recovery of any claim in Iowa

1914Code, sec. 3440, provides as follows: “Judgment obtained in an action by ordinary proceedings shall not be annulled or modified by any order in an action by equitable proceedings, except for a defense which has arisen or been discovered since the judgment was rendered; but such judgment does not prevent the recovery of any claim, though such claim might have been used by way of counterclaim in the action on which the judgment was recovered..” This section was first construed in Fairfield v. McNany, 37 Iowa, 75 .

1914This court, however, took the opposite view in Fairfield v. McNany, 37 Iowa, 75 ; and, indeed, as there said, the matter is disposed of by our statute, which provides that ‘a judgment does not prevent the recovery of any claim, though such claim might have been sued on by way of a set-off, counterclaim or cross-demand in the action in which judgment was recovered.

1897The policy stipulates that “no suit or action against the company for the recovery of any claim under or by virtue of this policy shall be sustained in any court of law or equity unless commenced within the term of six months next after the fire shall have occurred.” In Ellis v. Insurance Co., 64 Iowa, 507 , the policy provided that “action shall be commenced within six months next after the loss shall occur.” The court held the period began to run when the cause of action had accrued; i. e. sixty days after the notice and proof of loss had been furnished.

1884Co., 64 Iowa, 507 , it was held, under a similar provision in a policy of insurance, that a right of action on the policy did not accrue until the expiration of sixty days after the proofs of loss had been furnished, and that the period of limitation fixed by the parties did not begin to run until that time.

1933R. 4, was one in which the policy provided that “no suit or action shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity for the recovery of any claim for loss under this contract unless brought by the assured himself or his legal representatives.” In its analysis of the facts and the law of that case the court discussed what the-effect would have been had the policy contained a provision, as in the instant case, permitting action to be brought by the injured person after execution against the property of the assured had been returned unsatisfied and held that in such case it transferred an indem

1933R. 4, was one in which the policy provided that “no suit or action shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity for the recovery of any claim for loss under this contract unless brought by the assured himself or his legal representatives.” In its analysis of the facts and the law of that case the court discussed what the-effect would have been had the policy contained a provision, as in the instant case, permitting action to be brought by the injured person after execution against the property of the assured had been returned unsatisfied and held that in such case it transferred an indem

1933Because appellant has referred to the Zieman case in its brief, we call attention to the words of the court, “Wherefore that portion of the Zieman case hereby is repudiated and overruled.” Schmid v. Automobile Underwriters, 215 Iowa 170 , 244 N. W. 729 , 85 A. L.

1933Because appellant has referred to the Zieman case in its brief, we call attention to the words of the court, “Wherefore that portion of the Zieman case hereby is repudiated and overruled.” Schmid v. Automobile Underwriters, 215 Iowa 170 , 244 N. W. 729 , 85 A. L.

1900It was stipulated in the policy that “no suit or action upon this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless commenced within six months next ensuing after the fire.” ITnder the decisions of Wisconsin this period is computed from the time of the fire (Hart v. Insurance Co., 86 Wis. 77 ( 56 N. W.

1900It was stipulated in the policy that “no suit or action upon this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless commenced within six months next ensuing after the fire.” ITnder the decisions of Wisconsin this period is computed from the time of the fire (Hart v. Insurance Co., 86 Wis. 77 ( 56 N. W.

1897This ruling is expressly approved in Miller v. Insurance Co., 70 Iowa, 704 , and finds support in Steen v. Insurance Co., 89 N. Y. 321 ; Insurance Go. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750 ( 49 N. W.

1897This ruling is expressly approved in Miller v. Insurance Co., 70 Iowa, 704 , and finds support in Steen v. Insurance Co., 89 N. Y. 321 ; Insurance Go. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750 ( 49 N. W.

1897This ruling is expressly approved in Miller v. Insurance Co., 70 Iowa, 704 , and finds support in Steen v. Insurance Co., 89 N. Y. 321 ; Insurance Go. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750 ( 49 N. W.