recovery of any claim in New York

1962(Van der Stegen v. Neuss, Hesslein & Co., 243 App. Div. 122, 130 , affd. 270 N. Y. 55 .) “ There is no doubt that the court may, at Special Term, allow an amendment of a complaint by introducing therein even a cause of action barred by the statute of limitations.

1962(Van der Stegen v. Neuss, Hesslein & Co., 243 App. Div. 122, 130 , affd. 270 N. Y. 55 .) “ There is no doubt that the court may, at Special Term, allow an amendment of a complaint by introducing therein even a cause of action barred by the statute of limitations.

1918This view makes the practice uniform, and is in accord with the result reached in Hammond v. Shephard ( 50 Hun, 318 ).” Hamilton v. Royal Insurance Co. ( 156 N. Y. 327 ) was an action upon a standard fire insurance policy which contained the following clause: “ No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be maintainable in any court of law or equity * * * unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire,” The fire occurred on the 16th of January, 1892.

1918This view makes the practice uniform, and is in accord with the result reached in Hammond v. Shephard ( 50 Hun, 318 ).” Hamilton v. Royal Insurance Co. ( 156 N. Y. 327 ) was an action upon a standard fire insurance policy which contained the following clause: “ No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be maintainable in any court of law or equity * * * unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire,” The fire occurred on the 16th of January, 1892.

1914Defendant relies, principally, upon the decision in Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 119 N. Y. 344 .

1910Co., 56 Hun, 399 ; reversed on another point, 130 N. Y. 560 , wherein it appears to have been assumed that the company was entitled to proofs of loss either by the owner or mortgagee), then it is manifest that the provisions requiring the insured to give notice of the fire, to file proofs of loss and to arbitrate the damages if unable to agree thereon, are applicable, and that the action cannot be maintained.

1910Co., 56 Hun, 399 ; reversed on another point, 130 N. Y. 560 , wherein it appears to have been assumed that the company was entitled to proofs of loss either by the owner or mortgagee), then it is manifest that the provisions requiring the insured to give notice of the fire, to file proofs of loss and to arbitrate the damages if unable to agree thereon, are applicable, and that the action cannot be maintained.

1906The situation is the same as though the clause in the policy read: “ ISTo suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall he maintained in any court of law or equity unless commenced within twelve months after the fire, except in the cases provided for in section 405 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” These cases are distinguishable from Wetyen v. Fick, 178 N. Y. 223 ; 70 N. E.

1896Co., 39 N.Y. 45 ; Hay v. Insurance Co., 77 N. Y. 235 ,—containing a similar clause in the policy, which had held in the same direction; and Judge Danforth pithily says that: “ The defendant having made the doing of certain things, and a fixed lapse of time thereafter, conditions precedent to the bringing of an action, the parties must be deemed to have contracted in reference to a time when the insured, except for that contract, might be in a condition to bring an action.

1896In Steen v. Insurance Co., 89 N. Y. 316 , it was provided that the defendant insured against all such immediate loss or damage as might occur by fire to the property insured, and it was provided that: “No suit or action of any kind against this company [the defendant there] for the recovery of any claim upon, under, or by virtue of this policy shall be sustained in any court of law or chancery unless such suit or action shall be commenced within the term of twelve months next after such loss or damage shall occur; and, in case any such suit or action shall be commenced against this company aft

1896Co., 39 N.Y. 45 ; Hay v. Insurance Co., 77 N. Y. 235 ,—containing a similar clause in the policy, which had held in the same direction; and Judge Danforth pithily says that: “ The defendant having made the doing of certain things, and a fixed lapse of time thereafter, conditions precedent to the bringing of an action, the parties must be deemed to have contracted in reference to a time when the insured, except for that contract, might be in a condition to bring an action.

1864As was justly remarked by Sutherland, J. in Babcock v. Eckler, ( 24 N. Y.