24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jason People v. Danielle S.green2 sentences2018Section 3044, subdivision (b), sets forth seven factors that the court must consider when determining if the presumption was rebutted. 4 The factors must be considered, but they are not mandatory requirements for rebuttal of the presumption. "[A]lthough section 3044, subdivision (b) requires the court to consider the factors it lists, it does not require the court to find they all have been satisfied in order to find the presumption rebutted." ( Jason P. , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032, fn. 23 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 .) In Jaime G. v. H.L. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 794 , 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ( Jai 2018Section 3044, subdivision (b), sets forth seven factors that the court must consider when determining if the presumption was rebutted. 4 The factors must be considered, but they are not mandatory requirements for rebuttal of the presumption. "[A]lthough section 3044, subdivision (b) requires the court to consider the factors it lists, it does not require the court to find they all have been satisfied in order to find the presumption rebutted." ( Jason P. , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032, fn. 23 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 .) In Jaime G. v. H.L. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 794 , 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ( Jai | 3 | 3 |
People v. Carmonygreen2 sentences2025Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would 19 endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”12 (See People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 , 1028; People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88 , 92; People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438 , 443-444; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087 , 1094.) “The trial court must find 2022(See e.g., Kelley, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 582 .) Further, even if we were to consider such mitigating factors sufficiently compelling to strike one or more of the firearm enhancements at issue in this case, as an appellate court, we are “ ‘ “ ‘neither 21 authorized nor warranted in substituting [our] judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) With respect to the trial court’s reliance on certain circumstances of the offense in declining to strike the firearm enhancements or to impose a lesser one, it was entirely appropriate for the court | 1 | 2 |
In Re SDgreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [reviewing court has discretion to consider forfeited claims in order to forestall ineffective assistance of counsel claims]; In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077, 1079-1082 [A parent may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based counsel’s failure to object to a jurisdictional finding, from and “even after” the section 366.36 order terminating parental rights, “in the rare case where the appellate record demonstrates ‘there simply could be no satisfactory explanation’ for counsel’s action or inaction ” and due process requi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crittendengreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [reviewing court has discretion to consider forfeited claims in order to forestall ineffective assistance of counsel claims]; In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077, 1079-1082 [A parent may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based counsel’s failure to object to a jurisdictional finding, from and “even after” the section 366.36 order terminating parental rights, “in the rare case where the appellate record demonstrates ‘there simply could be no satisfactory explanation’ for counsel’s action or inaction ” and due process requi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [applying “furtherance of justice” standard for dismissal of strike prior under section 1385, subdivision (a)].) Finally, we note that the “shall be dismissed” language of subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C) has a logical meaning other than to override the controlling “furtherance of justice” standard. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2020The combined impact of these omissions resulted in a ‘breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.’ [(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d at p. 693 .)]” As did the California Supreme Court in Ochoa, we find this contention unconvincing based on our prior discussion of the individual assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2020The combined impact of these omissions resulted in a ‘breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.’ [(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d at p. 693 .)]” As did the California Supreme Court in Ochoa, we find this contention unconvincing based on our prior discussion of the individual assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Dockery v. Hyattgreen2 sentences1993(Dockery v. Hyatt (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 830, 833 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 488 ].) In fact, the failure of a court to consider the factors enumerated in rule 373(e) is a breach of the duty imposed on the trial court and is, accordingly, an abuse of discretion. 1993(Dockery v. Hyatt (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 830, 833 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 488 ].) In fact, the failure of a court to consider the factors enumerated in rule 373(e) is a breach of the duty imposed on the trial court and is, accordingly, an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Visco v. Abattigreen2 sentences1993(Visco v. Abatti (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 904, 907 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 833 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Gleneagle Dev. 1993(Visco v. Abatti (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 904, 907 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 833 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Gleneagle Dev. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jaime G. v. H.L.
green
2 sentences2018Section 3044, subdivision (b), sets forth seven factors that the court must consider when determining if the presumption was rebutted. 4 The factors must be considered, but they are not mandatory requirements for rebuttal of the presumption. "[A]lthough section 3044, subdivision (b) requires the court to consider the factors it lists, it does not require the court to find they all have been satisfied in order to find the presumption rebutted." ( Jason P. , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032, fn. 23 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 .) In Jaime G. v. H.L. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 794 , 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ( Jai 2018Section 3044, subdivision (b), sets forth seven factors that the court must consider when determining if the presumption was rebutted. 4 The factors must be considered, but they are not mandatory requirements for rebuttal of the presumption. "[A]lthough section 3044, subdivision (b) requires the court to consider the factors it lists, it does not require the court to find they all have been satisfied in order to find the presumption rebutted." ( Jason P. , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032, fn. 23 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 542 .) In Jaime G. v. H.L. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 794 , 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 ( Jai | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Skilling v. United States
green
2 sentences2022(Skilling v. United States, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 385 .) Because they were considered as part of a motion to change venue, appellant argues it is improper for this court to consider these factors in assessing whether she is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. 2022(Skilling v. United States, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 385 .) Because they were considered as part of a motion to change venue, appellant argues it is improper for this court to consider these factors in assessing whether she is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re the Marriage of Smith
green
2 sentences2022The marital standard of living is “a general description of the station in life the parties had achieved by the date of separation,” rather than a “mathematical standard.” (In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 491 .) The trial court possesses broad discretion to fairly exercise the weighing process of section 4320, with the goal of achieving substantial justice for the parties. 2022The marital standard of living is “a general description of the station in life the parties had achieved by the date of separation,” rather than a “mathematical standard.” (In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 491 .) The trial court possesses broad discretion to fairly exercise the weighing process of section 4320, with the goal of achieving substantial justice for the parties. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In re Marriage of McLain
green
2 sentences2022Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” 66 framework provides court with discretion in fashioning attorney fee awards].) “‘An award of spousal support is a determination to be made by the trial court in each case before it, based upon the facts and equities of that case, after weighing each of the circumstances and applicable statutory guidelines. [Citation.]’” (McLain, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 269 .) Section 2032 requires the court t 2022Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” 66 framework provides court with discretion in fashioning attorney fee awards].) “‘An award of spousal support is a determination to be made by the trial court in each case before it, based upon the facts and equities of that case, after weighing each of the circumstances and applicable statutory guidelines. [Citation.]’” (McLain, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 269 .) Section 2032 requires the court t | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences2021(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that 2020(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that | 2 | 2020–2021 |
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency v. R.V.
green
1 sentence2025But “[t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 .) Here, the evidence that Minor, who had already experienced dental issues including a root canal before the age of nine, had not been to the dentist for more than a year provides “some reason 36 beyond mere speculation” to believe that Minor was at substantial risk of harm. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Freitas v. Freitas
green
2 sentences2025The court found that husband’s “previous and numerous motions for reconsideration and motion[s] to set aside the spousal support orders were denied several times … [and husband] did not appeal any of those decisions adverse to him.” The court also found that a reservation of jurisdiction under Freitas, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 1059 “comes with the requirement that the court set an expiration or consideration date to resolve the reserved upon issues [and] that time has passed, several times over, in this matter.” The court also denied wife’s request to terminate spousal support because doing so w 2025The court found that husband’s “previous and numerous motions for reconsideration and motion[s] to set aside the spousal support orders were denied several times … [and husband] did not appeal any of those decisions adverse to him.” The court also found that a reservation of jurisdiction under Freitas, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 1059 “comes with the requirement that the court set an expiration or consideration date to resolve the reserved upon issues [and] that time has passed, several times over, in this matter.” The court also denied wife’s request to terminate spousal support because doing so w | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Scott
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 .) The People assert this claim is forfeited because Anguiano failed to promptly object to the trial court’s decision to not strike the enhancement. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Department of Social Services
green
1 sentence2025(Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, 92 .) The presence of lasting bruises may support a finding a parent crossed the line between permissible discipline and reportable abuse. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Kelley
green
2 sentences2022(See e.g., Kelley, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 582 .) Further, even if we were to consider such mitigating factors sufficiently compelling to strike one or more of the firearm enhancements at issue in this case, as an appellate court, we are “ ‘ “ ‘neither 21 authorized nor warranted in substituting [our] judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) With respect to the trial court’s reliance on certain circumstances of the offense in declining to strike the firearm enhancements or to impose a lesser one, it was entirely appropriate for the court 2022(See e.g., Kelley, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 582 .) Further, even if we were to consider such mitigating factors sufficiently compelling to strike one or more of the firearm enhancements at issue in this case, as an appellate court, we are “ ‘ “ ‘neither 21 authorized nor warranted in substituting [our] judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) With respect to the trial court’s reliance on certain circumstances of the offense in declining to strike the firearm enhancements or to impose a lesser one, it was entirely appropriate for the court | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Autumn H.
green
2 sentences2022(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575–576.) In making that determination, the court is to consider factors such as “the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (Id. at p. 576.) Although Caden C . was decided after the juvenile court’s ruling, it affirmed these factors are appropriately considered in evaluating the second element of the parental-benefit exception. 2022(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting Autumn H., at p. 576.) Here, the juvenile court properly considered H.E.’s age when she was removed from Mother’s care and the amount of time she spent having her daily needs met by others because “[a] ‘significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation.’ ” (In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230, quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) While the juvenile court did not expressly analyze how H.E. felt about 10 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Carlos
green
1 sentence2016We find no reversible error. “ ‘ “In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification is so unreliable as to violate a defendant’s right to due process, the court must ascertain (1) ‘whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary,’ and, if so, (2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1162 .) The court is to consider factors such as “ ‘ “the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of at | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.
green
1 sentence2016(See Sipple, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 153 .) Furthermore, Strasner fails to establish how any of the “factors” she presents can somehow compensate for the lack of minimum contacts. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kent B. Crane v. Archie Carr, III
green
1 sentence2016Cir. 1987) 259 U.S. App.D.C. 229 [ 814 F.2d 758, 762-763 ].) However, Strasner presents no authority requiring the court to consider such factors when she has failed to establish the threshold minimum-contact requirement. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2016We find no reversible error. “ ‘ “In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification is so unreliable as to violate a defendant’s right to due process, the court must ascertain (1) ‘whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary,’ and, if so, (2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1162 .) The court is to consider factors such as “ ‘ “the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of at | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Carter
green
1 sentence2016We find no reversible error. “ ‘ “In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification is so unreliable as to violate a defendant’s right to due process, the court must ascertain (1) ‘whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary,’ and, if so, (2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1162 .) The court is to consider factors such as “ ‘ “the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of at | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Tilbury
green
1 sentence2015Citing People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56 , the trial court denied defendant’s application and explained to defendant that application for restoration of sanity required a two-step process. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Holland v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
green
1 sentence2014(Accord, Holland v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 .) Nevertheless, we conclude Migliore's counsel did not make an offer of proof as to the substance of the evidence sufficient for this court to consider the claim of error. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.