compelling state interest test in Ohio

2000City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), 521 U.S. 507, 514 , 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624, 635 .

2000City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), 521 U.S. 507, 514 , 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624, 635 .

2000In State v. Whisner (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 217-218 , 1 O.O.3d 105, 124-125 , 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 , this court followed federal jurisprudence in enunciating a compelling-state-interest test in Ohio.

2000In State v. Whisner (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 217-218 , 1 O.O.3d 105, 124-125 , 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 , this court followed federal jurisprudence in enunciating a compelling-state-interest test in Ohio.

2000Citing Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, 233 , 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 , this court held: “What is required is a finding ‘that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.’ Id., at page 214 [ 92 S.Ct. at 1532 , 32 L.Ed.2d at 24 ].

2000Citing Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, 233 , 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 , this court held: “What is required is a finding ‘that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.’ Id., at page 214 [ 92 S.Ct. at 1532 , 32 L.Ed.2d at 24 ].

2000As the Smith court reasoned, “The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct * * * ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’ ” Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 885 , 110 S.Ct. at 1603 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 889-890 , quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. (1988), 485 U.S. 439, 451 , 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 99 L.Ed.2d 534, 548 .

2000As the Smith court reasoned, “The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct * * * ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’ ” Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 885 , 110 S.Ct. at 1603 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 889-890 , quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. (1988), 485 U.S. 439, 451 , 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 99 L.Ed.2d 534, 548 .

2022Only “[a] law failing to satisfy the religion neutral and generally applicable requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (a law is not religiously neutral if it is facially discriminatory or the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of religious motivation).5 4 Without further briefing the topic, Appellant also cites the Fourteenth Amendment while referring to a right of pr

2022Only “[a] law failing to satisfy the religion neutral and generally applicable requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (a law is not religiously neutral if it is facially discriminatory or the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of religious motivation).5 4 Without further briefing the topic, Appellant also cites the Fourteenth Amendment while referring to a right of pr

1995In O’Lone v. Shabazz (1987), 482 U.S. 342 , 107 S.Ct. 2400 , 96 L.Ed.2d 282 , the United States Supreme Court, when addressing the issue of whether prison regulations may abridge the religious freedoms of inmates, did not apply the compelling state interest test established in Sherbert and Yoder , and did not apply the balancing test adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Weaver .

1995In O’Lone v. Shabazz (1987), 482 U.S. 342 , 107 S.Ct. 2400 , 96 L.Ed.2d 282 , the United States Supreme Court, when addressing the issue of whether prison regulations may abridge the religious freedoms of inmates, did not apply the compelling state interest test established in Sherbert and Yoder , and did not apply the balancing test adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Weaver .

1993“Thus, for better or for worse, the United States Supreme Court has signaled a new parameter in the government’s ability to curtail religious practice without first demanding that the state set forth and prove that it has a compelling interest which supersedes the individual’s right to exercise his religious freedom.” See, also, Birch v. Birch (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 85 , 11 OBR 327, 463 N.E.2d 1254 ; State v. Schmidt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 32 , 29 OBR 383, 505 N.E.2d 627 .

1993“Thus, for better or for worse, the United States Supreme Court has signaled a new parameter in the government’s ability to curtail religious practice without first demanding that the state set forth and prove that it has a compelling interest which supersedes the individual’s right to exercise his religious freedom.” See, also, Birch v. Birch (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 85 , 11 OBR 327, 463 N.E.2d 1254 ; State v. Schmidt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 32 , 29 OBR 383, 505 N.E.2d 627 .

1993“Thus, for better or for worse, the United States Supreme Court has signaled a new parameter in the government’s ability to curtail religious practice without first demanding that the state set forth and prove that it has a compelling interest which supersedes the individual’s right to exercise his religious freedom.” See, also, Birch v. Birch (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 85 , 11 OBR 327, 463 N.E.2d 1254 ; State v. Schmidt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 32 , 29 OBR 383, 505 N.E.2d 627 .

1993“Thus, for better or for worse, the United States Supreme Court has signaled a new parameter in the government’s ability to curtail religious practice without first demanding that the state set forth and prove that it has a compelling interest which supersedes the individual’s right to exercise his religious freedom.” See, also, Birch v. Birch (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 85 , 11 OBR 327, 463 N.E.2d 1254 ; State v. Schmidt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 32 , 29 OBR 383, 505 N.E.2d 627 .

1989The court overruled its decision in Green v. McKeon (C.A. 6, 1972), 468 F. 2d 883 , in which it held that a two-year residency requirement for the position of city commissioner violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it created a classification that restricted the right to travel, and that such a residency requirement was to be viewed with strict scrutiny.

1975Krsewinski imposed upon the municipality the burden of demonstrating a ‘compelling’ state interest to justify the impairment but found such an interest to exist (where the residence requirement was as to police officers); Donnelly did not in terms impose the compelling state interest test but rather weighed the ‘reasonableness of a restriction upon private rights’ against the ‘importance of the public benefit’ ( 274 A. 2d, at 791 ), and found the restriction invalid.

1972In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling state interest test would be triggered by ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] * * *.’ ” The court concluded, at page 342, that: “ * * * durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’ ” The Supreme Court of the United States, in Shapiro, supra, at page 638, noted, in footnote 21, that durational residency requirements may “promote