consider challenge in New Mexico

2019Rent-A-Center[, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010)] appears to stand for the proposition that a party must specifically challenge the delegation provision in order for a court to consider the challenge rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator.” Id. ¶ 20.

2011The Court's decision to enforce the arbitration provision essentially established a rule of severability because the Court determined that "as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract." Id. at 445 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 . {20} In circumstances where parties have decided to arbitrate arbitrability—that is, where there is a delegation provision assigning questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator—the Supreme Court's recent holding in Rent-A-Center appears to stand for the proposition that a party must specifically challe

2025In essence, “a party must specifically challenge the delegation provision in order for a court to consider the challenge rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator.” Id. {26} In response to Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff raised several arguments, including a claim that the MAA as a whole is substantively unconscionable due to its inclusion of third parties.

2025Again, “a party must specifically challenge the delegation provision in order for a court to consider the challenge rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator.” Felts, 2011-NMCA-062, ¶ 20 (emphasis added).

2000See State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 3 , 123 N.M. 589 , 943 P.2d 1042 (“The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.”). {7} Section 32A-2-14, however, does not limit the children’s court to the factors contained in Subsection E in its determination concerning the rebuttable presumption of Subsection F. In State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 , our Supreme Court addressed the application of Section 32A-2-14 to the statement of a seventeen-year-old juvenile.

2000See State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 3 , 123 N.M. 589 , 943 P.2d 1042 (“The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.”). {7} Section 32A-2-14, however, does not limit the children’s court to the factors contained in Subsection E in its determination concerning the rebuttable presumption of Subsection F. In State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 , our Supreme Court addressed the application of Section 32A-2-14 to the statement of a seventeen-year-old juvenile.

2000See State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 3 , 123 N.M. 589 , 943 P.2d 1042 (“The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.”). {7} Section 32A-2-14, however, does not limit the children’s court to the factors contained in Subsection E in its determination concerning the rebuttable presumption of Subsection F. In State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 , our Supreme Court addressed the application of Section 32A-2-14 to the statement of a seventeen-year-old juvenile.

2000See State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 3 , 123 N.M. 589 , 943 P.2d 1042 (“The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.”). {7} Section 32A-2-14, however, does not limit the children’s court to the factors contained in Subsection E in its determination concerning the rebuttable presumption of Subsection F. In State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16-18 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 , our Supreme Court addressed the application of Section 32A-2-14 to the statement of a seventeen-year-old juvenile.