49 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wageringgreen2 sentences2013Regulation, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985) (stating that Florida’s “right of privacy is a fundamental right which ... demands the compelling state interest standard”). 2002See Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857 (Fla.1987). [4] Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which provides for the constitutional right to privacy, declares, "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life...." [5] See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985) ("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard."). [6] See Shaktman v. State, 553 So.2d 148, 152 (Fla.1989) ("[A] legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation sati | 9 | 14 |
Von Eiff v. Azicrigreen2 sentences2003We further explained that "the state can satisfy the compelling state interest standard [only] when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child." Id. at 515 (quoting Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1276 ). 2000We further explained that "the state can satisfy the compelling state interest standard [only] when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child." Id. at 515 (quoting Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1276 ). | 3 | 7 |
Shaktman v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Gomillion, 267 So. 3d at 506 ; Guardado v. State, 61 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1989) (involving law enforcement’s use of a pen register device on telephone lines and finding “a legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation satisfies the compelling state interest test when it demonstrates a clear connection between the illegal activity and the person whose privacy would be invaded.”). 2003See, e.g., *650 Shaktman, 553 So.2d at 152 (holding that a "legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation satisfies the compelling state interest test when it demonstrates a clear connection between the illegal activity and the person whose privacy would be invaded"). | 3 | 3 |
Stall v. Stategreen2 sentences2006"Determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a given case must be made by considering all the circumstances, especially objective manifestations of that expectation." State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350, 357-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990)). 2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 3 | 3 |
Lonon v. Ferrellgreen2 sentences2005Upon remand in Belair , the Fifth District expressly held that 752.01(1)(b) "fails to survive the compelling state interest test required by Beagle and is facially unconstitutional as it impermissibly infringes on privacy rights protected by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Lonon, 739 So.2d at 653 . 2004On remand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized and expressly held that section 752.01(1)(b) "fails to survive the compelling state interest test required by Beagle and is facially unconstitutional as it impermissibly infringes on privacy rights protected by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (declaring section 752.01(1)(b) facially unconstitutional). | 3 | 3 |
Beagle v. Beaglegreen2 sentences2003We further explained that "the state can satisfy the compelling state interest standard [only] when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child." Id. at 515 (quoting Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1276 ). 2000We further explained that "the state can satisfy the compelling state interest standard [only] when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child." Id. at 515 (quoting Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1276 ). | 2 | 9 |
City of North Miami v. Kurtzgreen2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla.1995). | 2 | 4 |
Bd. of Co. Com'rs of Palm Beach v. Dbgreen2 sentences2007However, before the right to privacy attaches and the standard is applied, a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist." Bd. of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 So.2d 585, 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 2007However, before the right to privacy attaches and the standard is applied, a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 So.2d 585, 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). | 2 | 3 |
Hillsborough Cty. Gea v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth.green2 sentences1999See Hillsborough County G.E.A., 522 So.2d at 362 ; Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985) ("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. 1998See Hillsborough County G.E.A., 522 So.2d at 362 ; Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985) ("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. | 2 | 3 |
NORTH FLA. WOMEN'S HEALTH SERVICES v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Thomas v. Smith, 882 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitted); *1045 see N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 620 (Fla.2003) (court reaffirmed the applicability of the compelling state interest test in article I, section 23 cases). 2006Thomas v. Smith, 882 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitted); *1045 see N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 620 (Fla.2003) (court reaffirmed the applicability of the compelling state interest test in article I, section 23 cases). | 2 | 2 |
Belair v. Drewgreen2 sentences2005Upon remand in Belair , the Fifth District expressly held that 752.01(1)(b) "fails to survive the compelling state interest test required by Beagle and is facially unconstitutional as it impermissibly infringes on privacy rights protected by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Lonon, 739 So.2d at 653 . 2004On remand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized and expressly held that section 752.01(1)(b) "fails to survive the compelling state interest test required by Beagle and is facially unconstitutional as it impermissibly infringes on privacy rights protected by Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (declaring section 752.01(1)(b) facially unconstitutional). | 2 | 2 |
Saul v. Brunettigreen2 sentences2001See Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.2000) (holding father's right to privacy trumped any rights dead mother's parents might have to visit their grandchild); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1997) (holding right of privacy did not render statute outlawing assisted suicide unconstitutional); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547-48 (Fla.1985) ("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. 2001See Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.2000) (holding father’s right to privacy trumped any rights dead mother’s parents might have to visit their grandchild); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1997) (holding right of privacy did not render statute outlawing assisted suicide unconstitutional); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547-48 (Fla.1985) (“The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. | 2 | 2 |
Krischer v. McIvergreen2 sentences2001See Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.2000) (holding father's right to privacy trumped any rights dead mother's parents might have to visit their grandchild); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1997) (holding right of privacy did not render statute outlawing assisted suicide unconstitutional); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547-48 (Fla.1985) ("The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. 2001See Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.2000) (holding father’s right to privacy trumped any rights dead mother’s parents might have to visit their grandchild); Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1997) (holding right of privacy did not render statute outlawing assisted suicide unconstitutional); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547-48 (Fla.1985) (“The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2019See Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 393 ("[I]n reviewing a claim of unconstitutional governmental intrusion, the compelling state interest standard is the appropriate standard of review."). "[T]he control and prosecution of criminal activity is a compelling state interest" when the State has established "a clear connection between illegal activity and the person whose privacy has allegedly been invaded." Id. 2019See Johnson, 814 So. 2d at 393 ("[I]n reviewing a claim of unconstitutional governmental intrusion, the compelling state interest standard is the appropriate standard of review."). "[T]he control and prosecution of criminal activity is a compelling state interest" when the State has established "a clear connection between illegal activity and the person whose privacy has allegedly been invaded." Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Confortigreen1 sentence2006"Determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a given case must be made by considering all the circumstances, especially objective manifestations of that expectation." State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350, 357-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Smithgreen2 sentences2006Thomas v. Smith, 882 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitted); *1045 see N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 620 (Fla.2003) (court reaffirmed the applicability of the compelling state interest test in article I, section 23 cases). 2006Thomas v. Smith, 882 So.2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitted); *1045 see N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 620 (Fla.2003) (court reaffirmed the applicability of the compelling state interest test in article I, section 23 cases). | 1 | 1 |
| Caddy v. State, Dept. of Healthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fahnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shadler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Craig v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Klossett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardner v. Bradenton Herald, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mirkin v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardner v. Bradenton Herald, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Shaktman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Kamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re TW
green
2 sentences2014In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989). 1998In holding that "this is a highly stringent standard" of review, this Court in In re T.W. noted that it could cite no cases in Florida in which "government intrusion in personal decisionmaking" survived the compelling state interest test. 551 So.2d at 1192 . | 4 | 1996–2014 |
Richardson v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2004Finally, the First District determined that the present case is controlled by this Court's holding in Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036 (Fla.2000). 2003Richardson, 766 So.2d at 1039 (quoting Von Eiff, 720 So.2d at 515 (citations omitted)). | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Spicer v. United States
green
2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Pacifica Foundation v. Federal Communications Commission
green
2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Levin v. Florida Bar
green
2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Long v. Florida
green
2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences2000City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 , 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . 1997City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 701 , 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996); Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla.1990), cert. denied sub nom., Long v. Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 , 111 S.Ct. 2888 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 . | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant
green
2 sentences1993Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Applicant, 443 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1983). 1988We believe that the correct standard for assessing a claim of unconstitutional government intrusion under section 23 is the compelling state interest test established in Winfield, 443 So.2d at 74 . | 2 | 1988–1993 |
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences1978First, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), and then in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 , 96 S.Ct. 1154 , 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976), the Court limited its earlier decisions of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), on which we had relied in Hall . [5] These decisions collectively stand for the application of a compelling state interest analysis only when a durational residency requirement is involve 1978First, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), and then in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 , 96 S.Ct. 1154 , 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976), the Court limited its earlier decisions of Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), on which we had relied in Hall . [5] These decisions collectively stand for the application of a compelling state interest analysis only when a durational residency requirement is involve | 2 | 1978–1980 |
GEORGE GOMILLION v. STATE OF FLORIDA
green
1 sentence2020Gomillion, 267 So. 3d at 506 ; Guardado v. State, 61 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1989) (involving law enforcement’s use of a pen register device on telephone lines and finding “a legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation satisfies the compelling state interest test when it demonstrates a clear connection between the illegal activity and the person whose privacy would be invaded.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Guardado v. State
green
1 sentence2020Gomillion, 267 So. 3d at 506 ; Guardado v. State, 61 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1989) (involving law enforcement’s use of a pen register device on telephone lines and finding “a legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation satisfies the compelling state interest test when it demonstrates a clear connection between the illegal activity and the person whose privacy would be invaded.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Mobile v. Bolden
green
2 sentences2013It is well settled that “a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.” City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 , 100 S.Ct. 1490 , 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). 2013It is well settled that “a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.” City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 , 100 S.Ct. 1490 , 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Warner v. City of Boca Raton
green
2 sentences2006Second, under the FRFRA, the definition of protected "exercise of religion" subject to the compelling state interest test includes any act or refusal to act whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief. 887 So.2d at 1032 . 2006Thus, the FRFRA "protects more conduct than conduct that is central to a litigant's religious practices." Id. at 1025 n. 1. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith
red
2 sentences2004The legislative history of the FRFRA suggests that in order to state a claim that the government has infringed upon the free exercise of religion, a plaintiff must only establish that the government has placed a substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief. [7] Thus, the FRFRA is necessarily broader than United States Supreme Court precedent, which holds that the "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that hi 2004The legislative history of the FRFRA suggests that in order to state a claim that the government has infringed upon the free exercise of religion, a plaintiff must only establish that the government has placed a substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief. [7] Thus, the FRFRA is necessarily broader than United States Supreme Court precedent, which holds that the "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that hi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Calandra green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Salas v. Casellas green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Fadjo v. Coon green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Shapiro v. Thompson green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Dunn v. Blumstein green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.