consider claim in Connecticut

1999“Only in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court.” Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 99 , 444 A.2d 907 (1982).

1999“Only in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court.” Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 99 , 444 A.2d 907 (1982).

2014The plaintiff finally maintains that a reviewing court should not raise an issue sua sponte when doing so would result in undue prejudice to a party, and, further, in the present case, it was improper for the Appellate Court to raise the issue that it did because the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced by the court’s action. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 442 , 978 A.2d 1089 (2009); see Practice Book §

2014The plaintiff finally maintains that a reviewing court should not raise an issue sua sponte when doing so would result in undue prejudice to a party, and, further, in the present case, it was improper for the Appellate Court to raise the issue that it did because the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced by the court’s action. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 442 , 978 A.2d 1089 (2009); see Practice Book §

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . . [See] Practice Book § 60-5 (court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial). [T]he determination of whether a claim has been properly preserved will depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain whether the clai

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . . [See] Practice Book § 60-5 (court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial). [T]he determination of whether a claim has been properly preserved will depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain whether the clai

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2019The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2016"Only in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canales, supra, at 579, 916 A.2d 767 .

2014For that reason, ‘‘[o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 579 , 916 A.2d 767 (2007).

1992Ed. 2d 997 (1983). “ ‘[O]nly in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’ ” Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 505 , 442 A.2d 911 (1982).

1992Ed. 2d 997 (1983). “ ‘[O]nly in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’ ” Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 505 , 442 A.2d 911 (1982).

1988Practice Book § [4185]; Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116,120 , 441 A.2d 65 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Evans, 165 Conn 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1988Practice Book § [4185]; Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116,120 , 441 A.2d 65 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Evans, 165 Conn 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1988“The general rule against considering claims not raised at trial, Practice Book [§ 4185] applies also to constitutional issues . . . . ‘Only in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’ State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).” (Citations omitted.) Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 377 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981).

1988“The general rule against considering claims not raised at trial, Practice Book [§ 4185] applies also to constitutional issues . . . . ‘Only in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’ State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).” (Citations omitted.) Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 377 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981).

2022Moreover, ‘‘ ‘we will not review a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial.’ Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 203 , 982 A.2d 620 (2009); [see] id., 202-204 (declining to review petitioner’s claim that habeas court improperly failed to apply due process analysis to his claim of right to appeal); see also Practice Book § 60- 5 (‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial’).’’ Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 584, 597 , 188 A.3d 702 (2018). ‘‘[O]nly in [the] most exce

2022Moreover, ‘‘ ‘we will not review a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial.’ Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 203 , 982 A.2d 620 (2009); [see] id., 202-204 (declining to review petitioner’s claim that habeas court improperly failed to apply due process analysis to his claim of right to appeal); see also Practice Book § 60- 5 (‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial’).’’ Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 584, 597 , 188 A.3d 702 (2018). ‘‘[O]nly in [the] most exce

2008Practice Book § 60-5; see, e.g., River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Conservation & Inland Wetlands Commission, 269 Conn. 57, 82 , 848 A.2d 395 (2004) ([o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court); PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 335 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (because review is limited to matters in record, court will not address issues not decided by trial court).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rowe, 279 Conn. 139, 149-50 ,

2008Practice Book § 60-5; see, e.g., River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Conservation & Inland Wetlands Commission, 269 Conn. 57, 82 , 848 A.2d 395 (2004) ([o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court); PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 335 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (because review is limited to matters in record, court will not address issues not decided by trial court).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rowe, 279 Conn. 139, 149-50 ,

2005It is a well established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1 , 48 n.42, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). 10 As the trial court properly noted, our statutes are replete with provisions for damages expressly designated as "punitive,” thus suggesting that, to the extent that such a factor is relevant to this inquiry, the legislature has not deemed the double damages under § 31-72 to be punitive damages.

1999First, “[o]nly in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court.” Id., 48 n.42.

2003Our law is well settled that a party “may not try its case on one theory and appeal on another.” Mellon v. Century Cable Management Corp., 247 Conn. 790, 799 , 725 A.2d 943 (1999), citing Levine v. Stamford, 174 Conn. 234, 236 , 386 A.2d 216 (1978); Gustave Fischer Co. v. Morrison, 137 Conn. 399, 404 , 78 A.2d 242 (1951). “[0]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim . . . that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 466 , 378 A.2d 547 (

2003Our law is well settled that a party “may not try its case on one theory and appeal on another.” Mellon v. Century Cable Management Corp., 247 Conn. 790, 799 , 725 A.2d 943 (1999), citing Levine v. Stamford, 174 Conn. 234, 236 , 386 A.2d 216 (1978); Gustave Fischer Co. v. Morrison, 137 Conn. 399, 404 , 78 A.2d 242 (1951). “[0]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim . . . that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 466 , 378 A.2d 547 (

1998Urban v. Prims, 35 Conn. Sup. 233 , 236 (1979).

1995Urban v. Prims, 35 Conn. Sup. 233 , 236 , (1979).

1994Co., [ 224 Conn. 8 , 9-10 n.1, 615 A.2d 1032 (1992)]; Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 99-100 , 444 A.2d 907 (1982). ‘Only in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court. . . .

1994Co., [ 224 Conn. 8 , 9-10 n.1, 615 A.2d 1032 (1992)]; Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 99-100 , 444 A.2d 907 (1982). ‘Only in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court. . . .

1988Practice Book § [4185]; Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116,120 , 441 A.2d 65 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Evans, 165 Conn 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1988Practice Book § [4185]; Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116,120 , 441 A.2d 65 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Evans, 165 Conn 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1985We have said many times: “Only in most exceptional circumstances can and wdll this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.” State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973); Tucker v. Alleyne, 195 Conn. 399 , 402 n.3, 488 A.2d 452 (1985).

1985We have said many times: “Only in most exceptional circumstances can and wdll this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.” State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973); Tucker v. Alleyne, 195 Conn. 399 , 402 n.3, 488 A.2d 452 (1985).

1981Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 377 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Rogers, 177 Conn. 379, 381 , 418 A.2d 50 (1979).

1981Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 377 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 331 , 438 A.2d 93 (1980); State v. Rogers, 177 Conn. 379, 381 , 418 A.2d 50 (1979).