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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smithred2 sentences2008We also note that in Smith II , the Court rejected the compelling state interest test outside the unemployment compensation field and held it would not apply to require exemptions for a generally applicable criminal law. 494 U.S. at 884 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . 2008We also note that in Smith II , the Court rejected the compelling state interest test outside the unemployment compensation field and held it would not apply to require exemptions for a generally applicable criminal law. 494 U.S. at 884 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 . | 2 | 3 |
Cude v. Stategreen2 sentences2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay 2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay | 2 | 2 |
Leebaert v. Harringtongreen2 sentences2007And it is doubtful that Smith—in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1602—has “reaffirmed” a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (Smith’s “hybrid claims” language dicta; parent’s religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anaya, 2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay | 2 | 2 |
Douglas County v. Anayagreen2 sentences2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay 2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay | 2 | 2 |
Boone v. Boozmangreen2 sentences2007And it is doubtful that Smith—in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1602—has “reaffirmed” a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003) (Smith’s “hybrid claims” language dicta; parent’s religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anaya, 2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay | 2 | 2 |
Bryan v. Bryangreen2 sentences2007Ark. 2002) (noting Smith included compulsory immunization of children as example of state action that should not be subject to compelling interest test; citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 , 110 S. Ct. at 1605-06 ; Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 818-20 (Ark. 1964)). 29 the state; it is the same interest identified by the Supreme Court in Yoder and Prince and by our supreme court in Cochise County No. 5666-J. ¶50 But, pursuant to § 8-531(4), ADES as Cheyenne’s custodian now stands “in loco parentis” to Cheyenne—that is, “in the place of a parent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004) (“Of, re 2007Ark. 2002) (noting Smith included compulsory immunization of children as example of state action that should not be subject to compelling interest test; citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 , 110 S. Ct. at 1605-06 ; Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 818-20 (Ark. 1964)). 29 the state; it is the same interest identified by the Supreme Court in Yoder and Prince and by our supreme court in Cochise County No. 5666-J. ¶50 But, pursuant to § 8-531(4), ADES as Cheyenne’s custodian now stands “in loco parentis” to Cheyenne—that is, “in the place of a parent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004) (“Of, re | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-78632green2 sentences2007See Pima County No. J-78632, 147 Ariz. at 587 , 712 P.2d at 434 (noting ADES's custodial responsibilities to dependent children). 2007See Pima County No. J-78632, 147 Ariz. at 587 , 712 P.2d at 434 (noting ADES's custodial responsibilities to dependent children). | 1 | 1 |
Kenyon v. Hammergreen2 sentences1994If education is a fundamental right [as it is in our constitution and as we held in Shofstall ], the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) ought to apply." Id. (citing Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 83 , 688 P.2d at 975 ). 1994If education is a fundamental right [as it is in our constitution and as we held in Shofstall ], the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) ought to apply." Id. (citing Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 83 , 688 P.2d at 975 ). | 1 | 1 |
Donald E. Carlyn v. City of Akrongreen2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União Do Vegetal
green
2 sentences2009Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 . 6 . 2009Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424 , 126 S.Ct. 1211 . 6 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
City of Boerne v. Flores
red
2 sentences2008City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. unconstitutional). 9 . 2008City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. unconstitutional). 9 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re the Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J
green
2 sentences2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay 2007And it is doubtful that Smith — in which the Supreme Court generally rejected the strict scrutiny test for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion, 494 U.S. at 878, 883 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1602 — has "reaffirmed" a compelling state interest requirement when a parent challenges a decision that affects her religious interests, ¶ 22, supra. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003) ( Smith's "hybrid claims" language dicta; parent's religious objection to mandatory health education subject to rational basis review); Douglas County v. Anay | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop
green
1 sentence1994If education is a fundamental right [as it is in our constitution and as we held in Shofstall ], the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) ought to apply." Id. (citing Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 83 , 688 P.2d at 975 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Carey v. Population Services International
green
2 sentences1990Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2020 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d at 690 n. 15. 1990Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2020 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d at 690 n. 15. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Doenges v. City of Salt Lake City
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Torres v. Village of Capitan
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Township of Jefferson v. City of West Carrollton
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Curtis v. Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences1986Id. at 953 , 104 Cal.Rptr. at 306 , 501 P.2d at 546 . 1986Id. at 953 , 104 Cal.Rptr. at 306 , 501 P.2d at 546 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Berry v. Bourne
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fishman v. City of Stamford
green
2 sentences1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 1986See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984) (no equal protection violation where no final authority on annexation is given to voters but instead to Board of County Commissioners); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978) (where challenged procedure does not involve nor contemplate an election there is no unconstitutional limitation upon the right to vote); Township of Jefferson v. City of Carrollton, supra, (unlike voting rights case where vote is final act triggering annexation, signing of petition is only necessary condition precedent); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.