed because his waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was not knowing and voluntary. 2007The Order of the Superior Court is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for the court to consider the claim, which was raised in his brief below, but not addressed by the panel, of whether petitioner’s confession should be suppressed because his waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was not knowing and voluntary. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Com. v. Perzel, J.
green
1 sentence2025It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included within the sentencing guidelines “as the sole reason for ____________________________________________ issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence[;] (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect[;] and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code[.] Perzel, 291 A.3d at 46 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Keystone ReLeaf, LLC v. Pennsylvania Department of Health, Office of Medical Marijuana
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 514 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2021See Austin, 66 A.3d at 808 ; Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 731 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Rush
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530 , 545–546 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2017). - 16 - J-S04005-18 That the trial court mentioned Appellant’s prior criminal history or noted the fact that Appellant was in a position of trust when he committed the crimes does not demonstrate that the court “double counted” sentencing factors. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Rush
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530 , 545–546 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2017). - 16 - J-S04005-18 That the trial court mentioned Appellant’s prior criminal history or noted the fact that Appellant was in a position of trust when he committed the crimes does not demonstrate that the court “double counted” sentencing factors. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re CP
green
1 sentence2017We direct the court to consider these factors when analyzing “the [intangibles such as love, comfort, security, ‘and stability,” “the nature of the status of the parent-child bond,” if any, and “the effect on the [C]hild[r]en of permanently severing that bond.” In re C.P., supra at 520 ; In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Com. v. Quinn
green
1 sentence2017Nevertheless, “[e]ven if a sentencing court relies on a factor that should not have been considered, there is no abuse of discretion when the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 192 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 666 , 980 A.2d 607 (2009). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re N.A.M.
green
1 sentence2017We direct the court to consider these factors when analyzing “the [intangibles such as love, comfort, security, ‘and stability,” “the nature of the status of the parent-child bond,” if any, and “the effect on the [C]hild[r]en of permanently severing that bond.” In re C.P., supra at 520 ; In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
J.R.M. v. J.E.A.
green
1 sentence2016The statute and judicial precedent require the court to consider the factors, but not to discuss each factor in detail in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion. [See J.R.M., supra at 653 ] (stating “all of the factors listed in section 5328(a) are required to be considered by the trial court”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Regina Polselli Rudolph R. Polselli (Intervenor-Plaintiff in d.c.) v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company. Regina Polselli green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Commonwealth v. Drumgoole green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.