compelling state interest test in Alaska

1979When we applied the strict scrutiny tier of equal protection judicial review in State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), the state’s interests in upgrading Alaska’s human resources, in reducing the level of unemployment within the state and in relieving the burden imposed by unemployment on the public purse were found not to be related sufficiently to the means selected for accomplishing the objec-fives (/. e., discrimination against new residents in hiring) to satisfy the compelling state interest standard of review.

1979See also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding on rational basis grounds Minnesota's one-year durational residency requirement for reduced tuition at the state university). [8] When we applied the strict scrutiny tier of equal protection judicial review in State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), the state's interests in upgrading Alaska's human resources, in reducing the level of unemployment within the state and in relieving the burden imposed by unemployment on the public purse were found not to be rel

1980The relationship between this mineral reserve factor and the longevity of the earnings distribution program is further attenuated by two factors: first, the cessation of mineral income flowing into the fund will affect only its growth, not its income-generating capacity; and second, any cessation of the distribution program itself would be a difficult political decision- i.e., the trade-off between the program and other governmental services will have to be assessed, which is the primary reason for the earnings distribution system's original enactment. [27] "In Dunn v. Blumstein , the Court fo

1980The relationship between this mineral reserve factor and the longevity of the earnings distribution program is further attenuated by two factors: first, the cessation of mineral income flowing into the fund will affect only its growth, not its income-generating capacity; and second, any cessation of the distribution program itself would be a difficult political decision- i.e., the trade-off between the program and other governmental services will have to be assessed, which is the primary reason for the earnings distribution system's original enactment. [27] "In Dunn v. Blumstein , the Court fo

1978In choosing to apply the foregoing equal protection test, I would take this occasion to reiterate this court's holding in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976). [12] There we said, in part: Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' It is this more flexible and more demanding standard which will be

1978In choosing to apply the foregoing equal protection test, I would take this occasion to reiterate this court’s holding in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976). 12 There we said, in part: Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ It is this more flexible and more demanding standard which will be ap

1997Erickson, 574 P.2d at 22, n. 144 . 18 .

1988Erickson, 574 P.2d at 12 .

1990Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972) ("Once a fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska has been shown to be involved and it has been further shown that this constitutionally protected right has been impaired by governmental action, then the government must come forward and meet its substantial burden of establishing that the abridgment in question was justified by a compelling governmental interest.").

1975Reels, 413 U.S. 123 , 93 S.Ct. 2665 , 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). [10] On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 703 (1973). [11] Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974). [12] See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 , 80 S.Ct. 412 , 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). [13] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). [14] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 (Alaska 1975). [15] Where a fundamental right has required use of the compell

2021Here, the purpose of the orders at issue was to authorize “immediate delivery” of respondents to an evaluation 50 In re Hospitalization of Gabriel C., 324 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2014). 51 AS 47.30.705-.730. 52 AS 47.30.715-.725. 53 AS 47.30.655(3). 54 AS 47.30.730-.740. 55 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)) (internal citations omitted). -17- 7525 facility for a 72-hour evaluation.

2021Here, the purpose of the orders at issue was to authorize “immediate delivery” of respondents to an evaluation 50 In re Hospitalization of Gabriel C., 324 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2014). 51 AS 47.30.705-.730. 52 AS 47.30.715-.725. 53 AS 47.30.655(3). 54 AS 47.30.730-.740. 55 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)) (internal citations omitted). -17- 7525 facility for a 72-hour evaluation.

2021Here, the purpose of the orders at issue was to authorize “immediate delivery” of respondents to an evaluation 50 In re Hospitalization of Gabriel C., 324 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2014). 51 AS 47.30.705-.730. 52 AS 47.30.715-.725. 53 AS 47.30.655(3). 54 AS 47.30.730-.740. 55 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)) (internal citations omitted). -17- 7525 facility for a 72-hour evaluation.

2001Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975).

2001Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev‘d on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev‘d on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1984State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 147 (Alaska 1973); see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518 , 98 S.Ct. 2482 , 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).

1980The relationship between this mineral reserve factor and the longevity of the earnings distribution program is further attenuated by two factors: first, the cessation of mineral income flowing into the fund will affect only its growth, not its income-generating capacity; and second, any cessation of the distribution program itself would be a difficult political decision- i.e., the trade-off between the program and other governmental services will have to be assessed, which is the primary reason for the earnings distribution system's original enactment. [27] "In Dunn v. Blumstein , the Court fo

1980The relationship between this mineral reserve factor and the longevity of the earnings distribution program is further attenuated by two factors: first, the cessation of mineral income flowing into the fund will affect only its growth, not its income-generating capacity; and second, any cessation of the distribution program itself would be a difficult political decision- i.e., the trade-off between the program and other governmental services will have to be assessed, which is the primary reason for the earnings distribution system's original enactment. [27] "In Dunn v. Blumstein , the Court fo

1979See also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding on rational basis grounds Minnesota's one-year durational residency requirement for reduced tuition at the state university). [8] When we applied the strict scrutiny tier of equal protection judicial review in State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), the state's interests in upgrading Alaska's human resources, in reducing the level of unemployment within the state and in relieving the burden imposed by unemployment on the public purse were found not to be rel

1979See also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding on rational basis grounds Minnesota's one-year durational residency requirement for reduced tuition at the state university). [8] When we applied the strict scrutiny tier of equal protection judicial review in State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), the state's interests in upgrading Alaska's human resources, in reducing the level of unemployment within the state and in relieving the burden imposed by unemployment on the public purse were found not to be rel

1979See also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding on rational basis grounds Minnesota's one-year durational residency requirement for reduced tuition at the state university). [8] When we applied the strict scrutiny tier of equal protection judicial review in State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973), the state's interests in upgrading Alaska's human resources, in reducing the level of unemployment within the state and in relieving the burden imposed by unemployment on the public purse were found not to be rel

1975Reels, 413 U.S. 123 , 93 S.Ct. 2665 , 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). [10] On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 703 (1973). [11] Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974). [12] See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 , 80 S.Ct. 412 , 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). [13] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). [14] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 (Alaska 1975). [15] Where a fundamental right has required use of the compell

1975Reels, 413 U.S. 123 , 93 S.Ct. 2665 , 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). [10] On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 703 (1973). [11] Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974). [12] See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 , 80 S.Ct. 412 , 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). [13] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). [14] Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 (Alaska 1975). [15] Where a fundamental right has required use of the compell

1973Thus we hold that, although the state has no duty to provide public employment, the state may not restrict the opportunity for such employment by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. 7 As Justice Tobriner said, speaking for the Supreme Court of California in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal.2d 566 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 456 P.2d 645, 657 (1969), “we may no longer question that state regulation of public employment must accord with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Appellants alternatively seek to avoid the application of the compelling state interest test by arguing that the durat

1973Thus we hold that, although the state has no duty to provide public employment, the state may not restrict the opportunity for such employment by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. 7 As Justice Tobriner said, speaking for the Supreme Court of California in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal.2d 566 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 456 P.2d 645, 657 (1969), “we may no longer question that state regulation of public employment must accord with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Appellants alternatively seek to avoid the application of the compelling state interest test by arguing that the durat