compelling state interest test in Michigan

2008Pursuant to McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131, 143 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999), and Reid v Kenowa Hills Pub Schools, 261 Mich App 17, 27 ; 680 NW2d 62 (2004), we apply the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) to challenges under the free exercise language in Const 1963, art 1, § 4, regardless of whether the statute at issue is generally applicable and religion-neutral, which is the case here. 5 In McCready, supra at 143-144, the Court stated: *315 Next, we turn to defendants’ claim that the act violates their religious freedom under art 1, § 4 of the

2004Because the regulations set forth by the MHSAA constitute state action, we analyze plaintiffs’ claim that the statute violates their religious freedom under Const 1963, art 1, § 4 using the compelling state interest test set forth in McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999): The test has five elements: (1) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is sincerely held; (2) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is religious in nature; (3) whether a state regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of su

2004Because the regulations set forth by the MHSAA constitute state action, we analyze plaintiffs’ claim that the statute violates their religious freedom under Const 1963, art 1, § 4 using the compelling state interest test set forth in McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999): The test has five elements: (1) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is sincerely held; (2) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is religious in nature; (3) whether a state regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of su

2004Because the regulations set forth by the MHSAA constitute state action, we analyze plaintiffs’ claim that the statute violates their religious freedom under Const 1963, art 1, § 4 using the compelling state interest test set forth in McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999): The test has five elements: (1) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is sincerely held; (2) whether a defendant’s belief, or conduct motivated by belief, is religious in nature; (3) whether a state regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of su

2013In Maldonado v Houstoun, 177 FRD 311, 331 (ED Pa, 1997), citing Mem Hosp v Maricopa Co, 415 US 250, 256-257 ; 94 S Ct 1076 ; 39 L Ed 2d 306 (1974), the court rejected a durational residency requirement that deprived persons of some but not all welfare benefits, noting that the Supreme Court has never made clear the “amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state interest test. . . .” Even an unjustified minor impingement on a constitutional right is abhorrent to the law.

2013In Maldonado v Houstoun, 177 FRD 311, 331 (ED Pa, 1997), citing Mem Hosp v Maricopa Co, 415 US 250, 256-257 ; 94 S Ct 1076 ; 39 L Ed 2d 306 (1974), the court rejected a durational residency requirement that deprived persons of some but not all welfare benefits, noting that the Supreme Court has never made clear the “amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state interest test. . . .” Even an unjustified minor impingement on a constitutional right is abhorrent to the law.

2008The Michigan Supreme Court in Donkers v Kovach, 481 Mich 897 (2008), recently voted to deny an application for leave to appeal in a case involving witness oaths, and three members of the Court who dissented from the order voiced their concerns that post-Smith cases, specifically McCready and Reid , applied strict scrutiny under the compelling state interest test to religious freedom challenges under Const 1963, art 1, § 4, relative to religion-neutral laws that were generally applicable, yet failed to explain the basis for imposing a greater burden.

2008Pursuant to McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131, 143 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999), and Reid v Kenowa Hills Pub Schools, 261 Mich App 17, 27 ; 680 NW2d 62 (2004), we apply the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) to challenges under the free exercise language in Const 1963, art 1, § 4, regardless of whether the statute at issue is generally applicable and religion-neutral, which is the case here. 5 In McCready, supra at 143-144, the Court stated: *315 Next, we turn to defendants’ claim that the act violates their religious freedom under art 1, § 4 of the

2008Pursuant to McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131, 143 ; 586 NW2d 723 (1998), vacated in part 459 Mich 1235 (1999), and Reid v Kenowa Hills Pub Schools, 261 Mich App 17, 27 ; 680 NW2d 62 (2004), we apply the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) to challenges under the free exercise language in Const 1963, art 1, § 4, regardless of whether the statute at issue is generally applicable and religion-neutral, which is the case here. 5 In McCready, supra at 143-144, the Court stated: *315 Next, we turn to defendants’ claim that the act violates their religious freedom under art 1, § 4 of the

2008If that were the case, *323 the test would essentially be rendered meaningless and would rarely, if ever, be satisfied, given that, as stated by the Supreme Court in People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 282 ; 501 NW2d 127 (1993), the “major benefactors [of free exercise rights] are religious minorities or dissidents whose beliefs and worship are suppressed or shunned by the majority.” (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, granting the requested religious accommodation and otherwise allowingreligious exemptions would compromise the government’s ability to administer the support enforcement p

2008If that were the case, *323 the test would essentially be rendered meaningless and would rarely, if ever, be satisfied, given that, as stated by the Supreme Court in People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 282 ; 501 NW2d 127 (1993), the “major benefactors [of free exercise rights] are religious minorities or dissidents whose beliefs and worship are suppressed or shunned by the majority.” (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, granting the requested religious accommodation and otherwise allowingreligious exemptions would compromise the government’s ability to administer the support enforcement p

1982American Party of Texas v White, 415 US 767, 781 ; 94 S Ct 1296 ; 39 L Ed 2d 744 (1974).

1982American Party of Texas v White, 415 US 767, 781 ; 94 S Ct 1296 ; 39 L Ed 2d 744 (1974).

1978Citing Bullock, supra, and Dunn, supra, the Alexander court applied the compelling state interest test and concluded, as in Green, supra, that the city’s interest in guaranteeing knowledgeable candidates did not justify the durational residence rule: "Even assuming that the interests asserted by the City qualify as 'compelling,’ the residency requirement in this case must fail.