8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. O'SEAROgreen2 sentences2025Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; citation modified); see also Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (“Malice is a legal term” that encompasses “not only a particular -7- J-S40042-25 ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.” (citation omitted)); Newton, 318 A.3d at 139 (“The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since 2024The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since “one does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body unless he intends to kill.” Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (Pa. 1976). | 5 | 5 |
Macklin v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia Countygreen2 sentences2025Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; citation modified); see also Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (“Malice is a legal term” that encompasses “not only a particular -7- J-S40042-25 ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.” (citation omitted)); Newton, 318 A.3d at 139 (“The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since 2024Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (Pa. 1976) (stating the deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact “founded on human experience,” since “[o]ne does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body unless he intends to kill.” (citation omitted)). - 14 - J-S41009-24 Our Supreme Court has held the period of reflection required … to establish the specific intent to kill may be very brief[. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kluskagreen2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa. 1939). 2024Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa. 1939). | 2 | 2 |
Com. v. Newton, I.green2 sentences2025“The deadly weapon presumption is -7- J-S47032-24 a presumption of fact founded on human experience, [as] one does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body unless he intends to kill.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2025Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; citation modified); see also Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (“Malice is a legal term” that encompasses “not only a particular -7- J-S40042-25 ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.” (citation omitted)); Newton, 318 A.3d at 139 (“The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Packergreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; citation modified); see also Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (“Malice is a legal term” that encompasses “not only a particular -7- J-S40042-25 ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.” (citation omitted)); Newton, 318 A.3d at 139 (“The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Talbertgreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added; citation modified); see also Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (“Malice is a legal term” that encompasses “not only a particular -7- J-S40042-25 ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured.” (citation omitted)); Newton, 318 A.3d at 139 (“The deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience, since | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Fitzpatrick, J., IIIgreen1 sentence2025Regarding the specific intent to kill, we have observed that “murder may be committed without a motive, either actual or apparent, but an established motive may go to prove the related intent[,] just as an absence of motive may be used to deny the existence of intent.” Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hicks, C., Aplt.green1 sentence2024Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1124 (Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (Pa. 1976) (stating the deadly weapon presumption is a presumption of fact “founded on human experience,” since “[o]ne does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body unless he intends to kill.” (citation omitted)). [T]he period of reflection required … to establish the specific intent to kill may be very brief[. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rivenbark v. COM. PA. BD. OF PROB. & P.
green
2 sentences1987Petitioner contends that the Board erred as a matter of law in determining that the sock was a weapon, or, in the alternative, that, even if the sock was a weapon, the Board had no authority to recommit him as a technical parole violator for possession of the weapon in light of our Supreme Courts decision in Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 (1985). 1987Petitioner contends that the Board erred as a matter of law in determining that the sock was a weapon, or, in the alternative, that, even if the sock was a weapon, the Board had no authority to recommit him as a technical parole violator for possession of the weapon in light of our Supreme Courts decision in Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 (1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.